Problems of Communism

Book Reviews
Michael J. Sodaro
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JULY-AUGUST 1979

The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy
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Afghanistan Under the Khalq
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THE GENERATION GAP AND THE BREZHNEV SUCCESSION
Jerry F. Hough

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Cover: Members of the senior generation of the Soviet leadership seen atop Lenin's tomb during the May Day 1979 parade: from the left, party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Premier A. N. Kosygin, and party secretaries M. A Suslov and A. P. Kirilenko. Photo by Boccon-Gibod of Sipa/Black Star.

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The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession

by Jerry F. Hough

The rate of personnel change at the top of the Soviet political structure has been remarkably sluggish during the Brezhnev era. As of the spring of 1979, only 12 of the 58 ministers and deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers in 1966 had retired or been removed—despite the fact that the survivors averaged 70 years of age. Similarly, only 6 of the 23 Central Committee secretaries and department heads named after the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966 had retired or been shifted to a lesser post in the 13-year period. In addition, almost as much turnover during this period had resulted from deaths, for 14 of the government officials and 2 of the Central Committee secretaries and department heads had died in office. Within the Politburo itself, there were no removals from voting membership between 1966 and 1972, and the more rapid turnover after the latter date brought no rejuvenation. The average age of the Politburo voting member was 62 in 1972 and 69 in 1979.

One of the most crucial questions in Soviet studies today is the explanation for this fascinating phenomenon. Has the subordination of the national leader to a "parliament" (the Central Committee) composed of appointed bureaucrats produced a system of virtual life peerage for those bureaucrats? Or does the Soviet Union simply have a leader who is incapable of firing anyone or who has decided to keep himself surrounded with people with whom he feels comfortable as he ages? Or are there perhaps still other explanations? At a time when the health of the leader appears shaky, the answers to these questions are crucial to informed appraisals of the USSR's likely future course.

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The Case for Petrification

In attempting to assess whether the confluence of the recent low rate of personnel turnover and a succession in the USSR foreshadow irremediable torpor for the Soviet system, it is important to bear in mind one point. A judgment that the Soviet system has petrified amounts to a prediction that the leadership cannot or will not cope with problems that continually arise in any political system, and such predictions have been wrong in the past. After Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, for example, a number of observers argued that a process of petrification had set in.[1] Yet today we can see that the post-Khrushchev leadership in its 15-year tenure has been able to bring about economic growth, a rise in living standards, and an increase in national power while still maintaining political stability. Therefore, although we can at present detect major problems in the USSR, only determinists—and then only those among them who are foolhardy enough to think that they have complete knowledge—will venture confident predictions about which choices the Soviet Union will make among the various options confronting it. Even if we could accurately gauge the probability of various decisions (and we really cannot), everyone knows that the low-probability numbers sometimes come up when the dice are rolled.

[1] Robert Conquest, "Immobilism and Decay," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1966, pp. 35-37; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Reflections on the Soviet System," ibid., May-June 1968, pp. 44-48.

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Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev with his aides during the June 1979 Soviet-US summit meeting in Vienna.

—Nogues-Bureau/SYGMA.

All this said, however, we should recognize that the Soviet system does, indeed, have a fundamental institutional problem. The leader is responsible to a body that he himself has major responsibility for choosing. Specifically, the Secretariat's responsibility for personnel selection and for the efficiency of the lower party apparatus has given the General Secretary a key role in picking the regional first secretaries, who in turn select the delegates to the party congress that elects the Central Committee to which the General Secretary is responsible. In the past, the incumbents of the General Secretary post (or its equivalent) have exploited this "circular flow of power" (to use Robert V. Daniels' phrase[2]) to build a political machine, stack the Central Committee with their supporters, and thus position themselves to dominate the Politburo, which is also responsible to the Central Committee.

The basic difficulty, however, is that, over time, others besides the General Secretary can foresee the probable outcome of the circular flow of power. True, the nature of the political mechanisms may well have been totally obscure to Yosif Stalin's opponents until it was too late, and by the time the succession of Nikita Khrushchev took place 30 years later, many may actually have come to view Stalin's victory as a natural triumph of the Central Committee over the various wrong-headed oppositions. But the Khrushchev example must have driven home the point that a rather ordinary politician could emancipate himself from most collective control and carry out a series of "voluntaristic" policies that the Central Committee did not like. Moreover, the bloodless purge of most of the regional first secretaries in 1960-61 provided a reminder that even those who had been the leader's instruments in his rise to power could not count on personal job security.

When the workings of the circular flow of power are widely understood at the top of the political system, the consequence may be a low rate of turnover in the upper echelons of the political system. The case for the intrinsic petrification of the Soviet political system in its selection of leading personnel rests on the assumption that this causal linkage has occurred. According to the argument, the Central Committee has been able to impose some type of restriction on the ability of the General Secretary to remove officials who sit on the Central Committee. Such a restriction, however, clearly cannot have been absolute. Only 1 of those 14 members of the 1961 Central Committee who worked in the Komsomol between 1948 and 1958 was reelected to the Central Committee in 1976, and the fact that Aleksandr Shelepin, a former Leonid Brezhnev rival who lost his seat on the Politburo in 1975, played a key role in the Komsomol in 1948-58 must be the major explanation.[3] Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that the Central Committee deliber-

[2] Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin,* New York, NY, Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1971, p. 20.

[3] By comparison, 27 of the 33 living members of the 1961 Central Committee who had worked in the Dnepropetrovsk, Belorussia, or Leningrad party organizations or who were top foreign policy officials in Moscow were reelected to the 1976 Central Committee. It surely is not a coincidence that these were the bailiwicks of Politburo members Leonid Brezhnev, Kirill Mazurov, Aleksey Kosygin, and Mikhail Suslov respectively. It is also highly revealing that 14 of the 18 living 1961 Central Committee members who had worked in the Komsomol sometime between 1937 and 1947 but not later were also reelected in 1976. The difference between their fortunes and those of their younger colleagues must therefore reflect a lack of political ties with Shelepin. See the discussion in Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 537-40.

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ately chose as leader a man known to be cautious and accommodating and that leading oligarchs warned him that he would be removed if he initiated a general policy of high personnel turnover. Under such circumstances, the General Secretary himself may have felt that his wisest strategy for survival was to make Central Committee members feel secure in their positions, so that they would have a personal reason to fear the selection of a new leader.

If these were indeed the calculations in 1964, one could easily contend that they represented the rational ones for each of the decision-makers from his individual point of view and that for this reason they will continue to prevail in the future.[4] An aging Central Committee will again choose a broker politican as General Secretary—probably one of those over 70 who might fear younger subordinates himself. The General Secretary will again avoid a shakeup as his best strategy of survival. In short, while the circular flow of power when understood by the General Secretary alone resulted in enormous freedom of action for the leader, it perhaps leads inexorably to a modern kind of feudalism when understood by the elite as a whole.

Bases for Doubts

Yet, such an argument creates feelings of uneasiness. First and foremost, it bears too much similarity to analyses that caused specialists on the Soviet Union to make fundamental errors of prediction at the times of previous successions. In the 1920's, most observers were convinced that the New Economic Policy (NEP) was the first step toward a convergence of communism and capitalism. In 1953, the typical prediction was that the kind of totalitarianism that had characterized the last years of Stalin's rule would persist or even intensify. During the first half of the 1960's, a flood of articles treated the essence of the Soviet Union as an activist ideological system, featuring totalitarianism without terror.[5]

In all these cases, analysts were looking at policies and practices that in retrospect were the products of an individual leader and a particular time, and they were assuming that these were an inherent and continuing part of the system. And, today, other analysts assert that a personnel policy found only in the Brezhnev period has become fundamental to the system itself. Perhaps the judgment will be correct this time, but, to repeat, the precedents of the past create feelings of uneasiness.

Second, as one begins exploring the biographies of the top Soviet elite, one discovers potentially significant anomalies in age distribution. In comparative terms, the top central officials on the CPSU Central Committee are quite old. The ministers, for example, averaged 64 years of age in 1976, with 87 percent of them being born before 1920. By contrast, the 185 party and government leaders of union republic and

A. N. Shelepin, whose removal from the party's Politburo in April 1975 dimmed the political prospects of those associated with him.

—EUPRA.

[4] See, for example, Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1979, pp. 29-42.

[5] See, for instance, the views cited in "Russia's New Chief Abandons the World Revolution," and "Trotzky: The Victim of His Own Revolution," *Literary Digest* (New York, NY), Oct. 30, 1926, pp. 8-9, and Jan. 28, 1928, p. 10, respectively; Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1956, pp. 293-303; Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism without Terror," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1964, pp. 558-75.

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Figure 1. Age Distribution of Union Republic and Regional Officials on the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, 1976

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: This age breakdown covers party secretaries of union republics, autonomous republics, oblasts, krays, and key cities, as well as officials of union republic councils of ministers and chairmen of the executive committees of certain oblast-level soviets. They total 185. Their years of birth were established from *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii 1977* (1977 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1978.

regional bodies who were elected to the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission in 1976 were 55 years old on the average. Moreover, a graph plotting the latter group's years of birth yields a startling pattern. Such a graph should normally produce a bell-shaped curve peaking in 1921, but in reality a trough, not a peak, exists around 1921 (see Figure 1).

Evidence of a major underrepresentation of officials born between approximately 1918 and 1926 also turns up in a comparison of the new first secretaries of oblast and kray party committees (*obkom* and *kraykom*) in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) who have been selected in the last decade and their immediate predecessors. The average year of birth of the new men has been 1926, while that of their predecessors was 1913. With the average year of birth of these two groups combined being 1920, one would normally expect the largest number of the men in them to have been born around that time. In fact, 27 of these secretaries were born between 1909 and 1916, only 14 between 1917 and 1924, and 27 between 1925 and 1932. As Table 1 indicates, the state governors elected in the United States over the same decade were born, on the average, only four years later than their immediate predecessors, yet the years of birth of the combined groups of governors distribute themselves in a normal pattern. These differences between the two countries suggest

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a real tendency for the jumping of a "generation" in the Soviet Union in the replacement process.

This general pattern of age distribution among top regional officials in the USSR scarcely seems to be a chance phenomenon. Persons born in the eight years after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were in their late teens and early 20's during World War II—i.e, in the age groups most critically affected by the war. Not only did this group suffer a very high proportion of the extraordinary number of wartime deaths, but the chances of those who survived to obtain a college education were seriously disrupted. Persons born after 1926, on the other hand, spent World War II in secondary school, avoided military service in the war, and received their college educations in the immediate postwar period when admission standards and programs became quite rigorous.

A question thus emerges: is it possible that one of the key explanations for the slow turnover of personnel in the top positions in Moscow lies in the shortage of suitable candidates, or at least in leadership doubt about the capacities of those who were in their 50's in the 1970's and the logical candidates for promotion? If so, this is a fact of major interest, for the situation with respect to the logical candidates is on the brink of radical change. The men who are now entering their 50's come from the large and well-educated group born in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Will we soon be seeing the same jumping of generations in the selection of top central officials that has been observable among the regional first secretaries in the last decade?

The Generational Factor

Whatever the answer to this specific question, it is clear that the generational factor should always be kept in mind when we assess Soviet developments in the past and near future. The drastic policy changes of the 1920's, the 1930's, and 1940's meant that the opportunities and life experiences of the Soviet young people of the time varied enormously with a few years' difference in the years of their birth. These differences have had powerful echo effects on the Soviet political and administrative elite as the various groups of young people have aged and risen through the bureaucratic hierarchies.

There are four Soviet political-administrative generations (really cohorts), born between 1900 and 1930, that are important from our point of view. The first generation—the Brezhnev generation—was born between 1900 and 1909. This was the age group that benefited enormously from the purge of 1937–38. The USSR people's commissars (ministers) of early 1937 had been born, on the average, in about 1889, and the first secretaries of the party committees of oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics, in 1892.[6] In general, those officials who had been born before 1900 had had a chance to rise to levels by 1937 where they found themselves in danger, while those who had been born after 1909 were too young to rise precipitously during the purge. However, the men born in the magic years often experienced incredible promotions in the late 1930's. Aleksey Kosygin became Commissar of Light Industry at the age of 35; Andrey Gromyko headed the American desk of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at 30; Mikhail Suslov was first secretary of the Stavropol' kray party committee at 37; Nikolay Patolichev was named first secretary of the Yaroslavl' oblast party committee at 31. These are but a small sample of the many instances of a "thrusting up" of a generation.

Although many of those of the Brezhnev generation who dominated the lower party organs and soviets in rural areas for years had little higher education, those who held important posts in the ministries, industrial

Table 1. Years of Birth of New RSFSR Regional First Secretaries and US State Governors, and of Their Immediate Predecessors, 1969–79

Year of birth	RSFSR *obkom* and *kraykom* first secretaries	Governors of US states
1901–08	0	1
1909–16	27	18
1917–24	14	35
1925–32	27	28
1933–40	0	15
1941–48	0	1

SOURCES: On the RSFSR, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet) for the 7th, 8th, and 9th convocations of the Supreme Soviet, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1966, 1970, and 1974; and the 1966, 1972, and 1977 editions of *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsipklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya."

On the USA: *Information Please Almanac, 1979*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1978, p. 702; *Congress and the Nation*, Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1977, Vol. IV (1973–76), pp. 39–45; and various editions of *Who's Who in America*, Chicago, IL, Marquis Who's Who, Inc.

[6] These figures are based on an incomplete list of the officials, especially in the case of the oblast, kray, and autonomous republic officials. However, the third edition of the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1970-79, carries a very large number of biographies of purge victims, and many of the officials of the 1930's are among them.

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administration, and major urban party work normally were college graduates—but usually graduates of a special type. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, the regime had conducted a massive affirmative action program to send young workers and low-level political officials to engineering institutes,[7] and the Brezhnev generation of politicians and administrators—especially those who survived politically into the 1960's—had entered college during this period when they were already adults. Since few of these *vydvyzhentsy* (the promoted ones) lost their lives during the purge,[8] they dominated the Soviet urban administrative scene for several decades.

The 1910–18 generation of politicians and administrators was more mixed in character. Its oldest members had an opportunity to rise rapidly during the purge if they had graduated from college at an early age, while the youngest barely had a chance to graduate from college before the outbreak of the war. Indeed, many of the latter had not completed their education by 1941, and essentially were thrust upward during the war. It is symptomatic that five of the Politburo members of the Brezhnev era who came

[7] For a comprehensive discussion of this program, the politics that led to it, and its consequences, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934,* London, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[8] See the calculation in Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite," *The Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), September 1979.

Flashbacks in the careers of two Soviet Politburo members; at the left, Premier A. N. Kosygin in the 1930's, when he was Commissar of Light Industry; at the right, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko in 1947, when he was a deputy minister.

—Sovfoto.

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The second generation in today's Soviet leadership: from the left, Yu. V. Andropov, Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR Council of Ministers; K. U. Chernenko, a CPSU Central Committee Secretary; and V. V. Grishin, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. All are full members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

—Boccon-Gibod-Sipa/Black Star, Sven Simon/Katherine Young, and TASS from Sovfoto.

from this generation—Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, Viktor Grishin, Kirill Mazurov, and the late Fëdor Kulakov—never completed a meaningful college education.

Nevertheless, the 1910–18 generation on the whole had a different set of opportunities than its older counterpart. The affirmative action program of the First Five-Year Plan period was basically ended in 1932 as part of what Nicholas Timasheff called the Great Retreat.[9] Engineering degrees could still be obtained in five years in evening school, especially by those already working in industry, but the standards of admission were substantially tightened for entry into full-time day college.

In practice, men of the 1910–18 generation who entered college in the 1930's usually did so within a few years of graduation from secondary school. Thus, in an elite sample of 966 top officials in the center and in the RSFSR oblasts and krays, those born in 1906, 1907, and 1908 had graduated at the average age of 27, while whose born in 1912, 1913, and 1914 had graduated at the average age of 24.[10] A substantially larger percentage of the 1910–18 generation came from white-collar families and a smaller percentage from workers' homes than was the case with the Brezhnev generation.[11]

There were other differences as well. The great majority of the Brezhnev generation had joined the party before they entered college, but admission into

[9] Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat*, New York, NY, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1946.

[10] The sample (which will be referred to a number of times in this article) includes USSR ministers, USSR deputy ministers, first and second secretaries of RSFSR oblast and kray party committees *(obkom* and *kraykom)*, chairmen of executive committees of oblast and kray soviets *(oblispolkom* and *krayispolkom)* in the RSFSR, and those first secretaries of city party committees of oblast and kray capitals whose biographies have been located. It does not cover officials of the autonomous republics or autonomous oblasts of the RSFSR. The figure on average age of graduation refers only to those who graduated in the 1930's and excludes those who got a degree (almost always from the Higher Party School) after the war. Biographies of persons in the sample were compiled from a variety of sources, but primarily oblast and kray newspapers.

[11] Judging by the biographical data on the elite sample, it would appear that 45 percent of the officials born from 1900 to 1909 were from worker families; 41 percent, from peasant backgrounds; and 14 percent, from white-collar ones. Only 26 percent of those born from 1910 to 1918 came from worker familes, as compared with 39 percent from peasant families and 35 percent from white-collar families. While there are problems in Soviet references to social origin, the irregularities should be fairly consistent.

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Table 2. Projected and Actual Soviet Population in 1960, by Year of Birth and Sex

Year of birth	Projected population[a]	Actual population[b]	Actual shortfall (-) or surplus (+)[c]
	MALE		
1905–09	5,570,000	4,149,000	-1,421,000
1910–14	7,040,000	4,799,000	-2,241,000
1915–19	6,490,000	3,753,000	-2,737,000
1920–24	7,440,000	5,098,000	-2,342,000
1925–29	9,730,000	9,278,000	- 452,000
1930–34	8,210,000	8,535,000	+ 325,000
	FEMALE		
1905–09	6,300,000	6,573,000	+ 273,000
1910–14	7,620,000	7,725,000	+ 105,000
1915–19	6,530,000	6,019,000	– 511,000
1920–24	7,630,000	7,776,000	+ 146,000
1925–29	9,790,000	10,575,000	+ 785,000
1930–34	8,260,000	8,825,000	+ 565,000

[a]These projections, made in 1946, attempted to indicate what the Soviet population would have been in 1960 had there been no war. They are based *only* on Soviet territory as of January 1939, i.e., excluding the substantial territories incorporated into the Soviet Union after that date.

[b]These figures include the territory acquired after January 1939, but actually refer to 1959. The real 1960 figures would be marginally smaller because of deaths in the intervening year.

[c]The figures only indicate the pattern of age differences, for the population of the USSR of the larger post-1939 borders is being subtracted from the projected population of the smaller pre-1939 USSR.

SOURCES: For the projections, see Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, p. 255. On the actual population, see US Department of Commerce, *Estimates and Projections of the Population of the USSR, by Age and Sex: 1950 to 2000*, Series P–91, No. 23, Washington, DC, March 1973, p. 15.

the party was halted in late 1932 and not resumed until 1937. This hiatus meant that the younger generation normally joined the party only after graduating from college and embarking on a career. Therefore, political activity was far less a factor in college admission. Moreover, the education that the 1910–18 generation received was, on the average, almost surely of higher quality. The earlier affirmative action program had been accompanied by harassment of professors that ensured low enough standards for the "promoted ones" to graduate, while the Great Retreat brought a renewed emphasis upon tougher standards in grading as well as in admissions.

Those born between approximately 1919 and 1926 were the wartime generation. Although the war took a heavy toll among all persons in their 20's and 30's at the time, the carnage inflicted upon the men born in the first years of the Soviet regime was still awesome in its scale. Table 2 gives some indication of these human costs. However, it still considerably understates the situation, for the actual postwar population includes peoples incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939–45 and not taken into account in the original projections. Hence the real human costs of the war are understated by perhaps 800,000 to 1,000,000 persons in each category.

Of course, the survivors of the wartime generation still number in the millions, and they could easily fill all the elite positions in the Soviet Union. The major long-term problem for the generation as a whole was the disruption of its college education. Because of the number of wartime deaths and the enormity of the reconstruction task, the regime did not institute an educational program for veterans after the war, but encouraged them to return to the civilian economy. The difficulties for the survivors of the wartime generation were exacerbated by the regime's belief that technical education was the proper preparation for political and administrative careers. (Of those in the elite sample who had been born between 1906 and 1917 and had received a college education before the war, 70 percent were engineers, and 15 percent were agricultural specialists.) Men who had served years in the military had forgotten too much mathematics to compete with the teenagers who had spent the war in secondary school. In addition, those who did return to college often had had experience in command or political work during the war and consequently found themselves drawn into political work in college. Such activities reduced their time for studies.

The impact of the war is dramatically evident if one examines the years of birth of more than 2,000 persons who held different types of RSFSR oblast and kray jobs from 1965 to 1977 (see Figure 2). Only the distribution of officials engaged in ideological and organizational work forms a normal bell-shaped curve. For such posts, the regime has not demanded technical education, and during the Brezhnev era it has, in practice, tended to fill them with men who had served in the war, often as political workers, and who had picked up party or correspondence education after the war. (There have also, it should be noted, been many women in this group. The presence of men at the front gave young women of the wartime generation a special opportunity to enter civilian political work, and they gravitated toward educational and cultural administration.)

To a more limited extent, persons of an age to fight in World War II have moved into spheres of activity where the education needed was not highly technical and essentially could be provided by the institution of employment. The realm of law and order is a good case in point. (Parenthetically, it is worth noting that

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A Soviet generation tries to pick up the pieces after World War II: at the left, a demobilized Soviet sailor talks with an engineer in a factory where he has been assigned; at the right, only a handful of young men attend the first postwar lecture at Moscow State University, on September 1, 1945.

—Sovfoto and TASS from Sovfoto.

the general field of diplomacy, scholarship on international affairs, and journalism in its international dimension affords another illustration, though it does not fall within the framework of our immediate discussion. The disruption of social studies during the 1930's, the purges of the last half of the same decade, and then the cessation of almost all college education during the war left the Soviet Union with an enormous personnel shortage in this broad sphere of activity after the war, when the USSR's international role had increased greatly. Consequently, a special international relations institute was established in 1944 and soon subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. The first classes recruited, especially the famous graduating classes of 1948 and 1949, came overwhelmingly from war veterans.[12])

Where technical education has been required for officials, however, the representation of the wartime generation drops off remarkably, as Figure 2 shows. During the first part of the Brezhnev period, the engineering graduates of the 1930's constituted the bulk of the industry and transportation officials, and as these men have reached retirement age, they have been replaced largely by persons born after 1926 rather than those born in 1919–26. The relatively small number of persons who graduated from agricultural institutes during the 1930's has produced two missing generations in agriculture, and an overwhelming proportion of the personnel selected in this sphere have come from those born in the second half of the 1920's. With the exception of the secretary in charge of "ideological" questions, oblast and kray party secretaries in the RSFSR are drawn almost exclusively from graduates of engineering and agricultural institutes;[13] hence, the pattern of their years of birth conforms roughly to those of officials in industry and transportation and in agriculture.

The fourth generation of politicians and administrators—the postwar generation—consists of

[12] *Zhurnalist* (Moscow) has fairly frequently discussed the institute in these early years. See No. 3, 1967, pp. 16–17; No. 11, 1970, p. 62; No.12, 1974, p. 29; No. 6, 1976, p. 69.

[13] An oblast or kray party committee normally has five secretaries: a first secretary and four secretaries with specialized responsibilities. Previously, there was a secretary for agriculture, a secretary for industry, a secretary for ideological questions (including supervision of education, culture, and science), and a secretary for organizational questions (including supervision of personnel selection, the police, the trade unions, and so forth). In the RSFSR today, however, the responsibilities formerly assigned to the organizational secretary are usually divided among the others, and there are two "urban" secretaries to go with the secretary for agriculture and the secretary for ideological questions. The division of labor between the two urban secretaries varies. In some oblasts or krays, one concentrates on industry, and the other, on construction. In other oblasts or krays, one handles heavy industry and construction, and the other, light industry and trade. In still other oblasts or krays, one deals with more long-term development, while the other handles current questions. Additional patterns are possible as well.

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

Figure 2. Years of Birth of RSFSR Oblast and Kray Officials, 1965–77

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

[a] Including the first secretary, the agricultural secretary, and the two secretaries who divide responsibility for industry, construction, and urban affairs. In earlier years, one of the last two concentrated on organizational matters, but that situation has now changed in almost all oblasts and krays.

[b] Including the head of the administration of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the head of the internal affairs administration, and the procurator.

[c] Including directors of important plants, heads of the railroads and their divisions (*otdeleniya*, which tend to correspond to oblasts and krays), heads of ocean and river steamship lines, and (in 1965 alone) chairmen and deputy chairmen of regional economic councils.

[d] Including the *obkom* or *kraykom* secretary for ideological questions, the head of the department of organizational and party work of the *obkom* or *kraykom*, the deputy chairman for education and culture and the heads of the departments of culture and of education of the *oblispolkom* or *krayispolkom*, the chairman of the oblast or kray trade union council, the oblast or kray newspaper editor, and the chairman of the oblast or kray people's control committee.

[e] Including the *obkom* or *kraykom* secretary for agriculture, the deputy chairman for agriculture and the head of the agriculture administration of the *oblispolkom* or *krayispolkom*, and the chairman of the agricultural supply agency (*Sel'khoztekhnika*).

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The individuals included in this sample were identified, and their ages determined, from lists of deputies to the oblast and kray soviets in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, and 1977, as drawn from the provincial press. While this methodology does not provide complete coverage of the occupants of the enumerated posts, it does account for an estimated 90 percent of them. Any official who held one of the listed posts at any time during the 1965–77 period and was elected to the oblast or kray soviet in one of the biennial elections is included, but if an official held two posts during the period—e.g., moved from head of the agriculture administration to deputy chairman of the *oblispolkom*, or transferred from one oblast or kray to another (applicable only in the cases of KGB and procuracy officials), he is counted only once.

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Table 3. Top Soviet Officials with Completed Full-Time Higher Education, by Year of Birth

Year of birth	Percent in age group who completed full-time higher education
1913–16	73
1917–20	63
1921–25	51
1926–29	73
1930–37	93

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: These figures are derived from an elite sample of USSR ministers, USSR deputy ministers, first and second secretaries of the oblast and kray party committees of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the chairmen of executive committees of RSFSR oblast and kray soviets, and first secretaries of city party committees of RSFSR oblast and kray capitals whose biographies have been located. This sample encompasses 966 officials. Biographies of the persons in the sample were assembled from a number of sources, but primarily oblast and kray newspapers. If the available information did not include a specific date when a person obtained a college degree, he was excluded from the calculations.

those essentially too young to have had their college educations interrupted by the war. The boundary between the wartime and the postwar generations is fuzzy. A man born in 1924 or 1925 had not forgotten as much math in the war as one born in 1920, and he had not had the same chance to rise to the type of posts in the army that would qualify him for an immediate administrative or political appointment after the war. Moreover, a man who was seriously wounded early in the war could also return to college early and, in a real sense, be a member of the "postwar generation."[14] However, the postwar generation begins unequivocally with those born in 1927 and 1928.

The biographies of the officials of the postwar generation have a very distinctive, almost startling character for anyone who has collected Soviet biographies over the years. A substantial number of older officials had not graduated from a full-time college, and almost none had a classic pattern of graduation from secondary school, direct entry into a full-time college, and graduation in the normal five years.[15] Even children of white-collar parents who had virtually classic patterns often had become industrial workers for a year or two after high school in order to obtain proletarian status for the purpose of entering college. Officials of the postwar generation, in contrast, have few educational irregularities in their biographies.

Table 3, based upon the elite sample mentioned earlier of 966 top Soviet officials, gives some indication of the character of the education of the postwar generation. While the percentage of officials with a full, day-time education declines substantially for the age groups most affected by the war, it then rises sharply for younger groups. It should be pointed out, however, that the table presents a somewhat distorted picture of the level of education of Soviet officialdom as a whole. On one hand, the sample covers only the top elite, and the average amount of education of persons holding lower-ranking posts is not as great as those in the sample. On the other hand, the table does not take account of the increasing tendency of younger officials to obtain a second or a third degree, even including the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D.

Not only does a high percentage of the postwar generation boast a complete, day-time education, but those of its members who entered full-time college also usually did so immediately after high school, or perhaps with a year's hiatus preparing for entrance exams, or, in a few cases, after a stint in the military. Just a tiny percentage of the officials with a full-time degree in the elite sample are reported to have had a job before college. When there is an irregularity in the biography, it is sometimes more apparent than real. Thus, Soviet sources typically describe the new Central Committee secretary for agriculture, M.S. Gorbachëv, as having been an assistant to a combine operator on a farm before he entered Moscow University. Yet a local biography indicates that he did this work during the summer while he was going to secondary school.[16] Although the post-1926 generation continues to be drawn from a variety of class origins, the proportion with a white-collar background seems to be higher than in the past.[17]

Implications

To sum up the analysis thus far, then, the Soviet Union has in recent years had a Politburo dominated by a generation that benefited enormously from the purge and that has been near the top for 40 years. As this Politburo has decided on its personnel policy, it

[14] One such example is V.I. Dolgikh, the Central Committee secretary for industry, who was born in 1924. Demobilized from the army in 1943 because of wounds, he then entered an engineering institute.

[15] This generalization, it should be emphasized, refers only to those who became important officials. Leading scientists of the future often passed directly through secondary school and the university or institute.

[16] *Stavropol'skaya pravda* (Stavropol'), Feb. 6, 1979.

[17] In contrast to its treatment of officials in early years, the oblast and kray press fails to give the social origin of over one third of the officials of the postwar generation. When the social origin of these officials is available in other sources, it invariably proves to be white-collar.

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

A member of a fourth generation of Soviet leadership, M. S. Gorbachëv, CPSU Central Committee secretary for agriculture.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

has essentially been able to draw officials from three groups of individuals. One group, who received relatively good educations in the 1930's, have been in their 60's during the 1970's. The second group, poorly educated and relatively few in number as a result of World War II, have been in their 50's during the last decade. The third group, well educated and very numerous in comparative terms, have just been entering their early 50's.

The crucial question is: to what extent has the character—or at least the perceived character—of the wartime generation been a significant factor in the sluggishness in top-level personnel change in the 1970's? There is also an important corollary question. To what extent does the arrival of the postwar generation at an age where they could conceivably be considered for greater responsibilities increase the possibility of radical changes in the near future?

The age distribution of oblast and kray officials shown in Figure 2 suggests two things relevant to these questions. First, the generational factor obviously has been a powerful one at the local level. The age distribution of different types of officials varies in the way that one would predict from the kind of education that their posts usually require, and individual or idiosyncratic factors simply cannot explain the general patterns evident.

Second, there has been no inhibition, as Table 4 further substantiates, against moving members of the postwar generation into key posts at the local level. Except for a few categories of organizational and ideological officials (most notably, the chairmen of the people's control committees), normal rejuvenation has taken place at this level. True, the average age of these officials has increased somewhat during the Brezhnev period, and the rate of turnover among them has decreased. But these changes reflect the abnormality of the situation in the past more than in the present. The statistics on the average age of officials usually named to the bureaus of regional party committees look quite reasonable by Western standards.

The generational factor is a much less satisfactory explanation for the personnel situation at the central level than in the provinces. The number of posts to be filled is relatively small, and had Brezhnev been eager to select younger subordinates, he certainly could have found enough appropriate candidates. It is still possible that he and other Politburo members of his age have, in fact, felt that the younger candidates who survived the war were less qualified than those educated in the 1930's. If so, however, that perception must flow in large part from the fear of these Politburo members that they might be replaced and perhaps from their insecurity about their own educations. It cannot be a coincidence that the educational credentials of such a large proportion of the 1910–18 generation on the Politburo have been so dubious.

But the question of the future is a different matter. The argument that the next General Secretary will have the same set of assumptions as the present one is far from conclusive. Although he could decide that personnel stability is his best strategy of survival and/or that the Central Committee will enforce that strategy, the motivations and interests of the participants in the struggle for succession should not be oversimplified. The members of the Central Committee are, after all, the administrative elite of the Soviet Union, and if the elite becomes so encrusted that economic performance and modernization are jeopar-

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Table 4. Average Age of RSFSR Oblast and Kray Officials, 1950–77

First secretary, oblast or kray party committee (*obkom* or *kraykom*)	44	50	53	57
Second secretary, *obkom* or *kraykom*	—	—	48	50
Other secretaries, *obkom* or *kraykom*[a]	42	46	47	50
Head of department of organization and party work, *obkom* or *kraykom*[b]	42	44	46	47
Chairman, *oblispolkom* or *krayispolkom*	44	48	49	52
Head of oblast or kray organ of Committee for State Security (KGB)[b]	42	46	50	55
Chairman of oblast or kray trade union council	45	48	51	55
Editor of oblast or kray newspaper	43	47	50	55
Chairman of oblast or kray People's Control Committee[c]	—	—	49	57
First secretary, city party committee, oblast or kray capital	42	44	44	48

[a] In 1950 and 1961, the lists of deputies elected to the oblast and kray soviets usually did not specify which of the secretaries were second secretaries, and there was not sufficient time to survey the oblast and kray newspapers to ascertain this information. For 1950 and 1961, therefore, the second secretaries were lumped with the other secretaries in the calculations.

[b] Some institutions have changed their names over time. The department of organizational and party work previously was known as the department of party organs, while the Committee for State Security was the Ministry of State Security in 1950.

[c] The earlier forms of the present People's Control Committees did not have nearly the status of the current committees, and in practice their officials often were not elected deputies. Therefore, data on them for 1950 and 1961 have not been included here.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: The age data are drawn from lists of deputies elected to the oblast and kray soviets in the respective years, as published in oblast and kray newspapers. Data were found for 34 oblasts or krays in 1950, 41 oblasts or krays for 1961, and 50 oblasts or krays for 1966 and 1977. RSFSR autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts were excluded from the compilation.

dized, the General Secretary may face a threat in the streets that is more alarming than the possibility of revolt in the Central Committee. In 1966, the voting members of the Central Committee averaged 56 years of age and consisted in substantial part of men who had been promoted in the personnel shake-ups of 1960–61. The danger of a loss of administrative vigor was much less than it is today, when the officials among the voting members are 62 years old on the average and often have been in their present job for years.[18]

A new General Secretary may also have a very different problem than Brezhnev in making himself politically secure. We are familiar with the number of politicians who catch the "Presidential bug" in the United States, and at a time when there is no logical successor in the Soviet Union, quite a few men surely see themselves as the appropriate choice for General Secretary, either immediately or in the relatively short run. An open struggle—or even the General Secretary's fear of a prospective challenge—is likely to lead to efforts to remove Central Committee members who are considered potential supporters of the political opposition.

Finally, the next General Secretary may have policy goals and a desire to make a name for himself in the history books. While Brezhnev could look upon the introduction of an orderly system of decision-making and moderation in policy as real achievements, his successor will not be able to establish his indentity as a ruler—or maybe even his authority—by simply doing what Brezhnev has already done. The successor may feel the need to associate himself with a concrete program, even if it offends some members in the Central Committee and Politburo and requires the removal of a number of them.

In 1964, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington saw a close relationship between the policy process and the process of acquiring power. They argued:

Policies—foreign and domestic—are major weapons in the struggle for power within the system . . . . During a succession crisis, each leadership faction appeals for support to different institutional groups; each attempts to endow its policy with ideological legitimacy; and each strives to demonstrate the opponents' deviationism . . . . Competition for power in the Soviet Union tends to magnify policy differences between the contestants.[19]

Although this type of phenomenon was not very evident in the Brezhnev period, the reasons for the analysis have not vanished, and it may be far more important in the next succession.

[18] The Central Committee is a frequently changing body. Seventeen members have died since the 25th Party Congress in 1976, and nine candidates have been promoted to full membership. In addition, roughly 18 members have retired or been demoted to jobs that will likely lead to their removal from the Central Committee at the next party congress in 1982. The figure of 62 years of age factors out those who have died, retired, or suffered demotion, and it excludes the worker and peasant members. If the retired and demoted members are counted, the average age of the living officials among the full members would be 63.

[19] *Political Power USA/USSR*, New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1964, pp. 191–93.

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Should a new leader feel so inclined, the personnel stability of the Brezhnev period and the aging of the elite it has produced will give him ample excuse for action. If he does take action, then the generation gap that has been discussed in this article is likely to provide the occasion for a substantial reduction in the average age of such categories of officials as deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, ministers, and Central Committee secretaries and heads of departments.

What lends particular weight to these possibilities is that the next succession has every opportunity to be a troubled one. The choice of a successor will be made by institutions which may have sharply divergent views and interests in the realm of personnel selection. Excluding Brezhnev, 50 percent of the voting Politburo members will be 70 years of age or older in 1979, and another 33 percent will be between 65 and 70. Yet none has given any indication of a desire to retire. On the other hand, a gradual rejuvenation has taken place among the regional party first secretaries, who traditionally have been in a position to dominate the selection of delegates to the party congresses. If a party congress were held in mid-1979, only 27 percent of the delegates would be chosen from oblasts, krays, autonomous republics, and major cities (specifically Moscow and Kiev) whose first secretary was over 60 years old at the beginning of 1979. Approximately 18 percent of the delegates would be from areas where he was between 56 and 60, 28 percent from areas where he was 51 to 55, and 27 percent where he was 50 or under.[20] In short, although a majority of the Politburo members will almost surely be trying to hang on after Brezhnev's departure, many of the key regional first secretaries will be impatient for promotion and perhaps policy change as well.

Furthermore, there is no logical successor, for Brezhnev has studiously avoided letting one emerge. Hence, an "illogical" successor will have to be chosen—one who by all external appearances has some serious defect in his ability to establish his authority and govern effectively. A large number of possible scenarios can be imagined, some involving very little change. But to assume that it is the Soviet system that has petrified rather than simply an aging administration, to assume that the present stagnation inevitably will continue, ignores many forces that may upset the political status quo. Above all, it ignores a really extraordinary generation gap that provides the opportunity for major rejuvenation of leading personnel if a top contender can take advantage of it.

If a drastic generation change—a "jumping" of generations—should take place just below the level of the top leadership, the precise impact of such a development is difficult to judge. To a large extent, the job that a man holds shapes his attitudes more than his age. Just as older plant managers have pushed for an increase in their own freedom of action, so younger officials of Gosplan are likely to continue to be centralizers. Moreover, much would depend on the values of the leader and the parameters set by the international situation.

Nevertheless, the generational change that we are talking about is not a trivial one. The generations that are leaving the scene were those most deprived of contact with the West until middle age, the ones whose work careers spanned much of the worst period of the Stalin era. Many of their members have real reason to be nervous about a thorough discussion of 1937 and 1938. Persons born in 1928, on the other hand, had hardly begun their careers by the time of Stalin's death in 1953. They had the freer access to information of the post-Stalin period before their arteries had had a chance to harden too much and, in fact, were young enough to find Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin a real shock. Indeed, those who have since been successful were part of the drive to break up the rigidities of Stalinist doctrine in the 1950's and the 1960's. In addition, those who deal with the international world in their professions received exposure to the West very early in their careers and repeatedly thereafter.

Although it would be wrong to proclaim the certainty of change, it would be even more incorrect to deny its possibility. There are differences of opinion and emphasis within institutions as well as between officials

[20] Lists of all the delegates to the 25th CPSU Congress, together with the names of the party organizations from which they were elected, may be found in *XXV s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (24 fevralya-5 marta 1976 goda). Stenograficheskiy otchët* (25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [February 24–March 5, 1976], Stenographic Report), Vol. 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp. 329–596. A tedious process of counting provides the number of delegates elected from each region. The ages of regional first secretaries may be determined by consulting *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Devyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya," 1974, and the 1977 edition of *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya"; moreover, the biographies of many of the most recently selected secretaries were published in the regional press in February 1979. The ages of new secretaries from regions electing 6 percent of the delegates could not be determined. Half of these were assigned to the 51–55 group, and half, to the 50 and below group.

It should be pointed out that the figures in the text are only approximations, for geographical migration of the population and differences in the recruitment of new party members results in marginal changes in the number of delegates elected from each region from congress to congress.

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of different institutions, and these may well be fairly strongly corollated with age. Consider the following reports of speeches of KGB heads in three oblasts of the RSFSR in January 1979—to my knowledge the only speeches by such officials at the oblast party conferences held at that time.

In Rostov oblast, A. A. Khlestov, a 59-year-old who had served as KGB head in oblasts such as Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk since at least 1965, apparently delivered a speech which embodied the same hard-line approach that has marked speeches by KGB officials at oblast conferences for decades, the same worry about the need for greater vigilance. According to the report,

He dwelt on the training of toilers in the spirit of social patriotism, of high social responsibility and political vigilance. He said that it is necessary to worry constantly about education in political vigilance, to conduct more persistent work in propagating the Soviet way of life, and to teach our people to oppose hostile ideology.[21]

G. V. Pipua, the recently-appointed KGB head in Murmansk, struck a somewhat contrasting note. Although his age is not known, this seems to be the first oblast in which he has held such a post; therefore, he is surely younger than Khlestov—probably between 50 and 55, and likely closer to 50. Pipua's speech contained a ringing affirmation that every guilty person must be punished, but every innocent one must be protected from improper arrest. However, the most notable feature of the address was its tone, one that seemed much more relaxed and more confident about the loyalty of the Soviet people than Khlestov's:

Our oblast is one of the most important regions in which the intelligence services of imperialist states show a heightened interest . . . . The moral-political quality of the Soviet people—its patriotism, its high political consciousness and vigilance . . . has not permitted the special services of the capitalist states to achieve any results . . . . The Soviet organs of state security actively conduct preventive work. The very fact that preventive measures are applied furnishes evidence of the force and power of the Soviet state, its humanity, its faith in Soviet man and the further development of socialist democracy.

The concrete area in which Pipua called for more work was not in raising internal vigilance, but in educating loyal Soviet sailors who go abroad about the danger of blackmail entrapment by Western intelligence agencies.[22]

Like Khlestov, V. V. Guzik, the 49-year-old KGB head in Kuybyshev oblast, indicated an interest in the struggle against ideological diversion and subversion. But the source of the subversion that concerned him was quite unexpected. According to the brief newspaper account, he "told [the conference] how the struggle was being organized against the forces of reaction and war, against ideological diversions and subversive activity by the opponents of the relaxation of international tension."[23]

Three examples are far too few to prove anything conclusive about generational differences in the attitudes of KGB officials, but at least they do show the possibility of a range of postures even in an institution charged with the responsibility of repressing dangerous dissent. And if there is a range of postures, it would not be surprising for officials of the postwar generation to have less deep-rooted suspicions of every new idea than their older colleagues have.

[21] *Molot* (Rostov-on-Don), Jan. 14, 1979
[22] *Polyarnaya pravda* (Murmansk), Jan. 21, 1979.
[23] *Volzhskaya kommuna* (Kuybyshev), Jan. 23, 1979.

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The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy

by Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier

In the past four or five years, signs have emerged of a Soviet reexamination and readjustment of economic relations with the Third World in the light of new perceptions about the nature of the world economy and the USSR's place in it. Both in theory and in policy there has been a search for new, more flexible and rewarding relations. The new trends in aid and trade policies and much of the attendant discussion suggest that the aim is not so much the displacement of the existing economic order as its modification to create appropriate conditions for greater and more advantageous Soviet participation.[1] Instead of trying to enlist less developed countries (LDC's) of the Third World in an international socialist division of labor, patterned on integration arrangements within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or based on bilateral deals with the USSR, the Soviets are increasingly discussing and instituting new forms of economic exchanges wherein mutual advantage, modified market forces, multilateralization, and commercial gain will benefit not only the LDC's and the socialist bloc but the West as well, with all three categories being considered and treated as parts of an interdependent world.

This new look and the changing policies are not always so readily apparent. The traditional rhetoric about imperialist exploitation of the Third World and the exemplary nature of Soviet-LDC relations persists in most official statements and in many popular and scholarly publications of the USSR. Furthermore, Moscow has as yet failed to produce a constructive reaction to Third World proposals concerning a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[2]

But there are also indications that the traditional Manichaean view of world economics, in which the socialist and the capitalist camps compete for the exclusive control of Third World resources, is being questioned. Indeed, it is increasingly being seen by many Soviets as not applicable to the present-day world, in which advances in science and technology are militating toward global interdependence. In short, the traditional outlook might not necessarily be the one to shape Soviet behavior in the years to come.

Better knowledge of these trends in Soviet-LDC relations and of the attendant debates in the USSR is es-

[1] The new economic thinking is related to various geopolitical factors that have changed Soviet attitudes toward the Third World, including China's claim to leadership of the nonindustrialized world; the growing power of nationalism in the Third World, coupled with insistence on one-sided concessions from outside powers; the appearance of petrodollars; the Soviet Union's decision to modernize its economy with the aid of Western credits and know-how; and the USSR's attainment of global strategic parity, which has in many ways reduced the need for Moscow to court the nonaligned world.

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[2] This is well illustrated by the joint Soviet bloc statement to UNCTAD V in Manila on May 7, 1979. It linked up the discrimination suffered by the socialist states with the inequities that affect the LDC's, blamed capitalism and the multinationals, and spoke in general terms about the elimination of discrimination in international trade in order to restructure world economic relations. See *Dokument predstavlënnyy delegatsiyami BSSR, NRB, VNR, GDR, Respublikoy Kuba, MNR, PNR, SRV, SSSR, USSR, ChSSR* (Document Presented by the Delegations of the Belorussian SSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the GDR, the Republic of Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), Manila, UNCTAD, TD/249, April 19, 1979.

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S. A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR Council of Ministers, signs a protocol with S. A. Monguno, Commissar for Trade and Industry of Nigeria, in Moscow on June 15, 1970, which envisaged cooperation in geological prospecting for metal ores, organization of a geological laboratory, and creation of training schools for industry in Nigeria. In the background is a photo of the Soviet-aided Aswan High Dam in Egypt.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

sential for our understanding of shifting Soviet perceptions of global issues and of the ways that the USSR proposes to link up with the world system. However, it is far from easy to describe the changing pattern. While the advantages of expanding Soviet business deals and trade with the West have been presented in a pretty matter-of-fact manner that readily acknowledges the benefits of interdependence, the search for economic advantage in the Third World within an interdependent context has not been presented with similar candidness.

Various factors condition this Soviet reticence. On the ideological level, V.I. Lenin's pronouncements about the alliance between the first socialist state (the Soviet Union) and the oppressed people of the East have been an integral part of official doctrine from the inception of the Soviet state. It is no simple matter to shift from this assumption of total identity of interests to acceptance of a world of give-and-take based on economic self-interest. On the diplomatic level, the claim about common Soviet-LDC interests vis-à-vis the imperialist powers is far too useful a card in the game of power politics to be discarded lightly for the sake of economic rationality. On the domestic level, the magnitude and complexity of the reforms necessary to restructure a centrally planned economy to pursue more

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flexible policies in a world economy dominated by market-economy countries defy quick and easy solutions.

Given this vortex of conflicting and unresolved aims, one cannot speak either of a well-formulated new policy or of clearly articulated positions. What is going on is a multilevel reassessment concerning the best ways of fitting Soviet-LDC relations into a global framework. Rather than defend set positions, most participants are groping for an appropriate redefinition of Soviet-LDC economic relations and for a workable reformulation of policies. All are interested in securing greater gains from an increased, better-rounded participation in international trade.

In the ongoing discussion, one can discern three broad interest groupings, each with its own approach, although the ideological or institutional boundaries of these groups are not that rigid. The first of these groups is the party apparatus, particularly people charged with maintaining political power and ideological orthodoxy. They would like to introduce more effective economic relations without having to make radical alterations in doctrine and in the Soviet administrative structure. General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev expressed this cautious approach in 1976 at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU):

Intertwined in foreign economic relations are politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade. Consequently, the approach to them and their guidance must likewise be comprehensive, linking up the efforts of all departments as well as our political and economic interests. This is exactly how this important issue is regarded by the party Central Committee.[3]

The Soviet government's economic ministries constitute a second group. Officials of these agencies are primarily concerned not with reconciling their activities with ideology but with bringing about practical results. Thus, when S. A. Skachkov, who has headed the USSR State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations—the Soviet Union's foreign aid organization—since its founding in 1957, discusses cooperation with the LDC's, he treats it as contributing to the development of the Soviet economy.[4]

The third group, comprising specialists in the academic community, actually manifests two somewhat divergent tendencies. There are "conservatives," who tend to follow a cautious line that tries to combine an uncompromising ideological stance with search for economic rationality. And there are modern-minded or technocratic specialists, who acknowledge the need for extensive readjustments in institutions and practices if the USSR is to obtain much-needed industrial and agricultural raw materials as well as hard cash. In addition, the latter press for changes in economic theory and ideological formulations. While the approach of the conservative specialists resembles that of the party, the outlook and the manner of the modernists seem to be closer to that of the economic ministries.

Delineation of these three groups should not obscure their considerable and evolving interaction and the linkages among the new ideas advanced by the specialists, the departures in economic policies, and the novel inflections discernible in official pronouncements. While the Soviet reassessment is still going on and remains inconclusive, it seems useful to describe certain of its parameters. Specifically, in the following sections I will examine: (1) the novel theoretical constructs that permit the recognition of interdependence; (2) the innovative proposals advanced by the specialists for more viable economic policies; and (3) the changes in aid and trade policies that indicate adaptation to a more broadly and pragmatically conceived international division of labor. A concluding section will attempt some tentative assessment of the prospects of further policy changes resulting from this multilevel reassessment.

Revising the "Two-World" Theory

From the inception of Soviet economic aid to the Third World in the mid-1950's, the administration of that aid was based on the theory of "two world economies" and of the unrelieved exploitation of all the former colonies by the capitalist metropoles. This theory not only justified the Soviet aim of detaching the Third World, with its resources, from the capitalist countries but also implied a shared interest between the USSR and the LDC's. That equation gave N.S. Khrushchev ample reason to believe that generous loans for steel mills, dams, or hotels, plus a good dose of rhetoric about economic liberation would turn the newly independent states against the West and bring them into the Soviet orbit.

Under Khrushchev's successors the aid program

[3] This portion of Brezhnev's report was quoted by N.S. Patolichev, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade, in a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the decree nationalizing foreign trade. See *Vneshnyaya torgovlya* (Moscow), No. 5, 1978, Supplement.

[4] "Foreign Economic Cooperation of the USSR in the 60th Anniversary Year of the Great October," ibid., No. 11, 1977, pp. 14-22.

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became better integrated with the economic needs and capabilities of Moscow and its socialist-bloc allies.[5] Nevertheless, the professed goal remained unchanged: to liberate the Third World from Western exploitation and replace the latter with a new type of international division of labor based on "equality and democratic principles." The socialist integration of CMEA, pursued since in 1971 on the basis of intergovernment agreements for planned long-term exchanges, was seen to provide such an alternative system, one that was viewed as superior to that offered by the world capitalist economy.[6]

This was the general tenor of official views and most of the specialized writings until roughly 1974. Since then, however, there have appeared two new theories that have undermined, if not yet replaced, the former certitudes about the bifurcated world economy and the common economic interests of the anti-imperialist front. The first is the concept of a single world economy—which provides the necessary theoretical underpinning for recognizing global issues and accepting interdependence. The second is the acknowledgment of economic differentiation among Third World countries—which permits revision of views about the situation of the LDC's on the world market.

When the notion of a single world economy was first discussed in print in 1974, that innovation met with some objections.[7] Since then, even though no major ideological conference has been convened to lend its imprimatur to the new theory, there has developed a general consensus about the existence of a single "world economy" *(vsemirnoye khozyaystvo* or *mirovaya ekonomika)* that consists of two subsystems: the socialist world economy and the capitalist world economy.

Beyond agreement on this rudimentary concept, interpretations of what led to the appearance of the global economy, how it works, and how it affects its components vary greatly. Academic authors of more conservative persuasion argue that it was the strength of the Soviet bloc, in combination with the exemplary nature of intrabloc relations, that was primarily responsible for the emergence of the global economy. They are also prone to stress that the interaction of the two subsystems, though beneficial and essential for the growth and development of each, does not affect or change their specific modes of production and that economic cooperation does not put an end to systemic economic competition.[8] Other authors provide an altogether depoliticized interpretation. They see the world economy as an objective phenomenon created mainly by advances in science and technology. It is the "sum total [*sovokupnost'*] of all the separate national economies, which find themselves in a situation of complex interaction and mutual interdependence."[9] Somewhere in between are those specialists who see the world economy as a "dialectic unity of opposites in which international economic relations of different social systems are intertwined."[10] This intermediate interpretation allows both for interdependence and for competition, although on the whole it is more apt to stress the former (depending, of course, on the audience).

The evolving body of Soviet theory places the developing countries in the capitalist subsystem of the world economy, albeit assigning them a special position in that constellation. Until the early 1970's, that position was almost exclusively viewed as one of dependence and subjection to neocolonial exploitation. Indeed, such a perspective is still upheld by old-school ideologues like R. Ulyanovskiy, who continues to argue that the problems of underdevelopment can be solved only through a decisive break with the capitalist system of exchange and production.[11] However, in recent years there has been a growing body of writings that tend to downplay old, politically phrased discussion in favor of objective analysis of economic facts. These writings recognize that many LDC's are becoming integrated to greater or lesser extent into a world economy dominated by the capitalist system.

[5] See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1970, pp. 415-33; and idem, "Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World," in Roger Kanet, Ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 215-36.

[6] This phase of Soviet policy is described by Richard Lowenthal in "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,'" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1976, pp. 52-63.

[7] The seminal work on the subject was M. Maksimova, "The World Economy and International Economic Cooperation," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter *MEMO*), No. 4, 1974, pp. 3-16. N.P. Shmelev's "Socialism and the World Economy," ibid., No. 10, 1976, p. 5, noted the existence of objections.

[8] See, for example, Moskovskiy Gosudarstvennyy Institut Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, *Mirovaya ekonomika* (The World Economy), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1978, p. 11.

[9] See, for instance, M. Maksimova, *SSSR i mezhdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo* (The USSR and International Economic Cooperation), Moscow, *Mysl'*, 1977, p. 12.

[10] See, for example, O. Bogomolov, "The Material Base of a Stable Peace," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 2, January 1978, p. 96.

Interpretation of the operations of the single world economy presents thorny political problems. An authoritative statement urging a positive solution of international problems warned at the same time that Western reformist theories on global problems could be a disguised attempt to bring about the convergence of socialism and capitalism. See V. Zagladin and I. Frolov, "Contemporary Global Problems," ibid., No. 16, November 1976, p. 95.

[11] *Sovremennyye problemy Azii i Afriki* (Contemporary Problems of Asia and Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 230.

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

Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin, left, shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai after the signing of new Soviet-Indian economic agreements in March 1979 in New Delhi; at the right, manufacture at a Soviet plant in April 1979 of a "3600" rolling mill destined for India's steel industry.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Such analysis tends to classify countries of the Third World not in terms of political profile, but in terms of economic indicators like gross national product or per-capita income. This new typology generally distinguishes four groups of states: the most backward countries (those of Tropical Africa); relatively developed countries (North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia); the oil-rich states; and the states of Latin America. Such typologies tend to leave out the separate category of states "of socialist orientation," an indication of the increasingly dispassionate and pragmatic nature of the new analysis.[12]

These writings do not eschew political categories, but employ them to expound economic indicators, to establish the degree of capitalist development of the given economy and its relationship to the world economy. According to the analyses, for instance, the poorest states, where prefeudal or feudal forms predominate, do not produce for export and need foreign assistance. The relatively developed states of capitalist orientation export raw materials and industrial products, and even increasingly invest abroad. They can be democratic, like India, or conservative, like Indonesia and Morocco. The reactionary oil-rich monarchies are ruled by state monopoly capital, spending tremendous sums for domestic development and foreign investment. How to categorize the Latin American nations is under dispute. Some Soviet specialists argue that capitalist development has advanced so far as to place them on the same level as the Western capitalist countries of Southern Europe, while others include them with the relatively developed states of Southeast Asia and North Africa.[13]

[12] Among the outstanding contributions to this analysis, the following should be mentioned: L.A. Fridman et al., *Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran* (A Typology of Nonsocialist Countries), Moscow, Nauka, 1976; G. Mirskiy, "The Changing Face of the 'Third World,'" *Kommunist*, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 106-15; V. Sheynis, "Countries of Middle-Level Capitalism," *MEMO*, No. 9, 1977, pp. 105-24; "Socioeconomic and Political Consequences of the Differentiation of the Developing Countries," ibid., No. 10, 1977, pp. 126-32; V. Rymalov, "Newly Free Countries: Problems of Economic Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 7, 1978, pp. 48-59; idem, *Strukturnyye izmeneniya v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khozyaystve* (Structural Changes in the World Capitalist Economy), Moscow, Mysl', 1978; Ye. Primakov, "Some Problems of the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1978, pp. 81-91; and N. Simoniya, "On the Fate of Capitalism in the Countries of Asia," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1979, pp. 17-21.

[13] See "How to Evaluate the Peculiarities and Levels of Development of Capitalism in Latin America," *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), No. 1, 1979, pp. 53-74; and "The National Liberation Movement: Some Problems of Differentiation," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 6, 1978, p. 31.

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Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, Nikolay S. Patolichev.

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The research community's demonstration of the degree of integration of LDC economies into the capitalist system is paralleled in official statements by a revised interpretation of the nature of the operations of "imperialism" in the Third World. The modification is best illustrated by comparing what was said on this subject at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses. At the earlier gathering, in 1971, Brezhnev and Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin roundly denounced the systematic plunder of the LDC's by the imperialist powers, advocated economic independence for the former, and eulogized the "new type of economic relations" between the developing countries and the socialist countries.[14] At the 25th Congress in 1976, the customary diatribes against the nefarious role of imperialism were conspicuously absent, and there were oblique references to interdependence. Brezhnev spoke about "global problems"—relating to shortages of raw materials and energy, to disease, to the environment, and to ocean resources—that affect the life of each state, and from the solution of which no country, including the Soviet Union, could "remain aloof." The international division of labor was now interpreted as a process that encompassed all states. And the LDC's, Brezhnev claimed, could play a "positive role" in the world economy since they were now strong enough to resist the dictates of the West.[15]

What is the new role assigned to the LDC's in the interdependent global economy? Alongside the old anticapitalist rhetoric, recent Soviet statements at international forums advance the novel suggestion that the developing countries give up confrontation and turn to broad international cooperation. Thus, Kosygin's message to the Fourth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV) held in Nairobi, Kenya, in May 1976 stressed that conditions were now favorable for a "constructive discussion of international trade and development."[16] While the official proposals do not specify what would constitute a "constructive approach," what is envisaged is clear from the specialized literature. This often suggests that Third World countries should participate in the international division of labor by concentrating first of all on the production of raw materials, which they should make available at stable and equitable prices.[17] Soviet concern that the LDC's keep producing the resources necessary for the functioning of the advanced economies is quite evident. At Nairobi, USSR Foreign Trade Minister N.S. Patolichev lashed out at Chinese proposals that the LDC's resort to "self-reliance" and stay aloof from the "international division of labor" proposed by the superpowers.[18] Many Soviet economists also express alarm at the proposed Third World regional groupings, because they would presumably involve an uncompromising collective stand vis-à-vis all the industrialized states.[19]

[14] *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Documents*, Moscow, Novosti, 1971, pp. 19-29, 199-200.

[15] L.I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU CC. The Party's Immediate Objectives in Domestic and Foreign Policies," *Reprints from the Soviet Press* (White Plains, NY), April 15, 1976, pp. 76-77, 20.

[16] *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), No. 7, 1976, p. 2.

[17] See *Mirovaya ekonomika*, p. 19; R. Ulyanovskiy, "The Energy Crisis and the Struggle of the Liberated Countries for Economic Equal Rights," *MEMO*, No. 2, 1976, pp. 19-32, and No. 3, 1976, pp. 16-30; R. Ulyanovskiy, "The Economic Front of the Struggle Against Neocolonialism," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1978, pp. 3-17.

[18] For the text of Patolichev's speech, see *Foreign Trade*, No. 7, 1976, pp. 3-9. For the text of the Chinese delegate's speech, see *Peking Review* (Beijing), May 21, 1976, pp. 17-19.

[19] See, for example, L. Zevin, "New Concepts of Economic Development and the International Cooperation of 'Third World' Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1978, pp. 97-105.

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No Soviet commentator will suggest these days that the LDC's deny their resources to the West or offer them at exorbitant prices. Patolichev warned specifically at Nairobi that Third World countries and groupings should operate with "due regard for the interests of both commodity producers and consumers."[20] Accordingly, the Soviets now see the LDC's as deriving advantage not from "economic liberation" but from "attaining equality." But even "equality" is interpreted in moderate terms, for the Soviets invariably add that it should be instituted within the general framework of "mutual profitability," and advise the LDC's to avoid "unbridled economic extremism" such as excessive nationalization.[21]

Recognition of the existence of a single world economy and acceptance of different levels and paths of economic development among the LDC's have considerably moderated traditional Soviet hostility to the Western presence in these countries. The fact that many Soviets now concede and discuss the possibility and feasibility of Third World development within the framework of the world capitalist system is a good indication of their coming to terms with this aspect of interdependence.[22]

Specialist Recommendations for Policy

How have these changing perceptions of the nature of the world economy evidenced themselves in recommendations concerning concrete Soviet-LDC economic relations? When some Soviet economists in the mid-1960's first began to propose acceptance of an economic rationale for Soviet trade and aid policies, the stress was on growing integration between the socialist and developing states in isolation from the rest of the world. A decade later, the same specialists discuss Soviet-LDC or CMEA-LDC exchanges as part of an "international division of labor" in which the West has a role. Indeed, they even mention the desirability of including the West in trilateral arrangements.[23]

The discussion of new forms of Soviet-LDC exchanges is related to the injunctions of the 25th CPSU Congress to improve the quality of the USSR's foreign economic relations. The academic community has been charged with the task of devising practical proposals. Specifically, the function of Soviet ties with both the capitalist and the developing countries in the context of deepening international exchange is among the six items on the 1976–80 research agenda worked out jointly by the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the CPSU's Central Committee and the Economic Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences.[24]

Internationalizing the Soviet economy is at the heart of the issue. No one questions the need to internationalize. As it was graphically expressed by Patolichev:

Today it would perhaps be difficult to find an economic sector in the USSR that is not connected with foreign trade to some extent, or does not receive effective practical aid in its further development. To put it figuratively, foreign trade has become an important artery in the blood circulation of the Soviet Union's economic organism.[25]

Despite this general agreement on the need to internationalize the Soviet economy, however, there seem to be disagreements over both the degree to which the USSR should participate in the world economy and the proper manner of expanding Soviet participation. On the first issue, one gets hints of differences of opinion about the dangers inherent for the USSR in dependence on foreign transactions, but—

[20] *Foreign Trade*, No. 7, 1976, p. 7.

[21] R. Ulyanovskiy, "The Developing Countries: Economic Front," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 34, August 1976, pp. 18-22; and his "The Economic Front . . . ," loc. cit. On the issue of nationalization, see Ye. A. Bragina, *Razvivayushchiyesya strany: gosudarstvennaya politika i promyshlennost'* (The Developing Countries; State Policy and Industry), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, p. 245.

[22] E. Ye. Obminskiy's *Razvivayushchiyesya strany i mezhdunarodnoye razdeleniye truda* (The Developing Countries and the International Division of Labor), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1974, was the first book to discuss this subject in detail. For a later elaboration see, A.I. Levkovskiy, Ed., *Inostrannyy kapital i inostrannoye predprinimatel'stvo v stranakh Azii i Severnoy Afriki* (Foreign Capital and Foreign Entrepreneurial Activity in the Countries of Asia and North Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1977.

[23] L. Zevin, "Mutual Benefit of Economic Cooperation of Socialist and Developing Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1965, pp. 72-83; and G.M. Prokhorov, Ed., *Problemy sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayuschikhsya stran* (Problems of Cooperation of Socialist and Developing Countries), Moscow, Nauka, 1966. Cf. L. Zevin and G. Prokhorov, "Economic Cooperation of Socialist and Developing Countries: New Tendencies," *MEMO*, No. 3, 1977, pp. 37-46; and G.M. Prokohorov, Ed., *Sotsialisticheskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya i sotrudnichestvo s razvivayushchimisya stranami* (Socialist Economic Integration and Cooperation with Developing Countries), Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 75-76.

The term "international division of labor" as used in this literature corresponds in many ways to the Western concept of "interdependence." However, being cast more explicitly in terms of economic interests, it sidesteps touchy ideological issues.

[24] N. Fedorenko, "Economic Science in the Tenth Five-Year Plan Period," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7, 1978, p. 4.

[25] N. Patolichev, "Lenin's Decree Is Still Effective," *Foreign Trade*, No. 6, 1978, p. 3.

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for obvious reasons—not much is printed on this sensitive subject.[26] On the second issue, open arguments about the best methods for instituting more dynamic exchanges with the LDC's have taken place. As suggested at the outset, specialists advocating serious innovation in this last area tend to divide into two groups—conservative and modernist.

Before describing the different tendencies among these innovators, it is essential to say a few words about who they are and the extent to which they may be able to exert an influence on actual policy decisions. Although one cannot claim to offer a definitive description of the research community, it would appear on the basis of written evidence and visits to various institutes that the writers who advance new and fresh ideas belong to the postwar generation that started publishing in the mid- or late 1960's. Their university training, specialization, and better acquaintance with the outside world (which often derives from work at the United Nations) make them less dogmatic than the academics who had achieved some prominence before World War II or started writing shortly after the war.

The views of these specialists often seem colored by the nature of the particular institutes with which they happen to be associated. For example, the staff of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations is apt to look at the Third World from the viewpoint of the single world market and to stress the advantages the LDC's will derive from participating in the

[26] One of the rare references to the topic appeared in the book by M. Maksimova cited in fn. 9. In this work, the author (on p. 61) tries to assuage fears that excessive internationalization of the Soviet economy might weaken the country's defense capacity and hurt its military-strategic interests.



A new high-speed spinning machine of GDR manufacture seen in operation at a textile plant in Klin, USSR. The equipment has also been installed in India, Pakistan, and Turkey.

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international division of labor.[27] Institutes with a regional focus, on the other hand, often see the relations between the periphery and the center in a different and less optimistic light. Publications of the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa, for instance, tend to stress that the specific developmental problems of countries in their particular areas defy speedy or easy solutions proposed on the basis of an abstract qualitative analysis of the operations of the global economy.[28]

It is more difficult to assess the influence of the innovators in the academic hierarchy, although it is clear that they are not relegated to insignificant positions. Many of them head research departments within the institutes and direct the work of large staffs. Others occupy responsible posts directly under older, more dogmatically inclined specialists. This intermingling in the hierarchy, plus the fact that printed reports on formal symposia register profound disagreements on very basic questions between the traditionalists and the innovators, indicates that the latter's views are not suppressed.

How does this research community—with its mixed perspectives—relate to the Soviet decision-making process? For one, many specialists move back and forth between government assignments and research work. It is also no secret that the institutes prepare position papers for the party and the various government bodies, from the Central Committee and the ministries on down.[29] Furthermore, from the tenor of the remarks made at the April 1978 meeting of the Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department with a group of leading economists from government and research organizations, it is obvious that the party authorities expect practical recommendations. Although they request the illumination of new problems from "Marxist-Leninist positions," they do get impatient when the rhetoric covers up an absence of thought. The meeting was reminded of Brezhnev's warning at the 25th CPSU Congress that "scholastic theorizing will only hold up our advance."[30] That the opinions of the innovators find their way into top-level policy deliberations is further suggested by the fact that publication of their views is not confined to the pages of the specialized journals. Indeed, they appear to have been charged with popularizing the new economic thinking. Thus, one of the volumes in the series meant to elucidate the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress is an eloquent explanation of the single world market and the resulting interdependence, and the pages of the prestigious party journal *Kommunist* have been open to presentation of new views regarding the changing economic profile of the Third World.[31]

To turn now to the precise recommendations of the innovators, there is agreement among them on what the main thrust of the Soviet economic program in an interdependent world should be. Neither the conservative group nor the modernist group is sympathetic to LDC demands for one-sided concessions or preferences, and neither addresses the social aspects of these demands.[32] Both are primarily interested in the most advantageous meshing of economic relations with the LDC's in the evolving pattern of a widening global interdependence. And both are apt to treat Soviet-LDC relations as somewhat ancillary to Soviet-West relations, or rather as fitting into a triangular relationship in which the USSR occupies the middle-ground position. To simplify the schema to its barest elements, what these specialists would like to see obtain in Soviet relations with the Third World is a mirror image of these specialists' idealized version of the complementary nature of East-West relations, as reflected in the following passage:

An important element of the Soviet Union's long-term and large-scale economic cooperation with Western countries takes the form of compensation transactions of mutual interest to both sides. The Soviet Union is interested in buying from the industrially developed countries machines and equipment on a credit basis

[27] That institute produced the pioneering work in this field. See *Razvivayushchiyesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy* (The Developing Countries: Regularities, Tendencies, Prospects), Moscow, Mysl', 1974, Chap. 2, pp. 50-78.

[28] The specificity of the East was first thoroughly analyzed in the two-volume publication of the Institute of Oriental Studies, *Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremennost'* (The East Beyond Our Borders and the Contemporary World), Moscow, Glavnaya Redaktsiya Vostochnoy Literatury, 1974. It has since been developed in more detail by A.I. Levkovskiy in *Sotsial'naya struktura razvivayushchikhsya stran* (The Social Structure of the Developing Countries), Moscow, Mysl', 1978. For contributions from the Institute of Africa, see I.A. Svanidze, *Sel'skoye khozyaystvo i agrarnyy stroy Tropicheskoy Afriki* (Agriculture and the Agrarian Structure of Tropical Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1977.

[29] For example, the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System prepared a report on the position of the socialist countries toward the NIEO. See N. Fedorenko, loc. cit., p. 12.

[30] See M. Volkov, "Urgent Tasks of Economic Science," *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1978, p. 66.

[31] See M. Maksimova, *SSSR i mezhdunarodnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo* (The USSR and International Economic Cooperation), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, published in the series: *XXV S'yezd KPSS. Problemy teorii i praktiki* (The 25th CPSU Congress. Problems of Theory and Practice); also G. Mirskiy, loc. cit.

[32] Recently, comment in the specialized writings about pauperization, unemployment, and human needs has increased, but there has been no substantive discussion of how Soviet aid can help alleviate these problems within the context of broader international cooperation.

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. . . to develop its natural resources and to create more capacity for manufacturing new products for domestic consumption and for export. In their turn, its Western partners are interested in large-scale Soviet purchases as well as in reliable and stable supplies of primary materials and other goods in repayment of the credit granted.[33]

The envisaged scenario of global cooperation, where some sort of an "invisible hand" would guide the multilevel flow of goods and services among the three groups, would look something like this: while the most advanced countries would find it profitable to invest in the development of Soviet raw materials and industry, the socialist bloc with its less advanced technology would in turn find it advantageous to deal with the LDC's. The role of the LDC's would be to produce the natural resources to fuel the economies of all the industrialized states, benefiting in turn from these states' assistance in accumulating funds and know-how for building up local processing industries. This harmonious interaction would emerge from not only bilateral but also various multilateral arrangements. These include joint Soviet/CMEA and Western projects in Third World countries, or joint ventures of the USSR and the more advanced LDC's in third countries. In the first type of arrangement, the West would provide the advanced technology; the USSR or the bloc, much of the middle-level technology; and the LDC's, chiefly their labor and raw materials, at least in the early stages and where it was appropriate. In the case of joint Soviet-LDC ventures in other Third World countries, the USSR would be the more technologically advanced partner.[34]

The proposal for joint Soviet-LDC ventures is part of a broader effort to map out an appropriately differentiated economic strategy for interacting with the different types of LDC's discerned by Soviet analysts.[35] In this context, cooperation with the least developed states of Tropical Africa is envisioned not in terms of increased handouts but of geological surveys leading to the exploitation of natural resources. As for countries that have reached middle levels of development, Soviet analysts note local production and investment capabilities and propose either creating Soviet subsidiaries there or undertaking with these countries the above-mentioned joint ventures in third countries. In the case of the oil-rich countries, the expectation is of cash deals for Soviet goods or aid projects.[36]

Where the two groups of innovators differ is over the best way to manage the expanding and increasingly complex network of economic relations.[37] The conservative reformers believe that the advantages the USSR seeks from the international division of labor will best accrue from more efficient operation of existing institutions, improved quality of production, better planning, a more flexible structure of exports, and more efficient and more aggressive sales promotion abroad. For example, specialists associated with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and with various research institutes attached to it take the state monopoly of foreign trade as their starting point. They maintain that the greatest gains would accrue from perfecting the Soviet Union's centralized decision-making apparatus and operations in the foreign trade sphere. This would enable the USSR to find the optimal opportunities in foreign markets without exposing the country to the fluctuations and other undesirable effects of the capitalist-dominated world economy.[38]

The liberal economists, associated chiefly with the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences (especially the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations), argue for a more open and flexible intertwining with the world economy, based on and protected by socialist integration. Since

[33] V. Akhimov, "Bank's Participation in Soviet Union's Foreign Trade," *Foreign Trade*, No. 6, 1978, p. 13.

[34] For one of the earliest descriptions of such a world, see N.P. Shmelev, "Socialism and the World Economy," *MEMO*, No. 10, 1976, pp. 3-18. Since then, much more detailed and specialized studies have appeared. See N.P. Shmelev, Ed., *Strany SEV v mirokhozyaystvennykh svyazyakh* (Countries of CMEA in Relations with the World Economy), Moscow, Nauka, 1978. Soviet comments on the benefits of multilateral cooperation tend to be reserved. East Europeans are much more outspoken. For an eloquent plea by a Pole, see Leon Zurawicki, "The Prospects for Tripartite Cooperation," *Intereconomics* (Hamburg), No. 7/8, 1978, pp. 184-87.

[35] V. Sheynis, "Socioeconomic Differentiation and Problems of the Typology of the Developing Countries," *MEMO*, No. 8, 1978, p. 93.

[36] For the least developed countries, see "Joint Statement by the Socialist Countries at the Fourth Session of UNCTAD," *Foreign Trade*, No. 9, 1977, Supplement; and *MEMO*, No. 4, 1977, pp. 103-04, and No. 8, 1977, pp. 128-33. For the other countries, see V.V. Lopatov, "The European Countries of Socialism and the 'Third World': Cooperation in the Form of Mixed Companies," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1976, pp. 7-18; L. Zevin and G. Prokhorov, "Economic Cooperation of Socialist and Developing Countries: New Tendencies," loc. cit.; N. Tret'yukhin, "New Directions in the Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR and Deepening of Its Participation in the International Division of Labor," *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 1, 1977, pp. 7-14; and S. Skachkov, loc. cit.

[37] These divergent approaches are most apparent in exchanges made at conferences devoted to improving the management of foreign trade. Printed reports give only a partial sense of issues under discussion, but nonetheless they do reveal a split. See "Scientific-Practical Conference of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System," *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 1, 1978, pp. 44-46. This conference was also reported in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1978, pp. 152-55.

[38] See, for instance, Y. Krasnov, "Sixty Years of Trade Monopoly," *New Times*, No. 17, April 1978, pp. 18-19; and N. Tret'yukhin, loc. cit.

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East European members of CMEA were the ones to pioneer the flexible, open, and commercial deals with both the LDC's and the West, those Soviet economists who are most familiar with these practices, as well as with the East European economic literature, tend to be the ones advocating greater Soviet integration into the world economy along the lines taken by the East European countries.

Rather than relying on strengthening the state monopoly of foreign trade, the liberals discuss certain structural changes that they see as required to give Soviet operations abroad greater comparative advantage. They do not believe that the USSR and its bloc occupy a sufficiently impregnable position to benefit most from insulation and extensive protectionism. They foresee that a greater opening up and decentralization of the economy will permit the USSR to take the best advantage of the dynamic effects of foreign trade operations.

From the drift of the discussion, it seems that the liberals are more inclined to have the entire Soviet economy participate in foreign trade, while the conservatives advocate having only specific branches of an industry, or individual plants specialize in export production. There are also differences of opinion about the criteria for judging the effectiveness of foreign transactions. While the conservatives are primarily interested in economizing on cost and labor, the liberals tend to take the satisfaction of Soviet consumer needs into consideration as well.[39]

The liberal position invokes the need for a number of reforms, of which five are most frequently mentioned.[40] First, there has been discussion of the desirability of instituting true convertibility of socialist currencies, to replace the current multilateral arrangements within CMEA for unloading trade surpluses. Second, a need has been mentioned for a more rational and unified system of pricing—one closely related to the world market—to allow the USSR to accurately judge the effectiveness of foreign trade transactions. Closely related to this seems to be Academician A. Rumyantsev's suggestion for more flexible, sophisticated planning, in which "commodity-money relationships" *(tovarnodenezhnyye otnosheniya)* would play as much of a role as direct regulations: *"Prices, credit, finance, trade turnover are*

Economist and sociologist A. M. Rumyantsev, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, an advocate of allowing economic mechanisms to play a greater role in the management of the Soviet economy.

—Istvan Toth/Eastfoto.

important means not for indirect but for direct regulation of socialist production."[41] Fourth, there has been talk about increasing the rights of individual enterprises, to stimulate their interest and participation in foreign trade by providing them such powers as the authority to bid, buy, and sell abroad, and to retain a share of resulting hard-currency earnings. And, finally, proposals to introduce greater flexibility into planning have been put forth. The more cautious suggest that the five-year plans should be replaced with longer-range plans to encourage more thoroughgoing innovations and adjustments. Others refer wistfully to the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early 1920's, when the state monopoly of trade did not give the central organs authority over all operations but empowered them only to plan general targets for production and trade.[42]

As suggested above, the liberals would like to adjust the workings of the Soviet system to the operations of

[39] See G. Shagalov's review of S.N. Zakharov's 1975 book, *Raschëty effektivnosti vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazey* (Calculations of the Effectiveness of Foreign Economic Relations), in *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 6, 1977, pp. 141-46.

[40] All these reforms are most cogently and thoroughly discussed in N. Shmelev, Ed., *Ekonomicheskiye svyazi Vostok-Zapad: problemy i vozmozhnosti* (East-West Economic Relations: Problems and Opportunities), Moscow, Mysl', 1976.

[41] A. Rumyantsev et al., "Methodological Problems of the Political Economy of Socialism," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 9, 1978, p. 8. Emphasis added.

[42] See A. Rumyantsev, *Sotsial'nyye i ekonomicheskiye problemy sovremennosti* (Contemporary Social and Economic Problems), Moscow, Nauka, 1977, as reported in *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1977, p. 113; and N. Shmelev, Ed., *Ekonomicheskiye svyazi . . .*, pp. 54-55.

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the world economy via the channel of CMEA. They argue that the greater, more complex integration of the socialist economies does not prevent but even promotes their more effective participation in international economic relations. According to some economists, "the socialist division of labor is being built with a world-wide division of labor in mind."[43] In a similar vein, comments on joint CMEA-LDC undertakings indicate that the aim of these measures is *not* to integrate the LDC's into an exclusive socialist bloc but rather to lend international legitimacy to CMEA and to facilitate a broader participation by CMEA states in an international economy where large economic units assume ever greater importance.[44]

Putting Theory Into Practice

One can detect in recent Soviet trade and aid practices a number of innovations that seem designed to facilitate a more complex and advantageous interaction of the Soviet economy with the global economy—many of them corresponding to certain of the above proposals from the Soviet research community. While high-ranking officials are reassuring the Soviet public that "mutually advantageous" cooperation with the LDC's is already supplying the USSR with "goods necessary for our economy" (ranging from oil and natural gas to citrus fruit) and providing increased markets for Soviet exports (machinery), they admit that the USSR must also develop *"new forms of external economic relations which go beyond the bounds of ordinary trade, greatly increase our potential, and produce . . . the maximum effect."*[45] And, indeed, there are already signs of an abandonment of the quasi-barter sort of bilaterialism that has characterized Soviet-LDC relations in the past in favor of more flexible bilateral planning, multilateralization of contacts, and a modest interdependence. These trends are evident on several levels: in Soviet-LDC relations per se, in expanding cooperation between CMEA and the Third World, and in Soviet undertaking of joint projects with the West in the LDC's.

An example of this evolution can be seen in work of the permanent intergovernmental commissions that have been managing Soviet aid and trade with major partners since the late 1960's. Initially, they were composed of high-ranking officials from various economic ministries, and their principal function was to negotiate long-term agreements for mutual deliveries of goods. Lately, however, there has been a trend to diversify the functioning of these bodies. Working groups have been set up to encourage intrasectoral cooperation, to discuss common production schemes, and to facilitate the signing of direct contracts between enterprises.[46]

In concluding treaties, Moscow has been increasingly resorting to open-ended "framework" agreements—general accords on technical and economic cooperation that merely specify the Soviet intention to provide long-term assistance. Follow-up negotiations define the extent and the character of the cooperation and set credit terms for each project. These terms may range from straight commercial transactions or supplier-type credits to liberal, long-term aid loans. This practice is a compromise between earlier concessional umbrella credits and the later specific project allocations which often carried harder terms. According to US government analysts, these agreements shift much of the burden for formulating viable new projects to the developing countries.[47] But it is also obvious that the open-ended agreements give the Soviets an opportunity to conduct feasibility studies, to figure out what projects on what terms will best suit Soviet needs and capabilities, and possibly to intermesh such projects with other undertakings elsewhere.

Several recent Soviet laws introduce greater flexibility into the USSR's administration of aid and trade. A law of July 6, 1978, gives the Foreign Trade Ministry and the State Committees on Foreign Economic Relations and on Science and Technology the same rights as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to initiate treaties. The aim of this legislation, among other things, is to "create legal prerequisites . . . for developing mutually advantageous economic ties with countries having different social systems." The foreign trade associations that are responsible for the actual implementation of

[43] See the review by A. Vinogradov and G. Prokhorov of Yu. Shiryayev, *Mezhdunarodnoye sotsialisticheskoye razdeleniye truda* (The International Socialist Division of Labor), in *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 10, 1978, p. 49.

[44] See V. Morozov, "Multilateral International Economic Relations of the CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 9, 1977, pp. 108-15.

[45] S. Skachkov, loc. cit., p. 14. See also I. Kapranov, "The USSR Economic and Technical Cooperation with Other Countries," *Foreign Trade*, No. 6, 1978, pp. 19-30. Emphasis added.

[46] L. Zevin, *Economic Cooperation of Socialist and Developing Countries. New Trends*, Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp. 182-96. See also UNCTAD, *Trade Relations Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems*, TD/B/708, Geneva, UNCTAD, July 17, 1978, pp. 23-24, item 52.

[47] See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER-10478U, Washington, DC, November 1978, pp. i, ii, and 7; and Orah Cooper, "Soviet Aid to the Third World," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 191.

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The first session of the Joint Commission of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Republic of Iraq, established in a CMEA-Iraq cooperation agreement of July 4, 1975, takes place in November 1976 in Moscow. Iraq Minister of Foreign Trade, Hikmat al-'Hazzawi, signs documents of the first session, which was chaired by Bulgaria's deputy representative to CMEA, G. Zhelev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

aid and trade transactions were put on a self-accounting basis *(khozraschët)* in May 1978, and their revised statutes show that representatives from participating enterprises are included in the decision-making.[48] These changes still fall far short of allowing Soviet enterprises to bid directly on the world market (a practice that obtains in some East European countries, and a reform that some Soviet specialists favor); nevertheless, the new enactments do involve a measure of decentralization and increase enterprise responsibility for, as well as interest in, foreign operations.

Within CMEA, administrative machinery is being set up to promote and coordinate joint Soviet bloc-LDC undertakings. An International Investment Bank was founded in 1973 with a separate credit fund for financing technical and economic aid to the LDC's. (At the same time, a common CMEA scholarship fund for Third World students was established.) In 1975, the first framework agreements between CMEA and Third World countries were concluded with Mexico and Iraq. In addition, the system of subcontracting portions of Third World projects to its CMEA partners, which the USSR has resorted to in the past when undertaking a large project, is becoming more formalized. Mixed intrabloc commissions for cooperation with individual LDC's (Algeria and Nigeria) now exist.[49] The Soviet bloc also now publicizes the fact that its members specialize in supplying equipment and services for specific branches of the economy: Bulgaria, for ag-

[48] See N. Mironov, "New Soviet Legislation on International Treaties," *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 1, 1979, pp. 24-33. The text of the May 31, 1978, law on the reorganization of the all-union trade associations is appended to *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 8, 1978. For the text of the new Statutes of the Soyuzneftеksport Association, see ibid., No. 1, 1979, pp. 50–52.

[49] On these developments, see A. Gromyko and V. Lopatov, "Cooperation of CMEA Countries with Independent Africa," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1978, p. 12.

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riculture; Poland, for coal mining; and the Soviet Union, for the iron and steel industry and hydroelectric technology.[50]

Of course, the key element in more flexible and open Soviet bloc-LDC cooperation is not so much the new administrative framework for disbursing aid multilaterally or intrabloc specialization but genuine currency convertibility on the local and international levels. The transferable ruble was introduced in 1971, but thus far it has served merely as a unit of accounting. This is not a satisfactory solution. Indeed, the LDC's are demanding, and Patolichev has responded positively (at UNCTAD IV), that the transferable ruble be made truly convertible and hence a genuine tool for clearing settlements.

Short of this, the USSR has renegotiated many of its long-term trade agreements so as to permit the settlement of payments in accordance with world prices and in hard currencies. (Under the terms of the old agreements, the contracting parties would more or less arbitrarily set the prices for the forthcoming year. The Soviets now concede that this once much-applauded practice actually hampered the expansion of trade, since in many cases neither partner was interested in selling at prices which turned out to be lower than those on the world market.[51]) Similarly, 5 percent of the International Investment Bank's fund consists of convertible currency.[52] Moreover, in 1977, the USSR decided to make 25 percent of its contribution to the UN Development Program in convertible currency.[53]

The USSR is seeking an even broader multilateralization of its dealings with the Third World than the CMEA framework affords. Probably the most portentous development is the appearance of joint Soviet-Western undertakings. Several such ventures already exist.[54] Here it is interesting to note that the long-term economic cooperation agreement with West Germany specifically provides for joint ventures in third countries.[55] Expansion of this novel tripartite form of cooperation is advanced not merely in Soviet specialized literature, but also in official Soviet statements at such politically sensitive forums as UNCTAD IV, where the Russians made it a point to advertise their economic policies as more flexible than those of the West.[56] There are indications that the USSR is contemplating even more elaborate trilateral deals than joint participation in industrial ventures. For example, there was under discussion in 1977 a petroleum deal entailing Soviet oil shipments to Venezuela's customers in Europe in return for Venezuelan deliveries to Cuba.[57]

Similar diversification is beginning to take place in Soviet cooperation with some of the more advanced of its major LDC partners. Several contracts were signed by India and the USSR in 1977 for supplying Indian equipment to steel projects built with Soviet assistance in Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Cuba. Plans for expanding the steel mills put up in India with Soviet aid envisage production of equipment to be supplied to third countries, especially other LDC's, and India has prepared a report on its ability to participate in Soviet-aided metallurgical projects in Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria.[58] Indeed, these proposals have been incorporated into the long-term economic cooperation agreement signed by the USSR and India in March 1979, and to judge from comments in the Indian press, cooperation in third countries will not be limited to Soviet-aided projects.[59]

In order to expand trade and sales abroad, the Soviet Union has set up a number of joint equity firms with foreign companies in both the public and private sectors. At the end of 1976, according to US government figures, 15 out of the 84 joint-stock companies in which Soviet organizations were participating outside CMEA were in the Third World.[60] It is interesting to note that although the USSR does not permit joint-equity ventures at home, it no longer feels ideological constraints against endorsing them for abroad. However, it should be noted that these mixed companies are confined to banking, trade, servicing, and shipping. The Soviets seem reluctant to expand this new

[50] UNCTAD, op. cit., p. 20, items 44 and 45.

[51] V. Kutuzov, "USSR-Afghanistan," *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 1, 1977, p. 19.

[52] *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 2, 1977, p. 46.

[53] Toby Trister Gati, "The Soviet Union and the N-S Dialogue," Background Paper No. 3 for the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on the Soviet Union and the World Economy, New York, NY, Jan. 29, 1979, p. 23.

[54] The Russians are building a steel pipeline in conjunction with an Anglo-American asphalt group in Nigeria. A Soviet foreign trade association, Tekhmashexport, and West German firms are supplying equipment for a textile mill in Afghanistan, and another association, Energomashexport, contracted with Babcock and Wilcox of the US to build a thermal electric plant in Argentina. The transshipment of Iranian gas via the USSR to West Germany, Austria, and France can also be included in this category. There is talk, too, of plans for a joint Soviet-Western undertaking to mine bauxite in Indonesia that is to be processed in India, but printed evidence is lacking.

[55] "Agreement on Developing and Deepening Long-Term Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany in the Economic and Industrial Fields," *New Times*, No. 20, 1978, p. 28, Art. 2.

[56] "Joint Bloc Statement to the Fourth UNCTAD," *Foreign Trade*, September 1976, Supplement, p. 21, item 8.

[57] US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., p. 28.

[58] UNCTAD, op. cit., p. 22, item 49.

[59] "India and Russia Sign a 15-Year Pact," *The Statesman* (Calcutta and New Delhi), March 15, 1979.

[60] US Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Commercial Operations in the West*, ER 77-10486, Washington, DC, September 1977.

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The March 1978 signing in Moscow of a long-term agreement between the USSR and the Kingdom of Morocco on economic and technical cooperation in the phosphate industry: at the left, Moroccan Prime Minister Ahmed Osman; at the right, Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

form of cooperation into production (something that the East Europeans do not hesitate to do).

Although the USSR is now using various forms to extend its participation in the international division of labor, industrial cooperation agreements compensated through a share of the production have thus far been regarded as the most efficacious. At UN meetings, the Soviet Union promotes long-term industrial cooperation, especially in the extractive sector, as offering a number of solutions to Third World problems: it provides necessary development funds, paves the way for the establishment of local processing industries, alleviates indebtedness, and introduces a measure of stability in the market. Back in the USSR, however, these ventures are justified more in terms of giving the USSR a steady supply of raw materials that are either in scarce supply or increasingly expensive to produce.[61]

There are few data on the actual returns the USSR might be getting from the production cooperation and pay-back arrangements or on how dependent it is prepared to become on them. According to Soviet figures, during 1978 almost 24 percent of imports from the LDC's originated in Soviet-assisted enterprises.[62] Western specialists have calculated that 40 percent of the total raw material supply for the Soviet aluminum industry comes from imports, half of which, in turn, comes from the LDC's.[63] Significantly, the aluminum industry was one of the economic sectors singled out in the USSR's 10th Five-Year Plan for expansion and modernization by means of foreign trade exchanges. Another sector thus designated was the fertilizer industry.[64] Accordingly, the USSR signed a $2 billion agreement with Morocco in March 1978 providing for Soviet aid in the exploitation of Moroccan phosphate deposits, to be repaid in kind over a 30-year period.[65]

More recently, the accumulation of petrodollars and the achievement of significant levels of development have made it possible for some Soviet partners to engage in straight commercial transactions with the USSR. The Soviets are eager to, and do, sell turn-key projects, set up joint business enterprises, engage in subcontracting, and offer patents and licenses for sale

[61] N. Shmelev, "Socialism and the World Economy" *MEMO*, No. 10, 1976, pp. 3-18.

[62] *Foreign Trade*, No. 6, 1979, p. 12.

[63] Theodore Shabad, "Raw Material Problems of the Soviet Aluminum Industry," US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., p. 672.

[64] Lawrence J. Brainard, "Soviet Foreign Trade Planning," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., p. 697.

[65] *Vneshnyaya torgovlya*, No. 6, 1977, p. 29; and UNCTAD, op. cit., p. 19, item 41.

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to countries like Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria, as well as certain countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia.[66]

Efforts are still made to differentiate Soviet commercial deals or investment from similar practices by Western firms. It is argued that while integrated operations by Western multinational corporations increase the "profits" of the monopolies, projects undertaken by socialist countries add to the "national income of each partner."[67] On a more sophisticated level, it is claimed that since Soviet capital participates in joint ownership for only a specified and limited period, after which the USSR is bought out by the local partner, that capital's functions are qualitatively different from those of private Western capital.[68] It is also contended that since the repayment of credits and payment for services are in no way related to profits of the enterprise but are disbursed in annual payments agreed upon in advance, they again in no way resemble the capitalist form of joint equity.[69]

Yet some Soviet economists take a more level-headed, practical approach to East-West cooperation in the Third World. Rather than engaging in such invidious comparisions of Soviet and Western operations, they suggest that commercial deals and tripartite ventures involving both socialist and capitalist countries necessitate serious study because of the problems created by the "differences in the partners' socioeconomic systems, in managerial methods, in economic managerial regulations."[70]

Implications

What is the significance of ongoing Soviet scholarly debate on means of internationalizing the Soviet economy and the indicated signs of change in the aid and trade patterns of the USSR? Clearly, the evidence is still insufficient to argue that new economic motivations have gained an ascendancy over political considerations in the Soviet Union's economic relationships with the Third World. However, the persistence of the discussions and the evolution of practice indicate that in many quarters people are coming to recognize the economic factors as compelling and perhaps decisive. Naturally, like every other country, the USSR looks out for its own interests first of all. But the context in which many Soviets in positions of influence now conceive of their country's self-interest has altered considerably.

Five aspects of the new economic thinking and activity are especially significant in having qualified former intransigent and narrow perspectives. First, Soviet-Third World relations are now being viewed in the framework of an interdependent global economy, an outlook that militates against a "zero-sum" game approach. Such a premise puts into question as impractical and counterproductive the drive to cut the West off from its raw material resources, or any other economically subversive and unilateral action.

Second, seeing the USSR primarily as an industrial state conflicts with ideological claims about the common Soviet-LDC anti-imperialist front. As a modern, highly developed state, the USSR is vitally interested in promoting the extraction and processing of raw materials that are essential for the operation of its own and other advanced economies.

Third, the search for economic advantage renders cooperation with the West less odious. If the USSR finds it profitable to intermesh with the existing order, Moscow will not seek to subvert or replace this system but only to readjust to it (or have it readjusted) so that more benefits can be derived from joining it.

Fourth, internationalization of the Soviet economy perforce is making it interact increasingly in a situation where market forces and capitalist relations predominate. This in turn will necessitate extensive readjustments in Soviet methods of planning and administering foreign operations.

Finally, Moscow is coming to terms with the fact that the Third World wishes to, and can, attain development by continuing to deal with the capitalist states. This, plus the fact that the USSR itself is no longer averse to cooperating with the West in various schemes, further undermines the old claims about the Soviets and the LDC's sharing an anti-imperialist unity on the economic front.

The degree to which these new perceptions will reshape Soviet policies regarding the LDC's and the NIEO can only be a matter of hesitant speculation at present. It is obvious that the Russians have not come to any clear-cut decision. Also, there is no indication that the new outlook is fully shared by the leadership. And even if it were, the economic and diplomatic situation in the world is such as to discourage the adoption of new economic policies on all fronts.

What one can safely predict for the near future is that the Soviets will continue to straddle the dilemma inherent in the USSR's conflicting political stance and its economic needs by combining anti-imperialist sloganeering with a search for greater and more prof-

[66] N. Tret'yukhin, loc. cit., p. 14; A. Gromyko and V. Lopatov, loc. cit., pp. 14-15.

[67] See, for instance, Yu. Shiryayev, op. cit.

[68] G. Prokhorov, Ed., op. cit., p. 209.

[69] L. Zevin, *Economic Cooperation . . .*, pp. 201-02.

[70] Ibid., p. 203; and I. Savyolova, "East-West Cooperation," *Foreign Trade*, No. 4, 1977, p. 30.

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itable participation in the world market. (Whether one sees in this a cautious probing for adaptation to a new situation or a cynically purposeful drive for domination depends on the observer's own point of view.) Thus, countless official statements and articles continue to denounce capitalist exploitation and offer general Soviet support for a radical restructuring of the world economy or of its commodity sectors. But some paragraphs further on one encounters warnings about the interdependent nature of world trade flows or about the need to institute commodity prices that are fair to both producer and consumer and are based on more or less modified market forces. This ambivalence is also evident from the fact that the Soviets seek to set themselves apart, by claiming that their bloc and the LDC's have established a "fundamentally different and truly equitable relationship," at the same time that they propose creation of an International Trade Organization so that the bloc can be included and consulted in the North-South and the NIEO dialogues. The urgency of practical solutions is such that it does not inhibit Moscow from advocating and engaging in tripartite cooperation. And the Soviet bloc statement to UNCTAD V this spring in Manila unabashedly proposed, right alongside a call for the liquidation of the "inequitable position of the young states in the world capitalist market," that there be "assurance" as well of a "proper share for the socialist countries in world trade, especially in industrial goods."[71]

It would be foolhardy to equate the changing Soviet perceptions and practices with the dawning of a new era. But it would be equally unwise to ignore the evidence of an emerging moderation and constructiveness in the Soviet approach. These are manifest in Soviet urgings that the LDC's avoid "economic extremism," and in the CPSU's eagerness to obtain from scholars the right answers to the dilemmas posed by the changing profile of the Third World. Similarly, a more open-minded stance can be detected in Brezhnev's statement:

In our times the world is socially uneven; it is composed of states with different social systems. That is objective fact. The socialist part of the world with its domestic development and its approach to international relations gives a good example of the ways to best solve the big problems facing mankind. But it cannot, of course, solve them for all of mankind. For that, there is need of purposeful efforts on the part of each country, . . . broad and constructive cooperation of all countries, all peoples.[72]

Since this reassessment and various Soviet calls for dialogue take place in the context of increasingly cautious and pessimistic commentary on Third World developments in general, we must take careful note of these trends. Analysts must watch how Moscow juggles the multiple considerations and see in what instances and in what areas these gropings for new departures become sufficiently clear and articulate to signal a promise of qualitative change in policies.

[71] "Eliminate Inequality," *Pravda* (Moscow), May 9, 1979, p. 5.

[72] Quoted in Dzherman Gvishiani, "Global Modeling," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Moscow), No. 8, 1978, p. 61.

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Afghanistan Under the Khalq

by Louis Dupree

The leftist coup d'état of April 27, 1978, which toppled the government of Afghanistan headed by President Mohammad Daoud was brought on by a series of accidents. Its outcome was also the result of accident and makeshift arrangements—of spur-of-the-moment action rather than of elaborate planning.[1]

The events which precipitated the coup began with bloodshed on April 17, when Mir Akbar Khyber, a well-known leftist ideologue, was murdered in Kabul by persons whose identity has still not been determined.[2] Massive demonstrations at Khyber's burial rites on April 19, during which an estimated 10,000–15,000 mourners took to the streets and marched past the United States Embassy shouting anti-American slogans, surprised both foreign and Afghan observers. Alarmed, the government of Mohammad Daoud arrested the leading politicians of the Left, but not before Hafizullah Amin, strong man of the *Khalq* (People's) party, contacted military cadres sympathetic to the Left with which he had long been in touch. A makeshift plan was drawn up, and the coup was launched on the morning of April 27, as the cabinet met to consider the fate of the people who had been arrested.

When the coup succeeded less than 24 hours later, the five-year-old Republic of Afghanistan lay shattered. President Daoud and some 30 members of his family—men, women, and children—had been killed. An additional thousand persons had probably died in fighting in and around Kabul. In their first public statements, the leaders of the newly declared Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) insisted that they were not Communists and that their policies would be based on Afghan nationalism, respect for Islam, economic and social justice, nonalignment in foreign affairs, and respect for all international agreements signed by previous Afghan governments. Few could object to such noble intentions. But as often happens after bloody changes of power such as this, the new regime's primary interest soon became the pursuit of legitimacy and security, at the expense of the human rights or economic well-being of the country's population.

Before trying to understand what has happened in Afghanistan since the coup, however, it is necessary to have some sense of the people and parties who made it. In the following pages, the background of the Left in Afhanistan since the early part of this century will be summarized. Then the policies adopted by the DRA regime and the tensions within the ruling coalition will be examined in order to clarify the forces which have determined the course of events in the country since April 1978—including the rise of opposition movements fighting to topple the new order. The regime's international status—i.e., its ties with the Soviet Union, its difficulties with its eastern and western neighbors, and its effect on superpower rivalry in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf—will also be discussed. A concluding section will be devoted to prognoses for the future.

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[1] For a detailed discussion of the accidents which led to the coup, see Louis Dupree, "Inside Afghanistan, Yesterday and Today: A Strategic Appraisal," *Strategic Studies: Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies* (Islamabad), Vol. 2, No. 3, Spring 1979, pp. 64–83. In addition, I am preparing an hour-by-hour account of the coup for publication as an American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) report.

[2] A blanket of silence descended over the killing after the coup. The question still remains whether Khyber was killed by the Daoud government or by a rival leftist group.

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Who actually made the coup against the Daoud regime? Initial Western press reports erroneously portrayed the leaders of the DRA as unknown quantities, members of a shadowy, illegal, underground Communist group. Political parties, however, had long flourished in Afghanistan as "extralegal" entities, with no legislation in existence to explicitly prohibit or permit them.[3] The Constitution passed by the Great National Assembly (*Loya Jirgah*) in 1964 called for the enactment of a Political Parties Law, and parliament actually passed such a bill. King Mohammad Zahir's refusal to promulgate the law was at least partly responsibile for the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and left unregulated the status of political parties of all hues in the country.

Leftist Movements, 1917–78

On the left of the political spectrum, we know that as early as the 1920's Afghan socialists traveled to and from the USSR, but primarily as individuals. No socialist agitation took place in Afghanistan because the Soviets wanted to cultivate better relations with the reform-minded and anti-British King Amanullah (1919–29). Under Soviet influence, Amanullah tried to move his country too far, too fast, too soon, and with too little internal support,[4] however, and his downfall during the 1929 tribal revolts which rocked the country was a setback for Soviet policy. General Mohammad Nadir, a distant cousin of Amanullah, came to the throne and followed cautious, conservative policies. These policies were continued after his assassination in 1933. Nadir's son, Mohammad Zahir (1933–73), became king, but Zahir's uncles held the reins of power until 1953.

In spite of periodic persecutions, the sparks of liberalism remained alive in Afghanistan during this period, fanned in 1947 by the creation of the reform-minded brotherhood, *Wikh-i-Zalmayan* (Awakened Youth).[5] The first public acknowledgment of the existence in the country of organized leftist movements occurred during the "Liberal Parliament" period (1949–52) which began two years later, when the government held relatively free elections (by Afghan standards). About 50 left-oriented candidates won and occupied seats in the 120-member parliament which replaced what had previously been a rubber-stamp, primarily appointed legislative body. A number of new newspapers appeared, published by urban liberal or regional, pro-Pushtun political factions. Principal among them were *Nida-yi-Khalq* (Voice of the People), *Watan* (Homeland), and *Angar* (Burning Embers). Such newspaper titles were themselves indicative of the ferment in the land. Conservative elements in the royal family interpreted the rising popularity of the leftist/liberal opposition as a threat to the status quo. As a result, the government crushed

A demonstration in support of the revolutionary government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in the streets of Kabul in May 1979. The women in the foreground bear portraits of President Nur Mohammad Taraki.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[3] See Louis Dupree, "A Note on Afghanistan," *AUFS Reports: South Asia Series* (Hanover, NH), Vol. 4, No. 2, Appendix A, December 1971, for a list of extralegal parties and their chief functionaries.

[4] L. Adamec, *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Tucson, AZ, University of Arizona Press, 1974; L. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1973; and R. T. Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan, 1914–1929*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1973.

[5] R. Akramovich, *Outline History of Afghanistan After the Second World War*, Moscow, Nauka, 1966, pp. 45–67; Mir Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar-Masir-i-Tarikh* (Afghanistan's Path Through History), Kabul, Afghanistan Ministry of Information and Culture, 1968; and L. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 496–97. For an excellent, measured, leftist interpretation of modern historical processes in Afghanistan, see F. Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," *New Left Review* (London), November–December 1978, pp. 3–44.

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Tradition in rural Afghanistan: peasants praying toward Mecca.

—Laurence Brun/Camera Press.

the nascent liberal movement before elections scheduled for 1952. Its leaders were arrested, and its newspapers were banned.

The impact of the "Liberal Parliament" period lingered, however, and this and other factors led Lieutenant-General Mohammad Daoud Khan, first cousin and brother-in-law of the king, to seize power from his uncle, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan, in a bloodless coup in September 1953.[6] To balance the tilt of the previous regime away from the Soviet Union and toward the West, Prime Minister Daoud promptly invited—and received—large infusions of Soviet economic and military assistance for his country. Contrary to widespread belief, Soviet aid to Afghanistan did not begin with Daoud's rise to power. It had its origins in Soviet subsidies granted in 1919. But there can be little doubt that with the turn of events precipitated by Daoud's action, Afghanistan's "big gamble" on the USSR had begun.

Why did the Soviets take the plunge into foreign assistance for Afghanistan so soon after World War II? The answer is rather complicated, but boils down to a theme articulated repeatedly by Nikita Khrushchev when he was First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU): the ultimate victory of world communism over capitalism through peaceful competition in the developing world.[7] In part, Soviet planners took their cue from the success of the Marshall Plan, under which the United States helped rejuvenate the wrecked economy of Western Europe. Why, reasoned Soviet planners, could economic assistance not be used to gain control of selected nations in the developing world? In short, Afghanistan became a sort of "economic Korea," that is, a testing ground on which to determine whether or not simple economic penetration could enable the USSR to shape the recipient nation's social and political institutions, and on which to gauge the economic responses of the West—particularly the United States—just as Korea had constituted an arena for testing the military responses and perseverance of the US and its allies.

Of course, the analogy with the Marshall Plan was flawed, for it overlooked—as both the US and the USSR have been wont to do—the human and cultural factors involved in economic development. To institutionalize change in the economic sector of a developing society requires shifts in emphasis (at times for better, at times for worse) in values, attitudes, and belief systems. World War II may have smashed the economic superstructure of Western Europe, but it did not alter its sociopolitical belief systems or institutions.

[6] The other factors included Afghanistan's tilt to the West, the slow pace of development projects, disagreements on the "Pushtunistan" issue, and Daoud's personal ambition.

[7] See, for example, N. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1959, pp. 1–18.

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Therefore, only money and machines, not whole new sets of values, were needed for recovery. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, what was needed was a sociopolitical transformation to accommodate the requirements of economic growth in a country where little development in the modern, post-industrial-revolution sense of the word had ever taken place.

As might have been expected under these circumstances, the first decade of Daoud Khan's rule (1953–63) brought rapid change in certain economic areas—especially in the development of the country's economic infrastructure[8]—and certain social institutions; but political growth virtually stagnated.[9] A flare-up of the Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan[10] in September 1961 resulted in the closing of the border between the two countries and the loss to Afghanistan of access to its Indian Ocean trade outlets. During the subsequent 18 months, Afghan dependency on transit facilities through the USSR increased tremendously until in March 1963 Prime Minister Daoud, sensing that greater balance between East and West had to be restored to his country's trade and aid position, took a step few strongmen have considered and resigned at the height of his personal power. After considerable negotiation brokered by the Shah of Iran, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was reopened in May of the same year.

Daoud's resignation heralded another abortive experiment in parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. A *Loya Jirgah* (Great National Assembly), partly appointed and partly elected, passed a new constitution which was promulgated by King Mohammad Zahir in October 1964. The country held two elections under this constitution—in 1965 and 1969—but several factors inhibited the institutionalization of the process, and the third election, scheduled for August-September 1973, was never held.

During the ten years of parliamentarism under Mohammad Zahir, the king vacillated and repeatedly refused to implement constitutional provisions for the authorization of political parties and the creation of provincial and municipal councils. Some of the king's closest advisers insisted that legalizing political parties would permit "Communist" (by which they meant "antimonarchist") groups to increase their strength. But the truth is that leftist parties were already functioning in the country, encouraged in their activism by the liberalized Press Law of 1965.

The first important leftist newspaper founded during this period was *Khalq* (The Masses, or The People), published by Nur Mohammad Taraki and edited by the poet Bareq Shafiyee. Six issues of the paper appeared between April 11 and May 16, 1966. The *Khalq* organization, headed by Taraki, announced that it would work to alleviate "the boundless agonies of the oppressed peoples of Afghanistan" and linked itself with the forces of international socialism in statements such as, ". . . the main issue of contemporary times and the center of class struggle on a worldwide basis, which began with the Great October Socialist Revolution, is the struggle between international socialism and international capitalism."

Outcries against *Khalq* arose from many quarters, particularly from among religious leaders in the parliament's *Meshrano Jirgah* (Upper House), 20 members of which demanded a governmental investigation.[11] Responding to accusations that it was anti-Islamic, antimonarchist, and anticonstitutional, *Khalq* asserted that it was not opposed to the principles of Islam, that it favored the fundamental rights embodied in the constitution, and that it recognized the necessity of the monarchy "at this stage of Afghanistan's development." Still, since *Khalq*'s advocacy of land reform and of public as opposed to private ownership of certain types of property was widely held to be contrary to the tenets of Islam, the Attorney-General's office, invoking Article 1 of the 1965 Press Law which made one of the law's goals the safeguarding of the fundamentals of Islam,[12] banned the organization's paper on May 23, 1966. Even many non-leftist Afghans considered this decision a mistake.

Slightly over a year later, the *Khalq* organization split into two groups, *Khalq* proper, led by Taraki, and the breakaway *Parcham*, led by Babrak Karmal,

[8] One interesting side-effect of development under Daoud was that great-power competition evolved into de facto (if not de jure) cooperation. For example, the United States assisted the Afghans in building roads from south to north; the USSR, from north to south. The roads obviously had to link up. For other examples, see L. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, op. cit., pp. 526–30.

[9] Ibid, pp. 530–38.

[10] The dispute centers on the status of the Pushtun tribes on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. See ibid., p. 485 and passim; and L. Dupree, "Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part I: *The First Five Steps*," *AUFS Reports: Asia* (Hanover, NH), No. 1, February 1978, pp. 7–9.

[11] The *Meshrano Jirgah* had 84 members. The king appointed 28; each of the 28 provinces appointed 1; and each provincial council was to elect 1. Since provincial councils were never elected, though, the *Meshrano Jirgah* functioned—many Afghan lawyers say unconstitutionally—with only two thirds of its legally mandated membership.

[12] Paragraph 3 of the first article of the law stipulated that "The goals which the law aims to secure consist of: safeguarding the fundamentals of Islam, constitutional monarchy, and other values enshrined in the Constitution."

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The late Mohammad Daoud, right, then President of the Republic of Afghanistan, reviews an honor guard at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport in April 1977. At the left is N.V. Podgornyy, then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

whose policy and personality conflicts with Taraki will be discussed later in this article. The new faction's newspaper, *Parcham* (Banner), published and edited at first by Mohammad Suleyman Laek, a poet, and edited at the end by Mir Akbar Khyber, first appeared on March 14, 1968. Shortly afterward, on April 4, another breakaway group from *Khalq* put out the first issue of a paper called *Shu'la-yi-Jawed* (Eternal Flame), of which Dr. Rahim Mahmudi served as editor and publisher. Both newspapers continued to appear until banned during the 1969 election campaign.

Shu'la, as the faction behind *Shu'la-yi-Jawed* was called, was led by Mohammad Osman Landai, the brothers Sadeq and Akram Yayari, and the Mahmudi family and was often referred to as "pro-Peking," while *Parcham* was considered "pro-Moscow." These were very loose terms, at best, of course. In addition, many urban Afghans believed that a connection existed between the ruling "establishment" and *Parcham,* which they jokingly, but pointedly, called the "Royal Communist Party." *Khalq* maintained an acknowledged independent stance. A final split in the Left occurred when Taher Badakhshi left *Parcham* to form *Setem-i-Meli* (Against National Oppression), whose manifesto called for Maoist-type mobilization and a localization of power in the countryside, i.e., for a combination of Maoism and ethnocentrism.[13]

With the king undecided on the direction in which he wanted his country to go and leftist organizations multiplying, other forces came into play. Former Prime Minister Daoud, convinced that Afghanistan's experiment in democracy had failed, seized power on July 17, 1973, in an almost bloodless coup aimed not only against the government but against the king and the monarchy as well. Daoud was supported by large numbers of young, reform-minded army, air force, and police officers who, although trained for the most part in the USSR, were more nationalist than Communist in outlook. Daoud proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan and was declared its Founder, President, and Prime Minister.

[13] For other leftist papers that appeared and disappeared during this period, see L. Dupree, "A Note on Afghanistan, 1971," loc. cit.

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Initially, Babrak Karmal's *Parcham* supported the Daoud republic, and immediately after the coup Daoud sent about 160 enthusiastic young *Parchamis* to the provinces as administrators, to spread the message of the new regime. However, the rural provincial elites effectively isolated these eager but inexperienced urban officials from the people. Frustrated, most of them cynically turned either as corrupt as their predecessors or more so; returned to Kabul and resigned or were dismissed; or decided to work within existing rural patterns to bring about change. It is not surprising, therefore, that by mid-1975 Daoud had effectively reduced the power of *Parcham*.

This experience over, Daoud moved to push ahead with his reform programs—at least on paper.[14] In early 1977, a partly elected, partly appointed *Loya Jirgah* approved a new constitution. The nation waited for the president to appoint a new cabinet, and most observers hoped that he would bring in new blood, including some moderate leftists. But at this crucial turning point—in the opinion of this author, the crucial turning point—Mohammad Daoud reverted to the behavior of an old tribal khan. He appointed friends, sons of friends, sychophants, and even collateral members of the deposed royal family.

Disdaining to actually rely on this official cabinet, Daoud began to depend more and more on an "inner cabinet" consisting of Sayyid Abdulillah (Vice President of the Republic), General Ghulam Haider Rasuli (Minister of National Defense), Abdul Qader-Nuristani (Minister of the Interior), and Mohammad Naim (Daoud's brother). A constitutional cabinet crisis developed when Daoud personally appointed the Central Committee *(Shura Markazi)* of the National Revolutionary Party *(Hezb-i-Inqelab-i-Meli),* the one party permitted under the constitution. Six ministers resigned in protest. They withdrew their resignations at the personal request of the president, but it was clear that Daoud was in trouble.

Meanwhile, *Khalq* and *Parcham* reunited in July 1977 to oppose the regime. But even they did not dream that events would move as quickly as they did in 1978 and that they would find themselves in power on April 27.

The First Cabinet of the DRA

The *Khalq-Parcham* regime installed after the coup of April 27, 1978, moved quickly to create a framework within which it could establish its "legitimacy." On April 30, Decree No. 1 of the 35-member Revolutionary Council in control after the coup announced that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan would be governed by decrees and regulations issued by the council itself and that Nur Mohammad Taraki, "the great national and revolutionary figure of Afghanistan," who had held the post of Secretary-General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan *(Jamiyat-i-Demokratiqi-yi Khalq*—PDPA) since its formation in 1965, had been chosen as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.

Decree No. 2, issued on the following day, named 21 people selected by the council to serve as cabinet members. Of the ministers appointed, 13 had been full or alternate members of the original 1965 Central Committee of the PDPA, which had a total of only 9 full and 10 alternate members. Three of the appointees were military men, reflecting the same proportional representation that the military had on the Revolutionary Council doing the appointing. At least 10 of the civilian appointees had participated in the 1965 and 1969 national elections, and five of these had been elected. None of the 21 had ever denied leftist political leanings, and none had ever expressed loyalty to any country other than Afghanistan. To the extent that it can be determined, none had ever attended or been invited to attend international Communist meetings.

Those looking for signs of Soviet influence on the course of events might charge that Moscow has often camouflaged its role during transitional periods and that the absence of obvious representatives of Soviet interests in the cabinet immediately after the Afghan coup simply reflected the way Communists operate under similar circumstances. But a case can also be made, as this author tried to point out shortly after the coup, that "governments, like persons, should be considered innocent until proven guilty."[15]

Except for the 61-year-old Taraki, the civilian cabinet members ranged between 40 and 50 years of age. The three military men named as ministers were younger still. Only Taraki and Babrak could be even remotely connected with activities of the *Wikh-i-Zalmayan* period. Most of the others cut their political teeth during the decade of constitutional "new democracy" between 1963 and 1973. Five of the ministers had been jailed at least once for their political activities.

[14] L. Dupree, "Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Parts I and II," *AUFS Reports: Asia*, Nos. 1 and 2, February 1978.

[15] *The New York Times*, May 28, 1978. A final observation in my letter, which the newspaper did not publish was: "Their [the government's] actions will speak louder than innuendos."

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Aside from the age factor, some interesting characteristics of the original post-coup cabinet also become apparent when its membership is broken down by party affiliation, educational background, occupation, and ethnolinguistic group. Eleven of the ministers were *Khalq* members, but two of these had considered themselves independent prior to the coup. Ten ministers belonged to *Parcham*.[16] Ten cabinet members had received some advanced education in the United States; two, in Egypt; and one each, in France and West Germany. Four had studied exclusively in Afghanistan. Only the three military men in the cabinet had received training in the USSR, and they considered themselves nationalists rather than pro-Russian.[17] Almost all of the ministers knew English, while only four (including the three military men) knew Russian. With regard to occupation, 11 cabinet members had held government jobs at the time of the coup—three in the military, two on the faculty of Kabul University, one on the staff of Radio Afghanistan, and five in the civil service. In addition, the group included three unemployed writers (including journalists); two doctors, two lawyers, and two academics—all unemployed; and a landlord. In terms of ethnolinguistic background, 11 ministers were Pushtun, the dominant ethnolinguistic group in the country, which accounts for about 50 percent of the population. Six were Persian-speaking Tajik; two, Persian-speaking Hazara; and two, Turkic-speaking Uzbek. All spoke both Pashto and Persian, the two dominant languages of Afghanistan.[18]

An argument could be made based on these data that the post-coup cabinet headed by Taraki was moderately representative of Afghan social and cultural realities. But there would be little point in pursuing such an argument since the cabinet alignment established by Revolutionary Council Decree No. 2 was very short-lived.

Below the cabinet level, the new regime tried to enlist the support of some elements of Afghan society and smashed others. The jails quickly overflowed with surviving members of the royal family (uncles, aunts, cousins, men, women, and children),[19] as well as with large numbers of qualified technocrats—able administrators with technical skills—whose sole transgression was that they had held responsible positions in previous regimes. The DRA replaced these invaluable individuals mostly with *Khalq* members, qualified or not. Estimates of the pre-coup *Khalq* membership varied from 10,000 to 50,000, but in Afghanistan the safest way to look at statistics of this sort is often to lop off the last zero. The cabinet ministers of the new regime were generally competent. But because of the restricted size of the manpower pool from which administrators had to be chosen, the government encountered a great shortage of able and experienced, action-oriented, middle- and upper-level administrators.

The Coalition Splits

Generally, when coalitions of the Left or Right succeed in toppling a regime, fission occurs almost immediately, and the *Khalq-Parcham* combination proved no exception. With the leaders of the order eliminated, the dominant *Khalq* element of the new leadership decided to remove Babrak and his *Parcham* followers from positions of power.

Babrak's political career indicated a certain flexibility and willingness to bend with the wind, combined with tremendous ambition which Taraki and the PDPA could hardly ignore. As has already been discussed, Babrak, a charismatic former student leader and a spellbinding orator, broke away from Taraki's *Khalq* in 1967, taking with him such leading leftists as Mir

[16] The original cabinet roster was as follows (M=full member of 1965 Central Committee of PDPA; A=alternate member of the 1965 Central Committee; *=no longer in cabinet). From *Khalq:* Nur Mohammad Taraki (M)—Prime Minister; Hafizullah Amin (A)—Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Abdul Karim Misaq (A)—Minister of Finance; Dr. Saleh Mohammad Ziray (M)—Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation; Abdul Hakim Sherai (A)—Minister of Justice and Attorney-General; Dr. Shah Wali (M)—Minister of Public Health; Ghulam Dastigir Panjshiri (M)—Minister of Education; Mohammad Esmail Danesh (A)—Minister of Mines and Industries; Mohammad Mansur Hashemi—Minister of Water and Power; Mahmud Suma—Minister of Higher Education; Abdul Qodus Ghorbandi—Minister of Commerce. From *Parcham:* *Babrak Karmal (M)—Deputy Prime Minister; *Colonel Abdul Qader—Minister of National Defense; *Nur Ahmad Nur (M)—Minister of the Interior; *Soltan Ali Keshtmand (M)—Minister of Planning; *Mohammad Suleyman Laek (A)—Minister of Radio and Television; *Major Mohammad Rafi—Minister of Public Works; *Dr. Anahita Ratebzad—Minister of Social Affairs and Tourism; *Nezamoddin Tahzib—Minister of Frontier Affairs; Major Mohammad Aslam Watanjar—Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications; Mohammad Hasan Bareq-Shafii (A)—Minister of Information and Culture.

[17] Apparently, as one Kabul wit remarked, the United States trains Communists, while the Soviets produce anti-Communists.

[18] For a discussion of the various ethnolinguistic groups in Afghanistan, see L. Dupree, *Afghanistan,* op. cit., pp. 55–247; idem, "Anthropology in Afghanistan," *AUFS Reports: South Asia Series,* No. 20 (5), December 1976; and idem, "Language and Politics in Afghanistan," *Contributions to Asian Studies* (Leiden), Vol. 11, 1978, pp. 131–41.

[19] Thus far, 73 women and children have been released, most of whom have joined relatives outside Afghanistan. For the list, see *Kabul Times* (Kabul), Oct. 26, 1978.

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Akbar Khyber, Mohammad Suleyman Laek, and Dr. Anahita Ratebzad.[20] Babrak chose to work within the political system during the 1963–73 parliamentary period and dominated session after session of the national legislature with his eloquence and showmanship. His clear purpose was to stay visible and viable. At the same time, he maintained close ties with the Soviet embassy. Babrak had some followers among younger military officers, but his main support came from urban students and intellectuals.

All of this was in marked contrast to Taraki's political posture. After Taraki participated (and was defeated) in the 1965 elections, he decided to withdraw from public view. He and *Khalq* favored a less flamboyant, more evolutionary approach to power, slowly recruiting cadres among the military, middle- and lower-range civil servants, the small but growing number of urban workers, and, particularly, provincial teachers, who were largely drawn from rural backgrounds. *Khalq* also took a harder line than *Parcham* on the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan.

Babrak, like Daoud, sensed the demise of the "new democracy" in the early 1970's. The inaction of the parliament and its interminable squabbles with the executive had caused many observers to believe that the king would call off the elections set for 1973, dissolve the legislature, and rule by royal decree. Babrak threw in the lot of *Parcham* with the Daoud plotters. As noted above, Daoud exploited *Parcham* and by mid-1975 had effectively discredited it as a serious political force. Ever resilient, though, Babrak negotiated a reunion with *Khalq* in July 1977, and by May 1978 found himself a Vice Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

During the hectic first few months of consolidation of the DRA regime, the behind-the-scenes struggle for power intensified. Babrak did not remain idle. He tried to elicit support from such important nationalist figures as Abdul Qader, a colonel who had been a key figure in both the 1973 and 1978 coups in Kabul and who had been named Minister of National Defense and promoted to Major-General by Taraki, but Qader rejected his overtures. The important military units stationed in Kabul also favored Taraki and *Khalq* strong man Amin. The *Parcham* leaders found even their Soviet friends pragmatic—and unhelpful.

Once the inability of *Parcham's* leaders to defend their position became clear, the *Khalq*-dominated Revolutionary Council under Taraki moved quickly against them. Most, including Babrak, were "exiled"

[20] As indicated in fn. 16, Laek and Ratebzad both ultimately became *Parcham* members of the first post-coup cabinet.

Abdul Qader, Afghan military figure promoted to major-general and named Minister of National Defense in the Revolutionary Council established after the 1978 coup in Afghanistan. Qader was one of a number of Muslim nationalists expelled from that body in August 1978.

—Wide World.

to ambassadorships[21]—a method which Daoud Khan had used effectively earlier to immobilize elements opposed to his regime.

With the *Parcham* elite defanged—at least temporarily—the *Khalq* government felt free to move against a more formidable group, the powerful nationalist-Muslim factions both inside and outside the cabinet. In late August, the government arrested (among other representatives of these groups) Major-General Qader, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Shapur Ahmadzai, and Dr. Mir Ali Akbar, President of Jamhuriat Hospital, and charged them with plotting to overthrow the regime. The government also collected evidence which led to the arrest of two

[21] In July 1979, Babrak was posted to Prague; Nur Mohammad Nur, to Washington; Abdul Wakil, to London; and Mahmud Baryalay (Babrak's brother), to Islamabad. The only woman in the cabinet, Minister of Social Affairs and Tourism Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, was sent to Belgrade. Upon her departure, her ministry was abolished.

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other cabinet members: the Minister of Education, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohammad Rafi, who had been a key figure in the April 27 coup, and Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the Minister of Planning. Nizamuddin Tahzib, the Minister of Frontier Affairs, was placed under house arrest, though the nature of his ties to the others arrested was a matter of speculation in Kabul. It was clear, however, that all those arrested, except Shapur Ahmadzai, had *Parcham* connections.

The regime extracted confessions from all of these individuals by the means used in Afghanistan regardless of the regime in power—physical and mental torture, threats to family members, etc. The confessions were broadcast over Radio Afghanistan, and the government-controlled press media published facsimiles in the handwriting of the accused, a gimmick that past regimes also had used to "legitimize" confessions. Babrak was depicted as the instigator and ringleader of the plotters, but most of those involved appeared to be more nationalist-Muslim and in favor of a genuinely nonaligned Afghanistan. The Revolutionary Council expelled Babrak, Qader, Nur Ahmad Nur, Keshtmand, Rafi, and Dr. Anahita from the PDPA, and in October it ordered all the *Parcham* ambassadors home. Under the circumstances, they refused to comply, and they currently live somewhere in Eastern Europe.[22] Tahzib was dismissed from his cabinet post, expelled from the PDPA Central Committee, and downgraded to the simple status of "party rank and file."

Reform Programs of the *Khalq* Regime

Having preempted the leftist and nationalist-Muslim opposition, the *Khalq* regime introduced a set of new administrative procedures and announced a series of far-reaching reforms. As of this writing (July 1979), eight separate decrees have been promulgated by the Revolutionary Council.[23] The first two have already been discussed. Decree No. 3, issued on May 14, 1978, abrogated Daoud's 1973 constitution and established legal procedures to be followed until a new one could be written. Basically, the interim arrangement left the existing legal system intact, but a military court was founded "to try persons who have committed offenses against the Revolution." The decree also gave across-the-board promotions to lower ranks in the civil service and the military, in an attempt to broaden the regime's base of support.

Three decrees followed on June 12, 1978. Decree No. 4 announced a new design for the national flag and emblem: solid red with golden symbols. Decree No. 5 withdrew Afghan citizenship from 23 members of the royal family, most of whom were already living in Italy or Iran. And Decree No. 6, potentially of much greater significance than the other two, was a noble attempt to eliminate usury in the countryside. Decree No. 7, promulgated on October 17, 1978, confirmed the equal rights of women (already recognized by previous Afghan constitutions), regularized dowry and marriage expenses, and forbade forced marriages.

Finally, Decree No. 8, which appeared on November 28, 1978, introduced land reforms which laid stress on the private ownership of land, though within established limits. The decree encouraged the formation of cooperatives to facilitate the provision of credit to farmers and the distribution of fertilizer, seed, and other agricultural necessities. On paper, the land reforms appeared to be a mixture of idealized Maoist localization of power and of Yugloslav-style individual ownership within cooperatives. No mention was made of rural collectivization.

The Revolutionary Council also issued a number of laws and regulations which were for the most part charters to fight corruption and to assist in the creation of cooperatives and agricultural credit and loan

A 1979 photo of Afghan peasants who had gained ownership of land under reforms initiated by the revolutionary regime in Kabul.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[22] No one seems to know exactly where. Rumors are that the Kremlin is keeping the *Parcham* leadership under wraps as a possible alternate cabinet if the Taraki-Amin regime collapses. This is unlikely, but the possibility cannot be completely discounted.

[23] Full English-language texts can be obtained from the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in Washington, DC, or can be found in the *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* published by the Asia Society, 112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10021.

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facilities. The "Law Regulating Duties and Legislative Procedures of the Revolutionary Council" issued on March 31, 1979, gave the Revolutionary Council unlimited power to govern and was in effect an interim constitution.

Few observers could disagree with the ideals expressed in Decrees 6, 7, and 8 and in the laws and regulations which accompanied them. It is interesting in this regard that some of the measures proposed by the DRA regime resembled in a rough way laws and reform programs which had been proposed by Daoud. The mechanisms established for implementation appeared feasible.[24] However, to implement reforms, any regime needs both expertise and stability, and it soon became clear that the DRA regime was to have little of either.

On March 28, 1979, Hafizullah Amin, who had engineered the sudden coup which toppled Daoud, finally made it to the top of the DRA hierarchy. He became Prime Minister, while retaining the foreign affairs portfolio, in the "new" 18-man cabinet announced by Taraki, who remained President of the Revolutionary Council, Secretary-General of the PDPA, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Observers were thus faced with the curious spectacle of a "revolutionary" regime run by a prime minister who had been trained at Columbia University in the United States; and by a president who years earlier had served as cultural officer in the Embassy of the Royal Government of Afghanistan in Washington, DC (1952–53), on the Kabul staff of the US Agency for International Development (1955–58), and as a translator for the US Embassy in Afghanistan (1962–63).

All the ministers in the cabinet were *Khalq*, or *Parcham* converted to *Khalq*, and only two really new faces appeared in the "new" ministerial lineup—Engineer Sadiq Alam Yar as Minister of Planning and Khayal Mohammad Katawazi as Minister for Radio and Television. The places occupied earlier by *Parcham* and nationalist-Muslim representatives had already been filled by *Khalq* stalwarts: Abdul Rashid Jalili (Education), Sher Jan Mazdoor Yar (Interior), Sahib Jan Sahrayi (Frontier Affairs), and Sayyid Mohammad Gulabzoi (Communications).

Thus, the "new" cabinet legitimized Amin as number one in the power elite, while Taraki continued to play the role of "the Great Leader of the Afghan people." *Khalq* tightened its control at all levels of government in Kabul. But the native experts whose services it needed to run the country, though trained with great difficulty during 35 years of abortive development, were for the most part either sitting at home or lying in prison. Many of them, as has already been noted, had been supporters of Babrak's *Parcham*.

Hafizullah Amin, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, pictured in September 1978 when he was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Khalq *regime. Behind Amin is a photo of Nur Mohammad Taraki, President of the DRA, whom Amin succeeded as Prime Minister of the Kabul government.*

—Dilip Mehta/Contact.

The Opposition Takes the Field

Initially, little opposition surfaced to the DRA regime for three distinct reasons. First of all, most people were stunned by the coup. Second, a majority seemed to want to give the new government a chance to suc-

[24] *See L. Dupree, "Toward Representative Government in* Afghanistan, Parts I and II," loc. cit.

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Afghan Islamic forces opposed to the Khalq *regime gathered in April 1979 in Barkandei, an old district center in Afghanistan's Pich Valley (north of the Khyber Pass between Afghanistan and Pakistan), before returning to their posts in the mountains.*

—Alain Mingam-Gamma/Liaison.

ceed. And finally, the spring and summer are seasons of major economic activity in the countryside, and the immediate concerns of farming and herding kept the focus of attention of most of the country's population off Kabul politics. When the agricultural off-season arrived, however, unrest exploded in the rural areas. In Kabul, periodic explosions rocked the city and a plethora of *Shab Namah* ("evening news") reminded the regime that opposition did exist.[25]

The first major uprisings occurred among the culturally distinct Nuristani ethnic group, north of Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan.[26] By March 1979, the Nuristani rebels controlled most of the upper Kunar Valley and had actually declared an *Azad* (Free) Nuristan. Here was the first vivid warning that whatever regime rules in Afghanistan in the future, the demands of several ethnolinguistic groups for regional autonomy will have to be taken into account. At the very least, the claims of the Nuristani, Hazara, Badakhshi, and Baluchi will have to be realistically considered.[27]

Once the floodgates were opened, revolt—largely spontaneous and uncoordinated—spread to over half of Afghanistan's 28 provinces. Major disturbances occurred in Paktya, Ningrahar, Kapisa, Uruzgan, Parwan, Badghis, Balkh, Ghazni, Farah, and Herat. In Farah, rebels temporarily controlled a major air base at Shindand; and in Herat, rebels killed an undetermined number of Soviet technicians and their wives and children before army units loyal to the *Khalq* regime restored order.[28]

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[25] *Shab Namah* is recognized by all Afghans as a play on words. The great 11th century Persian poet Firdausi wrote a *Shah Namah*, or *History of the Kings*, and the present *Shab Namah* are understood as referring to the "history" or activities of the present "kings," i.e., the *Khalq* regime.

[26] While the Nuristani speak dialects of Indo-Aryan, their dialects and Persian and Pashto are not mutually understandable. The Nuristani are proud of their distinctive mountain culture and were only converted to Islam under duress by Amir Abdur Rahman in the last decade of the 19th century.

[27] See L. Dupree, "Imperialism in South Asia," *AUFS Reports: South Asia Series*, Vol. 20 (3), June 1976; and S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Fall 1978, pp. 136–60.

[28] Estimates of the number of Soviet citizens killed run as high as 50.

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In all, about ten rebel groups have been identified, with political orientations ranging from the secular Left, made up of *Parcham* survivors, to the monarchical Right, a group with only a minuscule following. Outside of the Pushtun geographic areas, the most important groups, some of which have been discussed here, are based on ethnolinguistic and regional criteria. Within the Pushtun areas, along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the three major opposition groups are religiously based. The *Ettehadi-Inqelabi-Islami-wa-Meli Afghanistan* (Islamic Nationalist Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan) is led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, an Islamic moderate from a family of well-known religious leaders. The *Jabhai-yi-Nejat-i-Meli* (National Liberation Front) consists of several loosely organized groups and is headed by Hazrat Sebratullah Mojadidi, a member of another leading religious family. Finally, there is the ultraconservative *Hezb-i-Islam* (Islamic Party), small but well organized, under the direction of Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This party has been in refuge in Pakistan since Daoud's coup of 1973. Rebel successes in April and May 1979 related directly to semicoordinated efforts by the opposition brought about when Gailani, on April 13, called for a *jihad* against the government.

To meet the challenge posed by widespread opposition, the government intensified its rhetoric and its repression. Regular armed forces units, supported by large numbers of Soviet advisers, were thrown into the fray.

On this basis, some observers have predicted failure for the tribal revolts in non-Pushtun areas. But tanks, planes, and superior technology do not necessarily win nationalist guerrilla wars. Add the religious factor, and resistance can stiffen even more. Still, argue those who see the tribals going down in defeat, the Bolsheviks in Russia were victorious over the autonomy-oriented Central Asian Muslim *basmachi* in the 1920's, and in Afghanistan one sees again a leftist regime at the center trying with Soviet support to quell Muslim unrest. In the opinion of the present author, however, the analogy chosen is not suitable. The Red Army, after all, invaded and crushed the Central Asian local Muslim soviets after the defeat of the White armies, and Bolshevik troops and colonists replaced those of the Tsar, who had been in Central Asia for a generation or so prior to the October Revolution.

Other observers have compared the current situation in Afghanistan to the situation the United States faced in Vietnam, but several significant differences are clear from the outset. The US sent soldiers thousands of miles across the ocean, while the USSR shares a common border with the country in crisis. In Vietnam, the war was fought by predominantly conscripted American and South Vietnamese troops, on the one hand, and by partly conscript Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army regulars, on the other; in Afghanistan, the fighting so far has been between the overwhelmingly conscript Afghan army and their Soviet advisers, on the one hand, and all-volunteer antigovernment forces (including some Pushtun tribesmen from the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border), on the other. Finally, although the USSR and China never committed large numbers of combat troops to the Vietnam war, the former and to a lesser extent the latter did render massive aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. There is no evidence to substantiate claims by Kabul and Moscow that outside forces are taking part in the fighting against the *Khalq* regime. If such involvement does exist, it has not been a major factor to date.

Hazrat Sebratullah Mojadidi, leader of Jabhai-yi-Nejat-i-Meli *(National Liberation Front), a grouping of organizations in Afghanistan opposed to the* Khalq *regime. Mojadidi is pictured in Peshawar, Pakistan, in early 1979.*

—Wide World.

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Whether the USSR will follow the American example in Vietnam by sending combat troops into Afghanistan to save the Kabul government is the question of the hour. The Soviets may be tempted to make a quick ground sweep, coupled with massive air strikes, to smash the rebels, and then to withdraw. But such operations seldom had lasting impact in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, and Moscow might find itself bogged down in lengthy warfare against an elusive enemy in Afghanistan, no matter what the Soviets' initial intentions. The presence of Soviet combat troops in the country would exacerbate already strained Soviet and Afghan relations with Pakistan and could also heighten great-power tensions in the entire "arc of crisis" stretching along the southern border of the USSR from Turkey in the west eastward to South Asia.

Tensions With Pakistan

Since the advent of the current regime in Kabul, over 165,000 refugees have flowed across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan and have settled in about 12 camps, from Gilgit in the northeast to Baluchistan in the southwest. Official figures on the number of refugees are lower but do not take into account refugees living with kinsmen on the Pakistani side of the border. The status and fate of the refugees have, of course, had a direct effect on Afghan-Pakistani relations.

At the highest official levels, relations between the two countries remain cordial, but they are cooling. The President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq visited Kabul in September 1978, and his round of talks with DRA leaders resulted in mutual expressions of "good will" and "peaceful feelings" across the border. High-powered Afghan and Pakistani commercial delegations have also exchanged visits, and improved and expanded transit facilities for goods passing through Pakistan to and from Afghanistan have resulted.

Gradually, and increasingly after February 1979, however, Radio Afghanistan has come to charge "prejudiced religious elements" in Iran and "reactionary circles" in Pakistan with aiding guerrilla fighters opposed to the Kabul government. It has accused Pakistan of sending Pakistani troops in disguise to attack Afghan border posts. Pakistan has denied this and issued countercharges of Afghan artillery attacks across the border into Pakistan and violations of Pakistani air space by Afghan military aircraft.

The official Afghan media did not accuse other countries by name of intervention until July 1979, when they singled out the United States and China in addition to Pakistan, but they have asserted for a long while that the regime is being threatened by "imperialistic, international conservatives and extreme rightists." The Soviet media were more explicit much earlier on. On April 1, 1979, *Pravda* (Moscow) accused Pakistan of providing "logistical and propaganda backing for the Muslim rebels fighting the Marxist government in Kabul," and on April 12 it stated that training camps for Afghan rebels, directed by Pakistanis, Chinese, Americans, and Egyptians, existed in Pakistan. All of the accused nations have denied these charges.

The root of the problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan, of course, is the Durand Line of 1893, which separates the two countries but also divides into separate segments ethnolinguistic groups whose primary loyalties remain largely tribal rather than national. The border has always been a sieve. During the Baluch insurrection of 1973–77, thousands of Baluchi fled from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and guerrillas drifted back and forth across the border with impunity. Afghan nationals can certainly do the same today, no matter how seriously the Pakistanis attempt to stem the flow.

The government of Pakistan considered the refugee problem a provincial-level matter until April 1979. As numbers increased and resources were stretched thin, however, President Zia decided to internationalize the problem, insisting that Pakistan had no choice but to admit the refugees "on humanitarian grounds." Zia suggested that conditions be created in Afghanistan so the refugees could return home, but he refrained from offering specific suggestions as to how such conditions should be established. In mid-May 1979, two representatives from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees arrived in Pakistan to discuss the problem with Zia's government, but as of this writing little has been done to improve the situation. Meanwhile, tensions have remained high between Kabul and Islamabad, and the longer these tensions persist, the greater the chance of direct great-power intervention and confrontation in the area.

The Role of the Great Powers

Despite numerous allegations to the contrary, the Soviets were not, in this author's estimation, directly involved in the "planning" of the "accidental coup" of April 27, 1978. Soviet military personnel may have played an advisory role during the fighting which fol-

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lowed the start of the coup, but if so, they were probably as surprised as everyone else at the rapid flip-flop of events.

Nor is the Taraki-Amin regime directly controlled by Moscow, although the Afghan leadership does associate itself with the "international socialist movement." Influence is one thing; domination, another. And the gray zones of power in between are always up for grabs. The regime in Kabul is Marxist and Communist, but these terms are used here only to refer to international socioeconomic and political orientation.

The Soviets have—logically—tried to take advantage of the results of the coup, which dumped an obviously Moscow-leaning government into their laps, ready or not. The Kremlin would like all observers to *assume* that it is in control in Kabul so that it can observe the effect such a situation would have on Pakistan, India, Iran, the United States, China, and the Arab world. In addition, the Soviet leadership may reason that outside intervention is less likely in the face of a Soviet *fait accompli*—and it may be right. But this does not alter the fact that in reality no *fait accompli* exists.

For its part, the *Khalq* leadership *assumes* that Afghanistan will receive unlimited and unqualified Soviet support. On May 13, 1979, Radio Afghanistan quoted Prime Minister Amin as saying: "We also have our friends who are supporting us. They are giving us whatever we want. Whichever arms we demand, they will supply us." But what is the basis of the self-assurance of such statements? It is true that the USSR was the first state to recognize the DRA, but it had also been the first to recognize the Daoud regime in 1973. It is true that within a month of the coup the Soviets signed more than 30 aid agreements with the DRA, but most of these had been initiated during the Daoud period. And it is true that large numbers of Soviet technicians and their families swarmed into the

Oleg Shaidyuk, a Soviet expert from Kiev, consults in May 1979 with workers of a plant for the manufacture of prefab construction components built with Soviet aid in Kabul, Afghanistan.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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*Anti-*Khalq *Islamic guerrillas of the Nuristan region of northeast Afghanistan pose on a downed Soviet-made helicopter that had been in the service of regular forces of the Kabul regime and was downed in March 1979.*

—Wildenberg-Sipa/Black Star.

country after April 1978, but they had after the Daoud coup as well.

The reality is that the DRA regime acts in ways it *assumes* the USSR wants it to act because it *assumes* the USSR will never abandon it. Thus, the current situation seems based on a lot of assumptions. But of course, foreign policy is often based on assumptions and prejudices. The real crunch will come when—and if—the Taraki-Amin regime must admit that it cannot control the Afghan countryside and that the mainly conscripted army[29] now doing its fighting cannot be depended on. Already, many Afghan troops have deserted with their weapons and ammunition and joined the anti-government guerrillas.[30] In such circumstances, would the Soviet Union, which has already committed large amounts of military matériel to the country, intercede with Soviet combat troops?

Whatever happens, it is already clear that Pakistan now feels more threatened from the north than ever before, while Iran, trying to establish stability through anarchy, must continually look over its shoulder at events to the east. India, in spite of its treaty relationships with the USSR, is more worried privately than it admits publicly. And the demise of any Islamic-flavored regime, such as all those in Afghanistan prior to the coup, is always of concern to the Arab states. The United States (and its allies) would, as the official note addressed to the Soviet Union on March 23, 1979, stated, "regard external involvement in Afghanistan's internal problems as a serious matter with

[29] There are only a few specialized volunteer combat and air force units with nonconscripted status.

[30] As the rebels move toward Kabul, what I call the accumulated guerrilla effect (AGE) may set in. Tribesmen, villagers, and military units along their routes of advance may join their assault against the government.

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a potential for heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region."[31]

The USSR replied in kind to the US note, warning in *Pravda* of dire (but unspecified) consequences if Pakistan, aided by the Iranians, Americans, Chinese, and Egyptians continued to assist Muslim rebels *inside* Afghanistan.[32] But if the Soviets physically occupied Afghanistan to save Taraki and Amin, what would they gain? They would have outflanked Iran, of course, and would be nearer, though not on, the Arabian Sea. This is something which might have pleased Peter the Great. Given the current situation in the area, however, what would the Soviets actually gain from such an advance? They would not in fact be at water's edge. Moreover, they already have naval access through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea, thence through the Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. A Soviet naval squadron of about 25 vessels, including an aircraft carrier, operates constantly in the region, partly in response to the presence of US air and naval facilities at Diego Garcia. (Or is it vice versa? The United States maintains a flotilla of only about ten ships in the region, also including an aircraft carrier.) The Soviets already have access to port and naval facilities for their ships in East Africa and in South Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, their Pacific Fleet can presumably move additional task forces into Indian Ocean waters when needed with as much ease as the United States navy. With the "warm water war" already heated, would the Soviets like to fan the flames still higher?

More important than the naval perspective on this problem, in my view, is the fact that if the Kremlin does intervene directly, Afghanistan will be the first piece of new real estate physically occupied by Soviet troops since World War II. This would set a significant and potentially dangerous precedent. Moscow has signed loosely structured treaties of friendship with a wide scattering of developing countries over the last few years—including Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, India, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—but the operative clauses of the treaties have seldom bound the USSR to specific courses of action. Similar treaties were the source of considerable trouble for the United States in the 1960's and early 1970's, and the Soviets, if they have studied history well, might just decline to become the "world's policeman" of the 1980's. If so, they will likely not expand the meaning of these treaties and will feel less bound to aid the regime in Kabul. In short, events may be allowed to take their course without outside interference.

Another factor which might restrain the Soviet Union would be the impact a military occupation of Afghanistan would have on Moscow's relations with the Third World, and particularly Muslim countries. Moreover, the Muslim populations of the Soviet Central Asian republics themselves might object to being involved in the occupation of a brother Muslim land. The Russians will have to face a growing Islamic revival in Central Asia in coming years, as well as the problems created by rapidly increasing non-Russian populations in the national republics of the USSR.[33] With these prospects already looming on the horizon, they might choose to avoid any course of action likely to exacerbate anti-Russian feelings beyond present levels.

One can ask how the Soviets could justify their inaction to other socialist countries if they refuse to respond to (or ignore) a request to intervene to salvage the *Khalq* regime. An obvious answer might be to point out that the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Moscow on December 5, 1978, merely called for consultations between the two countries on major issues concerning them both—nothing less, but nothing more. Beyond this, Pakistan continues to officially deny allegations that it has interfered in Afghanistan, and claims to be trying to prevent refugees from becoming guerrillas (something obviously beyond its capabilities). The Kremlin can choose to accept this. After all, accusations in *Pravda* are one thing; active military intervention is another.

Likely Outcomes

One question remains to be answered. What will be the outcome of the current strife in Afghanistan?

If the anti-*Khalq* forces receive no large-scale outside assistance, will they manage to overthrow the regime? The answer lies in the response to a question which must be asked no matter how much one respects—or supports—the proposed socioeconomic and political reforms of the DRA regime. Is Afghanistan ready for the drastic overhaul Amin and Taraki propose? Afghan history and cultural patterns say no, and the answer will probably remain no unless the Soviets decide to intervene. Without external interference, the victor will be the side which wins the hearts

[31] See David Binder, "US Cautions Moscow to Avoid Any Military Role in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, March 23, 1979.

[32] *Pravda* (Moscow), April 10, 1979.

[33] See Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *L'Empire éclaté* (The Exploded Empire), Paris, Flammarion, 1978.

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and minds of the people, notwithstanding the superior firepower and Soviet-supplied tanks and planes of the *Khalq* regime.

In light of the analysis presented in the main body of this article, the Soviets probably stand to lose more than they stand to gain by occupying Afghanistan on behalf of this or any other regime—and one suspects that their better judgment may already be telling them this. As has been so in the past, any future government in Kabul will have to maintain a "special relationship" with Moscow which will preclude Afghanistan from opposing the Soviet Union on the international scene except on the rarest of occasions.[34] According to this schema, Afghanistan seems well-suited for the role of a *nonaligned satellite,* which is a perfectly legitimate stance for a developing country in close proximity to a great power. The Afghans could maintain their flexibility in trade and aid relations, their cultural identities and traditions, and their internal political independence.

It was perhaps recognition of the ultimate forcefulness of this outcome which determined the sensible wait-and-see attitude of the United States after the April coup. The US mixed watchful waiting with business as usual until February 14, 1979, when four armed terrorists, apparently from the ultra-left *Setem-i-Meli,* seized the American ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs. The kidnappers held Dubs hostage in a room in the Kabul Hotel in the hope of obtaining the release of four recently arrested comrades. Afghan authorities ignored repeated requests from the US government that no action be taken which might endanger the ambassador's life. And Afghan police, presumably under the orders of the then Commandant of Security Forces, Colonel Daoud Taroon, assaulted the room where two of the terrorists held Dubs at gunpoint. The terrorists and the ambassador died in the assault.

Since this tragic incident, the US Embassy in Kabul has been unable to ascertain with certainty the identity of the terrorists. Nor has the US received a satisfactory answer from Kabul regarding the role in the assault of several Soviet advisers observed consulting with the Afghan police at the time of the attack. The death of Ambassador Dubs probably resulted from the combination of Soviet attitudes toward hijackers (no negotiations) and the Afghan love of immediate action regardless of the consequences. In any event, American programs in Afghanistan have been winding down since February, and apparently when everything already "in the pipeline" is finished, US aid to the country will end. In late July, some 100 US Embassy employees and dependents were evacuated from the country, leaving behind a staff of just 48 people. This may not be what the US wanted, and it is unlikely to help the Afghans, whichever side of the current battle they are on. But what else could the US do?

Those who know Kabul well report that fear permeates the scene. Political prisoners are apparently being executed daily, and rebel forces seem to control more and more of the countryside every day. Fear even pervades the atmosphere at the demonstrations staged daily in Kabul in support of the government and at sites of "voluntary labor" for the public good, both of which have greatly affected normal work schedules in the capital. Kabul has seldom had a free press, but before the coup "freedom of the mouth" was a time-honored tradition, an urban manifestation of the open debates of the village *jirgah* (council). In private homes and in tea houses, Afghans argued politics incessantly. Now, not at all.

Afghan prisons are overflowing with an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 prisoners—though one tenth of such figures may be more realistic. The *Khalq* regime did not invent imprisonment and torture as political weapons, but it has gone far beyond previous limits in its treatment of the opposition, especially the intellectuals. Look, for instance, at the current power elite. Many of them spent time in Mohammad Daoud's jails; yet they live and are in power. In contrast, Daoud, who was certainly no saint but was a great man in modern Afghan history, and most of his family lie in unmarked graves.

Without stability in the countryside, even the most admirable reforms cannot be implemented. And in this case, there is considerable doubt that the reforms the *Khalq* regime wants would be viable in the Afghan setting. It has often been said that those who ignore the past have no future, and even a high-ranking Soviet official in Moscow has said, "If there is one country in the developing world we would like *not* to try scientific socialism at this point in time, it is Afghanistan." The DRA's thrust toward socialism may advance this battered country a ministep along the path. But even if the Russians occupy Afghanistan to save the *Khalq* regime, Afghan historical and cultural patterns, probably altered but still clearly recognizable as Afghan, will ultimately emerge victorious.

[34] Many less vulnerable Third World regimes already position themselves very close to the USSR on major international issues. There is no reason why Afghanistan could not be expected to do the same.

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Books

The French "New Philosophers"

by Michael J. Sodaro

JEAN-MARIE BENOIST. *Marx est mort* (Marx Is Dead). Paris, Gallimard, 1970.

JEAN-MARIE BENOIST. *Un singulier programme* (A Unique Program). Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1978.

ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN. La cuisinière et le mangeur d'hommes (The Cook and the Man-eater). Paris, Editions de Seuil, 1975.

ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN. Les maîtres penseurs (The Master Thinkers). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1977.

ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN. *Stratégie et révolution en France—Mai 1968* (Strategy and Revolution in France—May 1968). Paris, Christian Bourgeois, 1968.

GUY LARDREAU. *Le singe d'or* (The Golden Monkey). Paris, Mercure de France, 1973.

GUY LARDREAU and CHRISTIAN JAMBET. *L'Ange* (The Angel). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1976.

JEAN-PAUL DOLLÉ. *Le désir de révolution* (The Desire for Revolution). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1972.

BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY. *La barbarie à visage humain* (Barbarism With a Human Face). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1977.

PHILIPPE NEMO. *L'Homme structural* (Structural Man). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1975.

WHEN A BOOK bearing the momentous title *Marx Is Dead* appeared in France in 1970, the news came to many as a profound and disturbing shock. Although a certain shock value was implicit in the aims of the volume's author, Jean-Marie Benoist, his readers could scarcely have been more primed for the announcement. In a country where Marxism often passes as the lingua franca of enlightened discourse, and where, only two years earlier, the political order had been dramatically shaken by severe social disruptions, *Marx est mort* served notice that a radical reappraisal of both Marxism and the "events" of May 1968 was already under way among certain groups of young French intellectuals.

Over the next several years, the number of such reassessments multiplied, building into a veritable intellectual movement by the late 1970's. Perhaps the most striking feature about this wave of anti-Marxism in France was that nearly all of its principal exponents were veterans of the 1968 upheaval. Many of them had participated in France's would-be revolution as self-proclaimed Leninists, Maoists, or Marxists of one form or another. Their decision to shed their Marxist colorations of 1968 and to unleash a trenchant critique of the established Left has created a minor sensation in France, where they have become known collectively as *"les nouveaux philosophes"*—the new philosophers.

Although relatively little is known about the new philosophers outside of Europe, enough information has filtered through the media to present a composite picture of the group. It is generally recognized, for instance, that they have coupled their critique of Marxism with an equally sharp attack on the Soviet Union. The influence of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn on them in this regard has been particularly strong. (A recent television documentary produced by a Canadian journalist christened some of the new philosophers "Solzhenitsyn's children.") It has also been reported that several of the more outspoken of the group have taken full advantage of their photogenic good looks and verbal agility to expound their views with considerable aplomb on television talk shows and in lecture halls. In the process, their impact on French political life has complemented their influence among intellectuals. Several of the new philosophers have been feted

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at the Élysée Palace by the President of the Republic, and Socialist leader François Mitterrand took them seriously enough to postpone making a summary judgment on the group until he had time to prepare a studied critique. Meanwhile, the French Communist Party (PCF), a favorite target of the new philosophers, has responded to their assaults in kind.

While the anti-Marxist aspects of the new philosophers' thinking have tended to receive the lion's share of public attention, an examination of the principal works of the group reveals a far more variegated range of ideas than just a rejection of one-cherished Marxist tenets. For one thing, the extent to which the seven writers treated here repudiate their Marxist heritage varies considerably from case to case. Some dismiss Marxism *in toto* as a monstrous aberration of human thought. Others, however, prefer to discard only selected features of Marx's thinking, while retaining or reinterpreting others in an effort to refashion Marxism into a more adequate guide to social analysis or political action. Similarly, the methods employed by the various new philosophers in approaching their subject differ from one writer to the next. While nearly all of them acknowledge their debt to such luminaries of the French intellectual scene as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan, the methodological emphasis tends to shift from philosophy (Glucksmann) to structuralism (Benoist) to psychology (Nemo) or to other influences, depending on the predilections of the author. This analytical heterogeneity produces not only a wide variety of approaches, but a variety of conclusions as well. In short, the new philosophers cannot be regarded as constituting a coherent group. While there are several new philosophers, there is no "new philosophy."

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the phenomenon of the new philosophers concerns the question of where they should be situated on the left-right political spectrum. Although all of them proceed from anti-Marxist axioms, this does not mean that they have moved to the center or right of the political continuum. On the contrary. As their chief writings plainly demonstrate, most (but not all) of the new philosophers are as antagonistic to existing liberal-democratic institutions as they are to the "totalitarian" systems of the Soviet Union or China, which several of them regard as the logical culmination of Marxism. The attitude is patently one of "a plague on both your houses."

IN MANY RESPECTS, this categorical rejection of both liberal democracy and established communism (and even socialism) did not originate with the new philosophers of the 1970's. Its roots may be found in the quixotic student movement of May 1968. Indeed, it is precisely as an outgrowth of the May movement that the new philosophers can best be understood. The extraordinary explosion of May 1968 constituted their political baptism, and many of the new philosophers still hold some of the basic notions that animated the student radicals of May. These notions include above all a deep hostility to the political and economic structures of the Fifth Republic, and an equally bitter resentment of the leaders of the French Communist Party, whom the students reviled in 1968 as Stalinist bureaucrats preoccupied with maintaining their stake in the existing order. In addition, most of the new philosophers

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reflect the general reluctance (or inability) of the student radicals of 1968 to specify their aims. To move beyond a sweeping denunciation of the status quo and to provide at least the broad outlines of the new order destined to replace it were deemed inherently unrevolutionary acts by the radicals and violated one of their more colorful slogans, *"Un mouvement se prouve en marchant"* ("A movement gets its bearings as it moves along"). The new philosophers have been similarly unforthcoming in clarifying the kind of political and social order they wish to see created. Finally, one of the most fundamental characteristics common to both the new philosophers and the radicals of 1968 is anti-authoritarianism. This expresses itself in a universal condemnation of all "oppressive" regimes, whether Communist or "bourgeois" in nature. More precisely, it reflects a basically anti-statist bias, and culminates in a rejection of hierarchical power structures in general. A number of the new philosophers are outspoken in their aversion to power itself—an attitude reminiscent of Daniel Cohn-Bendit's appeal to his fellow students in 1968 "to struggle against the formation of any kind of hierarchy."[1]

In view of these and other striking similarities, it becomes apparent that most of the new philosophers have more in common with the radical inclinations of 1968 than with any other identifiable political orientation. What has changed in the interval is not so much their earlier radicalism, but rather their evaluation of Marxism's relevance in defining that radicalism. Marxism is now seen in retrospect to have been an inadequate vehicle for articulating just what kind of political and social change the students of 1968 were ultimately seeking. In a word, what most of the new philosophers of today are challenging is not the radicalism of 1968, but their former assumption that this brand of radicalism was compatible, if not identical, with Marxism. The resulting mixture of anti-Marxism and visionary radicalism means that the new philosophers continue to belong to the French Left, but occupy a unique and rather novel position in relation to more traditional leftist groupings.

Perhaps nowhere is this shift in the appreciation of Marx's relevance to May 1968 more evident than in the writings of André Glucksmann. Glucksmann's book *Les maîtres penseurs* is generally regarded as one of the most important works produced by any of the new philosophers. In essence it argues that the intellectual sources of all 20th-century statism, antisemitism, and totalitarianism lie in the seminal writings of four German "master thinkers": Georg Hegel, Johann Fichte, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. While elements of this thesis will be explored later on, it is pertinent to note here that, in this work, Glucksmann classifies Marx among the progenitors of the modern police state. This was not always the case. In the early summer of 1968, Glucksmann had occasion to write a brief tract outlining his views on the recently concluded May cataclysm. The book *Stratégie et révolution en France—Mai 1968* was a tribute to Marx's prescience in forecasting the type of revolutionary activity that had occured in May. "Not for a century," Glucksmann wrote, "has a movement so closely resembled the one which Marx had in mind in 1848" (p. 128). And what, precisely, did Marx have in mind? For Glucksmann in his 1968 garb, Marx was fundamentally anti-statist and a protagonist of immediate, popular revolution. Defining the May movement as an example of *"dé-étatisation"* and popular revolt, Glucksmann cited Marx as the theoretical guide to both. Nine years later, however, Marx materializes in *Les maîtres penseurs* as . . . a statist! "Marx and Engels," Glucksmann the new philosopher tells us, "displayed a penchant for a statist and dictatorial strategy of the proletarian revolution" (p. 107). Marx is further denounced for his opposition to spontaneous revolution.[2]

Quite clearly, Glucksmann is engaging in a bit of exegetic sleight of hand here. As if by revolving-door magic, the anti-statist Marx who drew praise in *Stratégie et révolution* suddenly disappears from *Les maîtres penseurs,* where another, totally different Marx is summoned before our eyes. One element, however, remains constant in Glucksmann's thought. It is his anti-statism. Glucksmann's antipathy to the state—any state—runs like a thread through both his earlier and more recent intellectual phases, a factor which links him as a new philosopher to the student movement of May 1968.

LIKE MARX, Mao Zedong has undergone a transformation from hero to villain in the eyes of certain new philosophers. This fall from

[1] Known as "Danny the Red," Cohn-Bendit was one of the leaders of the May 1968 student movement. The citation is from the book he coauthored with his brother, Gabriel. See *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative,* New York, NY, McGraw Hill, 1968, p. 254.

[2] Another work written by a scholar connected with the new philosophers argues that Marx was in fact never interested in revolution, but only in the dominance exercised by his own class, the bourgeoisie. See Françoise P. Lévy, *Karl Marx, histoire d'un bourgeois allemand* (Karl Marx, The Story of a German Bourgeois), Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1976.

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grace is documented in two works by Guy Lardreau: *Le singe d'or,* written in 1973, and *L'Ange,* which he coauthored with Christian Jambet in 1976. The earlier work is a product of Lardreau's identification with the Maoist component of the French Left. Glorifying Maoism as "the revolutionary thought of our time," Lardreau interpreted it in much the same way as did many of the French students who considered themselves Maoists in 1968. For them, Mao was not to be regarded as an authoritarian figure, but rather as a liberator of mankind from elitist oppression. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was accordingly viewed primarily as an effort to implement Mao's ideological anti-elitism and exaltation of the masses. Reflecting these understandings, Lardreau in *Le singe d'or* interpreted the May events as the realization in France of Mao's proclaimed faith in the revolutionary spontaneity of the masses, a notion Lardreau considered ideologically superior both to Marx's determinism and to Lenin's elitism.

Several years later, however, Lardreau drastically revised this picture of Maoism's doctrinal superiority. In an essay appearing in *L'Ange* under the curious title "Lin Biao as Will and Representation," Lardreau conceded that Maoism had degenerated into an elitist cult of absolute power. Even the Cultural Revolution, he wrote, had come to an end with the apotheosis of Chairman Mao as the virtual God of the People's Republic. In spite of feeling abandoned by Mao, neither Lardreau nor Jambet has lost his faith in revolution. Both feel that "the angel" of revolution will eventually come and eliminate all oppression at its source by extirpating power itself. With or without Mao, Lardreau and Jambet thus remain faithful to the radical heritage of 1968.

THIS BASIC ANTIPATHY to power in all its forms is especially evident in the new philosphers' attitude toward communism. Whether conceived of as an inevitable outgrowth of Marxist thought (a view propounded by Glucksmann and Lévy) or merely as a subsequent perversion of it by the Soviets (as argued by Dollé), communism as it actually exists is condemned by virtually all the new philosophers as rampant totalitarianism. As noted earlier, Solzhenitsyn has been particularly influential in shaping some of these attitudes, especially those of Glucksmann and Lévy. Glucksmann has devoted an entire book to excoriating the Soviet system as a "man-eater"—an epithet borrowed from Solzhenitzyn.

And yet, however vociferous their denunciations of communism, nearly all of the new philosophers are just as critical of the Western democracies. Glucksmann, for one, claims that the Soviet Union and the United States are both "totalitarian" systems, indistinguishable in their intolerance of dissidents and their penchant for mass terror.[3] Since Marxism is essentially Western in origin, Glucksmann sees the Soviet system as merely the projection of West European history onto Russia. For him the USSR is simply the mirror image of the Western experience, "the bolshevik terror is a jacobin-style bourgeois terror."[4] As a consequence, asserts Glucksmann, "the Russian dissidents can help us know ourselves."[5]

In a similar vein, Jean-Paul Dollé denounces the liberal democracies as "commercial societies" in which a bourgeois elite compels the masses to live in misery and ignorance and to accept the false values of consumerism. In varying degrees, other new philosphers as well vent their spleen on the West.

To some extent, this simple formula of "East=West" arises from a general tendency on the part of the new philosophers to avoid strict definitions of their terms. Words such as "totalitarian," "bourgeois," and "barbarism" are casually flung about as epithets and attached indiscriminately to the most diverse forms of political reality. This is not the only methodological problem that mars the new philosphers' work, however, and it is appropriate at this point to glance briefly at a few of the others.

AS INDICATED EARLIER, Glucksmann's recent book, *Les maîtres penseurs,* locates the origin of all modern totalitarianism, whether of East or West, in the ideas of four major thinkers: Hegel, Fichte, Marx, and Nietzsche. How does Glucksmann establish the link between 19th-century German thought and the political system of the United States? In fact the connection is more asserted than demonstrated. As a general rule, Glucksmann assumes a far more simplistic notion of the causative impact of ideas upon history than is empirically warranted. His favorite procedure is to select from the vast corpus of the thinkers in question those passages advocating such things as a strong state or antisemitism, and then to attribute to these writers full responsibility for all subsequent manifestations of these phenomena. The word, in short, leads directly to the deed, bypassing all intervening historical variables. On Glucksmann's straight-line map of intellectual history, even nuclear deterrence

[3] In making this comparison, Glucksmann cites as alleged examples of US mass terror American policy toward the American Indians, toward Japan at the end of World War II, and toward Vietnam after 1964.

[4] *La cuisinière at le mangeur d'hommes,* p. 106.

[5] Ibid., p. 11.

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theory emerges full blown from the minds of Hegel and other "master thinkers."

Bernard-Henri Lévy's *La barbarie à visage humain*[6] presents an equally perplexing array of procedural difficulties. One of these involves Lévy's thesis concerning the "proletarianization" of mankind. According to Lévy, the force of modern technological advance threatens to reduce all humanity to a single social plateau, which he labels the "proletariat." Precisely how this will happen is not explained, but that is not the only problem with Lévy's formulation. Lévy describes this proletariat as utterly powerless to rectify its status of "generalized servitude." Humankind sinks to the level of increasingly homogeneous "dominated classes." But dominated by whom? If all the world constitutes a single class, what social groupings are left to impose their domination? Lévy further complicates his argument by suggesting that, under these circumstances, class struggles will continue, and the state as an instrument of power will never wither away. But these statements are equally hard to reconcile with Lévy's proletarianization thesis, with its visions of a universal single class and generalized powerlessness. In addition, Lévy engages in Glucksmann's practice of drawing spurious connections between historical occurrences and antecedent intellectual currents. If anything, Lévy's sweep is much broader. Not just an identifiable set of "master thinkers," but the entire Western enlightenment tradition is to blame for the crimes of Yosif Stalin's *gulag!*

Having dismissed as monstrous Leviathans both major political systems of the industrialized world, what do the new philosophers offer as a guide to future action? With only one exception, they are basically opposed to any kind of political activity aimed at taking power. Lévy is most explicit on this point, arguing that intellectuals must never again seek to advise the Prince or to assume power by themselves. He favors abandoning political activity altogether, preferring instead to fight against all forms of "barbarism" through strictly intellectual means, such as metaphysics, art, and "ethics and moral duty." Dollé offers roughly similar advice. Philippe Nemo, whose book *L'Homme structural* is a bizarre attempt to redefine traditional left-right political categories in terms of psychoanalytical concepts borrowed from Jacques Lacan, believes that practically all political activity is guided by irrational factors. Hence, most efforts at effecting major change are doomed from the start.

The lone exception to this antipolitical tendency of the new philosophers is Benoist. Although critical of certain aspects of "bourgeois" society, Benoist is the only new philosopher to rise to the defense of liberal democracy. He personally manifested his commitment to political action by running against PCF chief Georges Marchais in the 1978 elections and by issuing a stinging indictment of the Common Program of the Left in his book *Un singulier programme*.

In general, however, most of the new philosophers are *against politics* itself, in the sense that they oppose the very aim of traditional political activity, that of taking power.[7] This consensus springs from a commonly held belief that power itself is objectionable, and that the ultimate aim of political action must be to abolish it once and for all in an "unprecedented revolution."[8] Although they differ on the question of whether such a revolution is actually feasible (Lévy doubts it, but Dollé, Lardreau, and Jambet are more optimistic), most of the *nouveaux philosophes* share the quintessentially radical notion of the unacceptability of political power. In view of these fundamentalist premises, it should not be surprising that the new philosophers propose little beyond a sterile anarchism or a resigned withdrawal into personal moralism to remedy the problems of advanced industrial society.

At bottom, most of the new philosophers are radicals without a program, utopians without a utopia. In this respect, they remain loyal to the legacy of 1968. The chief discovery of their mature years seems to be that neither Marx nor Mao was with them in 1968 as they had once believed. In their oversimplified understanding and categorical rejection of capitalism and socialism, democracy and communism, the state and even "workers' control," the new philosophers seem to be a uniquely French phenomenon. No similar combination of anti-Marxism and anti-democratism has as yet appeared elsewhere on the European political horizon. Having witnessed at first hand France's near-revolution of May 1968, the new philosophers are still very much the product of that radical and singularly French event.

[6] Lévy's book recently appeared in English translation as *Barbarism With A Human Face*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1979. References here are to the French edition, and the translations are my own.

[7] On recent tendencies in Europe against politics, see Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979, pp. 27–50.

[8] The phrase is from Lardreau and Jambet, *L'Ange*, p. 152.

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Soviet Military Doctrine in the 1970's

by Paul F. Walker

WILLIAM F. SCOTT. *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975.

ALEKSEY A. YEPISHEV. *Ideologicheskaya bor'ba po voyennym voprosam* (The Ideological Struggle Concerning Military Questions). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974.

ALEKSEY A. YEPISHEV. *Mogucheye oruzhiye partii* (The Mighty Weapon of the Party). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973.

A.S. MILOVIDOV and V.G. KOZLOV, Eds. *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War (A Soviet View).* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975. A translation of *Filosofskoye naslediye V.I. Lenina i problemi sovremennoy voyny,* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972.

PETER H. VIGOR. *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality.* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

MORE THAN four decades ago, the British military theorist B.H. Liddell-Hart lectured on the necessity for more serious study of the social phenomenon of war. In part, he said:

We live in a time when "war" is on everyone's lips; when everything contemporary is dated in relation to the last war; when those, who dislike the subject most, talk about it most–if their talk be only about the prevention of war.

. . . They talk much ***about*** *war, but rarely do they talk* ***of*** *it, as a subject so serious as to be worth the serious study of every thinking man and woman. . . .*

For the failure to treat it as a branch of scientific knowledge, responsibility lies as much on men of learning as on men of war. By the nature of their profession, soldiers are practitioners, not detached researchers. . . .[1]

Hart's statement is still relevant today, perhaps even more so than in the 1930's. The subject of war and of military preparations is of wide interest now in the nuclear era, particularly in regard to Soviet-American strategic relations. Indeed, Western military and civilian defense analysts issue numerous contradictory and accusatory statements regarding American and Soviet military capabilities and intent. Yet all too little attention and thought has been given, at least in the United States, to one important side of superpower military relations—Soviet military doctrine and its basis in Marxist-Leninist theory. Many, perhaps most, US military analysts are unacquainted with Soviet theoretical writings on military doctrine and strategy, even though the Soviets claim that these serve as the basis for their policies.

The reason for this lack of heed on the part of US analysts to Soviet military theory is difficult to pinpoint. To some extent, it is certainly due to the dearth of materials in translation. Until recently, the only major work on Soviet military theory available in English translation was *Voyennaya strategiya* (Soviet Military Strategy) by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy.[2] In the last few years, this work has been supplemented by the translation, under the auspices of the US Air Force, of a series of primary Soviet writings on military thought.[3] Additional materials available in translation, such as articles from the Soviet military paper *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), have been so tediously propagandistic as to preclude much Western interest in them. Other reasons for Western lack of interest in Soviet military thought include general

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[1] *The Ghost of Napoleon,* London, 1933, pp. 145-47, quoted in Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World,* New York, NY, Collier, 1962, p. 11.

[2] Three editions of this work were published in the Soviet Union between 1963 and 1968. An English version of the third and latest edition of *Soviet Military Strategy,* translated and edited by Harriet Fast Scott, was published by Crane, Russak & Co., New York, NY, in 1975.

[3] The "Soviet Military Thought" series, available from the US Government Printing Office. Dr. Michael Milstein of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has recently informed this author that a major new Soviet volume is being prepared to replace the Sokolovskiy work.

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skepticism about its relevance to Soviet military capabilities, extreme Soviet secrecy with regard to military matters, and the decrease over the last decade of financial support in the US for the study of such topics.

In any event, the United States, as a consequence of this situation, has found itself with many self-proclaimed Soviet specialists but few well-versed in Soviet military affairs.[4] One possible response to this is: "Well, so what?" But it *is* important, for there has been a resurgence in recent years of unsubstantiated and contradictory reports of Soviet military capabilities and intentions. This situation creates the potential for another false scare like the 1955 "bomber gap" or the 1960 "missile gap."

FOR STUDENTS and analysts who wish to familiarize themselves with Soviet military theory, William Scott's slim but worthwhile volume, *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy,* is a good starting point. Scott, a retired US military officer affiliated with the New York-based National Strategy Information Center, provides an annotated bibliography of some 168 Soviet books published between 1960 and 1974 on military doctrine and strategy. He also includes a useful, although brief, introduction covering Soviet sources, spokesmen, and research institutes.

It should be noted, however, that the volume does have some minor faults. There is no index to authors and titles, and some of the annotations are not as expansive as they might be. In addition, Scott's comments at times have a disconcerting cryptic quality. For example, in reference to one book he states: "The chapter on civil defense. . . should give readers cause for reflection."

Among the recent volumes listed by Scott are the two by General of the Soviet Army Aleksey A. Yepishev which are under review here. Three decades ago, Yepishev was stationed on the Ukrainian front with Generals Andrey Grechko, Anton Gastilovich, and Kirill Moskalenko, as well as with a political officer named Leonid Brezhnev, and today he heads the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which has primary responsibility for carrying out political indoctrination of the Soviet armed forces. His two works examine at length the importance of Marxism-Leninism, of the class struggle, and of capitalist-Communist antagonisms for military activities and education. Unfortunately, Yepishev's writing is typical of the doctrinaire, tedious, and repetitious style which has characterized Soviet works in this area for so long.

Another volume of interest to analysts of Soviet military theory is that edited by General-Major A.S. Milovidov and V.G. Kozlov on Leninist doctrine on socialist armies and warfare. This book, included in the Soviet "Soldier's Bookshelf" series, numbers among its authors such well-known specialists on military affairs as V.M. Bondarenko and Ye. I. Rybkin. Fortunately for non-Russian readers, it has been translated into English as the fifth volume of the "Soviet Military Thought" series.

A major common feature of these recent—as well as past—Soviet publications on war and military doctrine is the continued emphasis on Marxist-*Leninist* doctrine for military affairs. Even though it was Leon Trotskiy who organized the Red Army in 1919, both he and Yosif Stalin are totally ignored. Lenin is repeatedly idealized as "the brilliant thinker" on military affairs whose writings comprise the "richest theoretical basis for development of military theory and practice under contemporary conditions." The problems of war and peace, according to Milovidov and Kozlov, continue to remain "the most important military-philosophical problems" for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and for the international system.

Soviet views of war, peace, and neutrality are well outlined and explicated in the book by Peter H. Vigor, currently in charge of Soviet Studies at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Vigor does a particularly admirable job of delineating the complex matrix of Soviet views on the interrelated issues of war and peace. He writes persuasively, citing historical examples wherever possible, that "the Soviet attitude to war, as laid down in [Marxist-Leninist] theory, corresponds with remarkable fidelity to the facts of Soviet history from the October Revolution down to the present day" (p. 213). In addition, he includes extensive footnotes and a selective, annotated bibliography.

Occasionally, to be sure, bias and cynicism, as well as factual errors, creep into the book. For example, it is at best misleading to describe the East-West European military balance in terms of numbers of divisions (p. 213) when divisional strengths vary several hundred percent. However, such faults are minor in an otherwise excellent analysis.

AS MILOVIDOV AND KOZLOV, Yepishev, and Vigor all point out, Soviet military theory begins with the Marxist-Leninist notion of the class-based nature of war. For the Soviet theoretician, war is a spontaneous consequence of the eco-

[4] Harriet Fast Scott also emphasizes this important point in her inroduction to Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. xviii.

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nomic class antagonisms inherent in the nonsocialist world. That is, it represents a normal outcome of the exploitation of a proletarian class by a bourgeois, capitalist society. The eradication of that exploitation in a truly Communist society, according to Marxism-Leninism, will make wars occurrences of the past. Milovidov and Kozlov, for example, write:

Wars are a historically transient phenomenon. They are linked only with the period of existence of an exploiter society. They are based on private ownership and the division of society into classes. Liquidation of the exploitation system and transition of all mankind to socialism and Communism will eliminate the causes of wars, with the disappearance of military conflicts themselves. . . .(p. 14)

Thus, war, in the Soviet mind (and in keeping with Lenin's reading of Karl von Clausewitz), is the continuation of politics by other means. Specifically, it constitutes a mode of carrying on the worldwide class struggle between proletarian and bourgeois forces. It is therefore inseparable from both domestic and international politics. Indeed, in Lenin's eyes, "a civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for power [is] a war *without* which there *can be no real movement forward*."[5]

Lenin differentiated between "progressive" and "reactionary" wars—what present Soviet writers identify as "just" and "unjust" wars. This differentiation is the central principle underlying Soviet military doctrine. It affords Leninists the basis for looking at a war in terms of its societal causes and consequences. According to Lenin, "it is necessary in each specific instance, for each specific war, to define its political content."[6]

In the Soviet view, reactionary or unjust wars are those launched by imperialist forces in an effort to promote the bourgeois class, while progressive or just wars are wars of proletarian national rebellion, which may take the form of anticolonial revolutions. Soviet writers clearly state that they support the latter but will react only defensively in the case of the former. In *Socialism and War,* for example, Lenin said:

We understand the inevitable connection between wars and the class struggle within a country; we understand that wars cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created; . . .we regard civil wars, i.e., wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor class, by slaves against slaveholders, by serfs against landowners, and by wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as fully legitimate, progressive and necessary. We Marxists differ from both pacifists and anarchists in that we deem it necessary to study each war historically.[7]

In order to carry out this mixed policy of backing "just" wars and preparing to repel "unjust" aggressions, the Soviet Union places much importance on "increased vigilance" and "combat readiness" of its conventional and nuclear forces. Yepishev is particularly direct in emphasizing this point. He warns repeatedly of the danger of imperialist attack and quotes Lenin as arguing:

. . . We should keep military preparedness in any case. Disregarding the blows already struck against imperialism, we should keep our Red Army in full combat readiness no matter what and strengthen its fighting capability.[8]

This stress on constant military preparedness that runs through Soviet military writings, including the three Soviet volumes under review here, has given some observers the impression that the USSR is intent on provoking war between the socialist and capitalist worlds. A closer analysis of Soviet military doctrine, however, suggests that such a judgment is questionable. In fact, Soviet military doctrine and strategy have over the last two decades undergone what Soviet officials have labeled "revolutionary changes."

These changes are a result of the advent of nuclear weaponry and date from Nikita Khrushchev's speech to the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. Khrushchev—as well as Soviet military analysts writing subsequently—stated that any nuclear warfare between the capitalist and socialist worlds would be disastrous for both sides. This pronouncement rendered it more complex to fit such a war into the Leninist category of "just" wars. In Leninist doctrine, a "just" war meriting support from the socialist world must have two features: (1) violent means must be more efficient than peaceful means in attaining the victory of communism over capitalism; and (2) victory must be assured. According to Soviet writings, the appearance of nuclear weapons has raised doubts with regard to both of these necessary preconditions.

[5] V.I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, p. 13, quoted in Milovidov and Kozlov, p. 12.

[6] Lenin, op. cit., p. 262, quoted in Milovidov and Kozlov, p. 25.

[7] Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *The Lenin Anthology,* New York, NY, W.W. Norton and Co., 1975, pp. 183–84.

[8] Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 42, p. 130, quoted in Yepishev, *Mogucheye oruzhiye partii,* p. 28.

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Thus, nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is seen from a dual perspective. It is defined dogmatically in Leninist terms as "the outcome and continuation of the policy of defense of the cause of socialism, progress, and justice" (Milovidov, p. 36). But the Program of the CPSU also definitively concludes that nuclear war "cannot and shall not serve as a means of settling international relations."[9] In Soviet military doctrine, in other words, nuclear war is not an inevitable or desirable outcome of the class conflict. Rather, it represents a last resort. Sokolovskiy reinforces this judgment when he argues that "struggles between two social systems are and must be carried out by peaceful means—economic, political, ideological, but not military."[10]

At the same time, Soviet military theorists do warn that any war in which the major powers get involved will inevitably escalate to the nuclear level and therefore to the global level.[11] They do not appear to differentiate between limited exchanges with tactical nuclear weapons and exchanges of a major strategic sort. Hence, they insist that it is essential to avoid all direct nuclear and conventional wars between the nuclear powers in order to prevent a fatal nuclear confrontation. However, they still regard non-superpower confrontations as inevitable. "As long as imperialism and colonialism exist," Sokolovskiy maintains, "national-liberation and revolutionary wars are unavoidable. . . . the USSR will render, when it is necessary, military support as well to people subject to imperialist aggression."[12]

Contemporary Soviet military doctrine, as reflected in the writings, also attaches considerable importance to "peaceful coexistence" and "arms control and disarmament," for in a nuclearized world, these undertakings become means of avoiding cataclysmic warfare. For instance, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the linchpin of Soviet-American détente since 1969, receive support, if sometimes indirectly, from both Yepishev and Milovidov. Nuclear war is condemned in strong terms as a crime against all humanity.[13] And all efforts at limiting or eliminating not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons are repeatedly praised.

EVEN AFTER a thorough and serious reading of the volumes under review and writings on Soviet military affairs, the Western military analyst may be puzzled about how to interpret Soviet outpourings on military theory. What the Soviets might describe as Marxist dialecticism in their analyses may appear to non-Marxists as confusing and schizophrenic contradictions or even misstatements of fact and history. Several of these contradictions deserve specific mention.

The most pervasive and obvious one concerns the socialist-capitalist relationship. Yepishev and others lay heavy emphasis on the continuing class struggle between the clashing economic systems of socialism and capitalism. There is little evidence of friendliness in their discussions of the "reactionary, anti-Soviet imperialists" as "forces of repression" in the world. Yet elsewhere—e.g., in the Milovidov and Kozlov and Sokolovskiy works—one finds a conciliatory approach to world politics, one stressing détente and "peaceful coexistence."

A second dialectical feature of these works has to do with the concept of war as the inevitable extension of politics, in the Clausewitzian sense. According to Sokolovskiy, "the essence of war as a continuation of . . . politics by means of armed violence and the specific nature of war appear today more distinctly than in the past, and modern means of violence acquire ever-increasing importance."[14] Moreover, Soviet military theoreticians continue to contend that a socialist-capitalist military confrontation will result in a decisive victory for world communism. Yet these same authors regard war in the nuclear sphere as something less than fatally inevitable and a development to be avoided if at all possible.

A third contradiction involves military preparedness. Yepishev, in his two works, repeatedly underlines the importance of "Soviet vigilance" against imperialist aggressions. He recommends heightened combat readiness, improved technical training, and increased inventories of modern weapons. This emphasis may be indicative that the readiness and morale of Soviet troops are less than optimal, but it also appears to be at least partially at odds with the stress on arms control and disarmament—in Sokolovskiy's words, "the realization of total disarmament and of the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons."[15] Milovidov and Kozlov explain the conflict as Leninist dialecticism: "the stronger we are, the stronger peace is, and the greater the possibility of pre-

[9] Quoted in Milovidov and Kozlov, p. 37.
[10] Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. 177.
[11] For instance, Sokolovskiy (op. cit., p. 195) states that "any armed conflict will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into this conflict."
[12] Ibid., pp. 182–84.
[13] For a more recent Soviet view on SALT and détente, see V. Petrovsky, "The Soviet Union's Struggle for Real Disarmament," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1979, pp. 12–22. See also the regular features on disarmament in this monthly journal.
[14] Sokolovskiy, op. cit., pp. 174–75.
[15] Ibid., p. 197.

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venting war" (p. 262). But this argument smacks of a rationale for nuclear and conventional superiority on the part of the USSR.

A fourth dialectical aspect of Soviet military theory is related to strategic nuclear doctrine. On the one hand, the Soviets appear to have accepted the mutual deterrent system of second-strike assured destruction. According to Milovidov and Kozlov, for example, "today every potential aggressor knows full well that in the case of an attempted nuclear-missile attack on our country he will receive a devastating return blow" (p. 115; see also p. 148). On the other hand, the Soviet military has begun to write about the significance of missile sophistication for target acquisition. Statements such as the following appear to constitute proposals for the development of capabilities to destroy hardened targets: ". . . an increase in accuracy of target detection and hits on target will facilitate an even more powerful effect on the morale of the populace and troop personnel" (Milovidov and Kozlov, p. 213). It is unclear, however, whether Soviet analysts fully grasp the first-strike implications of such comments.

Although not a contradiction per se, one final aspect of Soviet military writings is worthy of note. This is the black-and-white picture that they present of the world. These writings dwell at length on the dangers of an imperialist surprise attack, on Western military preparations for war, and on aggressive American intentions. In contrast, Soviet actions are depicted as "peaceful" and solely "defensive" in nature. A concrete example of this one-sided approach concerns civil defense. Soviet analysts describe civil defense in the Soviet Union as a means of protecting the proletariat, while they denounce Western efforts along the same lines as "sheltermania" which "intensifies the reactionary nature of internal policy, promotes the deterioration of a country to a military dictatorship and greatly broadens the sphere of militarization." Milovidov and Kozlov even hold that "the universality and extensive development of [US] civil defense (it is organized everywhere from the remote hinterlands to the great metropolis, at every factory, in every office, in every school and home) make it a powerful weapon of imperialist policies and militarism" (p. 246). It should be noted, of course, that Western analyses are not totally devoid of such self-serving imagery.

WHAT GENERAL conclusions might one draw from this discussion, albeit brief, of recent theoretical writing on Soviet military affairs? First, it appears that Soviet military and political doctrines have partially diverged since N. Khrushchev's 1956 condemnation of nuclear war as catastrophic for all antagonists. On the one hand, Yepishev, Milovidov and Kozlov, and others espouse the Leninist interpretation of Clausewitz's dictum that war is a continuation of politics by violent means. Thus, they maintain that war is an inevitable occurrence in the socialist-capitalist struggle. This serves as the broad political basis for Soviet military affairs. On the other hand, Soviet military doctrine now treats nuclear war as a last resort which must be avoided at almost all costs. If peaceful means to attain socialist objectives exist, such avenues must be pursued. This position does not mean that all wars are to be avoided, or that the Soviet Union will disarm unilaterally. On the contrary, local, surrogate wars not involving direct superpower confrontations are to be actively supported in furtherance of socialist causes. And the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a strong military establishment for "increased vigilance" against a heavily armed "imperialist world."

A second point to be made is that when one tries to interpret Soviet writings on military doctrine, uncertainty is more the rule than the exception. Just as serious defense analysts will readily acknowledge the numerous ambiguities in Soviet military developments, so too must one concede that Soviet theoretical writing can be ambiguous and confusing because of Marxist-Leninist dialectics. The Soviets promote disarmament, yet they also emphasize weapons development and accumulation. To them, war is a predictable extension of politics in some instances; in others, not. They portray nuclear weapons as utilizable only in second-strike, defensive, and retaliatory modes; but they at the same time pursue improvements in the accuracy of old missile systems and build new systems unnecessary for retaliatory deterrent capability. Such ambiguities highlight the necessity to be wary of claims of definitive interpretation by Western analysts.

Sokolovskiy, Yepishev, Milovidov and Kozlov, and other writers lead one to believe that military doctrine is indeed important to Soviet planning. If this be true (and it is difficult to prove otherwise, as Vigor points out), then it behooves "men of learning and men of war"—to paraphrase Liddell-Hart's comment quoted earlier—to study these works and others. Those who do so will gain not only a better understanding of Soviet military policy, but also a better appreciation of the complex nature of Soviet-American relations.

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The Search for Law in Soviet Legality

by John S. Reshetar, Jr.

PETER VANNEMAN. *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System*. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1977.

MICHEL LESAGE. *Le droit soviétique* (Soviet Law). Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1975.

PETER H. JUVILER. *Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR*. New York, NY, The Free Press, 1976.

PETER H. SOLOMON, Jr. *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1978.

RICHARD S. WORTMAN. *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness*. Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

THERE IS no shortage of laws and legal codes in the Soviet Union. However, there is a need to probe the fundamental questions of the nature and quality of Soviet law—its origins and sources, whom it does or does not serve and bind, as well as the question of its effectiveness. The legal system of a country tells us much about its traditions and political culture, its understanding of justice, and the kinds of demands made on its citizens.

In the Soviet case, the first major question is: Who are the lawgivers? Observers tend to answer this either in terms of constitutional/juridical documents or in terms of the central political role of the Communist Party. These alternatives pose something of a dilemma in that exaggerated emphasis of either approach may result in a skewed perspective. For example, Peter Vanneman's pioneering study of the USSR Supreme Soviet depicts that institution as the "constitutional centerpiece of the Soviet juridical order" (Chap. 2). Yet, Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution (which, unfortunately, Vanneman did not have at his disposal when writing his monograph) provides for a *political* centerpiece, the Communist Party, which it defines as the "leading and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of all state and public organizations."[1] Thus, there has now been laid an explicit Soviet constitutional basis for having the party oligarchy and its higher apparatus serve as the nucleus of both the judicial system and of the Supreme Soviet. Of course, in practical terms, the Soviet leaders—as experienced dialecticians—have never permitted the juridical order to be isolated from the political system and party.

Although Vanneman's study is marred by careless transliteration, a fragmented approach, prolixity, and the severe handicap of having all its constitutional references to the now outdated 1936 document, it nevertheless offers much hitherto ignored detail concerning the development and functioning of the Supreme Soviet; therefore, it is a welcome addition to the literature on Soviet governmental structure. Vanneman was, understandably, unable to interview deputies or officials of the Supreme Soviet. Nor did he make more than limited use of the available stenographic reports of sessions.[2] He has instead relied heavily on the statements and claims (and in some cases, implicit criticisms) made by Soviet commentators.

Inevitably, there remain many obscure areas in Vanneman's, or anyone's, study of the Supreme Soviet. To what extent do government ministries observe or ignore the three-day limit for replies to questions raised by deputies? What is the precise relationship of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium to the USSR Supreme Court, and how does the Presidium exercise its constitutional power to "interpret USSR laws"? What is the legal competence of the Presidium, and does it in practice usurp the power of the Supreme Soviet's two chambers?

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[1] For a translation of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Nov. 9, 1977, pp. 1–13, which also notes all deletions from and addenda to the original draft.

[2] Supposedly verbatim stenographic reports of Supreme Soviet sessions have been published since 1938. However, Vanneman cites such reports from only eight sessions, nearly all of which met prior to 1955.

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What are we to make, moreover, of Vanneman's intriguing and provocative observation that "there does not appear to be any legal reason why the Supreme Soviet and perhaps even its Presidium could not issue a law or ukaz amending the Constitution and radically changing the Party's legal status" (page 205). "Legal reason"? No. Practical reasons? Yes. Thus, we read in a letter addressed to party General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev by Oksana Meshko, a courageous and outspoken member of the Ukrainian Helsinki watch group and a rehabiitated victim of 10 years of Stalinist repression:

Is it a criminal act to understand the Constitution literally and not allegorically as is done in certain state institutions? There it is said: what is written [in the Constitution] does not concern you, it is composed only in order to have the ikon look attractive.[3]

If Meshko's analogy is valid, the Constitution, describing the formal governmental structure, may be said to have a decorative quality.

This same quality is reflected in the bicameral Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, which serves as a symbol of and exercises the legislative powers of the Supreme Soviet on the more than 350 days of each year when the parent body is not in session. Indeed, the activities of the Presidium seem to range beyond those accorded it as a "representative body." In particular, it serves as a useful conduit through which the party maintains control over the USSR Council of Ministers and the governmental apparatus. Thus, the decision in 1977 to have General Secretary Brezhnev also hold the Presidium chairmanship may well reflect the party oligarchy's concern that the governmental bureaucracy remain subservient to it. It remains to be seen whether this merging of the two positions will establish a precedent for a regime that has generally refused to be bound by precedent—whether legal or otherwise.

Brezhnev's assumption of both posts tends to undermine Vanneman's emphasis on the distinction between state power and political (party) power. Vanneman repeatedly uses the term "burgeoning" to describe the authority of the Presidium and the Supreme Soviet's powers and functions of socialization and monitoring the bureaucracy's actions. He contends that the party's "immunity from the law" might be circumscribed gradually. However, he leaves unanswered the basic question: Will the Supreme Soviet continue to be monopolized by the party as the legitimizing function of the former grows?

Vanneman, it should be acknowledged, does not see the Supreme Soviet evolving into a parliament, for he contends that the Russians have no parliamentary tradition and historically have tended to reject "rigid legalism." He also recognizes limitations in the process of legitimation. For example, he sees subversion of the federal principle and erosion of the rights of union republics in the practice of holding joint sessions of the two chambers and of their commissions—a practice that demeans the role of the Soviet of Nationalities. Moreover, he concedes the significance of the interlocking role of personnel in higher party bodies and in the officialdom of the Supreme Soviet. If there is a contradictory quality in Vanneman's work, it may simply reflect the contradictory (or anomalous?) nature of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet political system.

Potentially, the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet could play a more important role, one that conceivably could lead to a restructuring of the system. Vanneman notes, for example, the growing role of their commissions and subcommissions. Yet one must also recognize that the hard realities of these chambers' ritualistically brief sessions make such a development remote. Vanneman also emphasizes an "embryonic ombudsman function" of the deputy. But how can such a role develop in view of the high rate of turnover among deputies (the overwhelming majority are not elected to a second five-year term)? Only with more secure tenure could deputies effectively monitor the activities of the Soviet bureaucracy. As matters now stand, most deputies come and go, while those deputies who are returned are principally members of the party apparatus and the governmental bureaucracy.

IN FACT, a great deal of the repression that occurs in the Soviet Union emanates from administrative bodies and hence, in practice, is beyond the purview of elected deputies. For example, the purely administrative decisions of oblast officials of the Council for Religious Affairs can close a house of worship. These same officials can simply ignore the signed petitions of citizens requesting permission to reopen or build a church. The legal basis for such decisions is not published, and recourse to the courts or to the plenary session of the local soviet by religious believers is unlikely to obtain redress. Soviet officials can also deny housing or appropriate employment to released political prisoners, thus "punishing" them beyond the terms of formal sentences.

[3] For the text of the letter, dated Sept. 29, 1976, see the Ukrainian-language monthly *Suchasnist'* (Munich), No. 193, January 1977, pp. 98–100.

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Such circumstances highlight the gap between the legal litany of constitution or codes and the meaning given them in administrative and judicial practice. Similarly, Soviet legal textbooks and commentaries emphasize the theoretical as against the applied aspects of law. The same approach unfortunately characterizes the brief popular work *Le droit soviétique* by Michel Lesage, professor at the Sorbonne. This volume, which often reads like a Soviet textbook, *sans* ideological overtones, could safely pass the Moscow censors for official publication in a Russian translation. It is descriptive, in an incomplete sense—for all its references to various Soviet laws, it avoids any judgments or discussion of practical legal problems. The closest approximation to a judgment is the author's assertion that in Soviet legislation, in contrast to that of the West, the "interests of the author are subordinated to those of society" (page 108). Yet Lesage avoids the obvious questions of who actually represents "society" or how its interests are articulated.

In endeavoring to avoid saying anything critical or even controversial about Soviet law, Lesage equates "legality" with the Russian definition of *kontrol'*—verification of the activities of administrative bodies and public organizations. In practice, *kontrol'* means determining whether or not party policy has been faithfully executed by the particular agency or organization such as a court, a ministry, or even the procuracy. Limiting legality to *kontrol'* makes it possible for Lesage to avoid any examination of the ends to which law is directed or to assume that such ends are appropriate. Legality is then equated with governmental policy and "social control." The approach tends to accept the Soviet Union's own positivist approach to "legality," which is not receptive to philosophical debate on the substance and alternative purposes of the law.

Lesage attaches significance to the fact that the number of Soviet legal personnel increased by 38 percent between 1959 and 1970. Yet, as he also demonstrates, the overwhelming majority are in administrative and enterprise law. Lawyers in the state procuracy and judiciary (more than 30,000) outnumber by two to one those in the *advokatura,* i.e., lawyers engaged in legal practice on the behalf of individuals. Moreover, the nature of such legal practice and the many limitations imposed upon defense counsel in Soviet proceedings receive no attention in Lesage's book.

PETER JUVILER's *Revolutionary Law and Order* is a markedly different work, for it clearly relates Soviet law enforcement to political ends. It is undoubtedly the best single volume on the Soviet system of criminal justice and does not omit any important issue. The entire history of Soviet legal and judicial practice passes in concise review, and the author provides a wealth of documentation from the full range of Soviet and non-Soviet literature.

As Juviler points out, crime is alive and well in the Soviet Union. In fact, it is so extensive that official statistics remain a state secret, available only to a limited number of officials. And even those statistics are probably unreliable because of underreporting of crime due to numerous undetected or ignored varieties of "white-collar crime" and theft of state property.

Despite the persistence of crime, criminology is a recent phenomenon in Soviet society. Although millions languished and perished in prison camps, there was no criminology under Stalin. His successors have restored the study of crime but have limited the number of criminologists (Juviler estimated the total at about 150) and have directed them principally to criminal law research rather than research into the sociology of crime. Juviler contends that Soviet policy seeks to combine repression with preventive measures in combating crime. However, Soviet criminology suffers, he contends, from a failure to resolve such ideologically sensitive questions as the extent to which crime is a social phenomenon or has a biological or psychological basis. The latter approach poses a threat to the Soviet view of crime by raising the possibility of a revival of Lombrosianism,[4] with its bio-psychological approach and study of the criminal personality and genetic factors. Thus, Soviet criminology, like the legal profession, must pursue its expertise within political limitations.

The influence of ideology on criminology in the USSR is given little attention in Peter Solomon's *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy.* One is particularly surprised that in Solomon's interviews with more than 40 Soviet crime specialists concerning the important role of certain criminologists in three cases of the 1960's, there is no investigation of their role in the area of penal policy. To be sure, Solomon may have avoided this ideologically sensitive topic out of a certain self-confinement, or his interviewees may have been reticent to discuss penal practices with a foreigner. But the most likely inference is that the Soviet criminologists themselves have been prevented from focusing on

[4] After Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso. His major treatise *L'Uomo delinquente* was partially translated into English as *Criminal Man*, in 1911.

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this important aspect of criminal policy. If they are indeed unaware of what goes on in Soviet prisons, they can hardly be called professional criminologists. Fortunately for at least outside observers, the abundant *samizdat* documentation prepared by political prisoners provides important information on Soviet penal policies and practices and provides a new dimension to our understanding of Soviet legality.[5]

In enlisting the expertise of criminal law specialists to combat the serious crime problem, Soviet policymakers have, Solomon notes, relied on only a relatively narrow circle of Moscow specialists. Leningrad specialists were neglected, and those in the non-Russian republics were ignored. In addition, those who are consulted are establishment specialists employed as legal researchers in the USSR Procuracy and Ministry of the Interior (MVD).

Of course, as Richard Wortman reminds us in his impressive monograph, *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness*, it was establishment specialists who laid the groundwork for the Judicial Reform of 1864. The Reform created a judiciary that had professional solidarity and sought to be independent of the administration. However, although the study of law became popular in the Russian Empire, the Reform was to a large extent aborted because the Russian executive saw itself as the sole source of legality. This particular syndrome of political culture persists to the present day in the Soviet Union's Russian rulers. Presumably, the Soviet leaders would accept Wortman's thesis that an independent judiciary was incompatible with Russian autocracy and a threat to "untrammeled executive power" (p. 285).

Wortman concludes (p. 288) that "legal modernization did not bring an element of stability to Russia" after 1864. One might ask whether the Soviet rulers are not facing a similar dilemma. They have sought the benefits of a degree of "legal modernization," but they have been unwilling to face up to its implications and long-range consequences. Thus, the Soviet oligarchs have refused to accord the legal profession even the limited freedom of activity that it enjoyed under the imperial regime. Nevertheless, the oligarchs and the lawyers—those of the latter who are not mere technicians and *chinovniki* (bureaucrats)—may be on a long-term collision course. In this regard, it is significant that lawyers are to be found among today's Soviet émigrés and dissidents.[6]

THOSE WHO would understand Soviet law need to seek answers to a number of persistent questions: Why is the accused denied access to defense counsel during the pretrial investigation? Why have certain accused persons been held for more than the nine-month maximum period provided for in the procedural code? Why are de facto closed trials held in the cases of political defendants despite the professed commitment to *glasnost'* (publicity)? Why have there been no known acquittals in political trials? Why have professional criminals rather than political prisoners benefited from amnesties? Why are Soviet officials so obsessed with obtaining recantations from political prisoners? Why has the death penalty been imposed on alleged Nazi collaborators more than three decades after the war while the Soviet Procuracy has failed to prosecute thousands of MVD and security police officials and camp officers and guards who perpetrated crimes against innocent prisoners during the "cult of personality"? Why is there no Soviet judicial body of unquestioned integrity to serve as a court empowered to resolve issues of constitutional interpretation? Why is constitutional law a neglected branch of Soviet jurisprudence?

The answers to these important questions lie beyond the artificial limits of legal research and must be sought in the study of Russian political values and experience. It has been all too easy for the Soviet oligarchs to blur the distinction between *zakonnost'* (legality) and *zakonomernost'* (conformity with "law"—whether natural, social, or historical). Their excessive use of the latter term in conjunction with the "laws" of their ideology has undoubtedly resulted in the corruption of "legality." One of the most important questions in the Soviet Union's future is whether or not the Communist Party can continue "to redefine what legality is at any stage, [and] to reorder justice in terms of its changing political needs" (Juviler, p. 177). Whether the challenging appeals to new, more universal sources of legal standards that are surfacing in *samizdat* writings will fare any better than the 1864 reform efforts may not be so important as the evidence they give that a search for a legal consciousness persists.

[5] Also, for an eyewitness account of conditions in the infamous Vladimir Prison, see Greville Wynne, *Contact on Gorky Street*, New York, NY, Atheneum, 1968.

[6] See the case of the Ukrainian jurists Levko Lukianenko, Ivan Kandyba, and Iosyp Borovnytsky in Michael Browne, Ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 31–93. For the case of the Ukrainian lawyer, Ievhen Kramar, see his letter to Communist parties of Western Europe, Canada, and the US, published in *Suchasnist'*, January 1977, pp. 103–06.

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Metropol' as a Social Phenomenon

by Konstantin M. Simis

Metropol'. Moscow, 1979.

IN JANUARY 1979, a group of 23 Soviet writers announced in Moscow that it had published eight typewritten copies of a legal uncensored almanac called *Metropol'*. As a form of publication, the almanac has a long tradition in Russian literature, dating from the time of Aleksandr Pushkin in the early 19th century. It is a collection of writings by various men of letters, published under the same title from time to time but not at regular intervals (which distinguishes it from a journal).

This issue of *Metropol'* contains dozens of poems from the pens of nine poets as well as four essays and articles, but literary prose fills most of its 500 pages. Among the authors are such widely known and officially recognized writers as Andrey Voznesenskiy, Bella Akhmadulina, Andrey Bitov, Fazil' Iskander, Mark Rozovskiy, Leonard Batkin, and Vasiliy Rakitin; two popular "bards" (poets who write the texts and music to their songs as well as perform them), Vladimir Vysotskiy and Yuzef Aleshkovskiy; and some relatively young writers never, or almost never, published before in the USSR.

The contents of the almanac are markedly apolitical in nature. In all 500 pages of the publication, there is no direct criticism of the Soviet regime, there are no attacks on the government's policies, there is, generally speaking, nothing that might create a sensation for the Western news media.

Nevertheless, all major newspapers and agencies with correspondents in Moscow carried detailed reports about this seemingly unsensational event, devoid at first glance of any political interest. Is it fitting that the publication by a group of writers of their strictly artistic works without submitting them to censorship should attract the attention of the world press? Is it also fitting that the nearly simultaneous publication of the uncensored journal *Journey* by a group of Moscow socialists went almost unnoticed, despite the fact that the journal's content is highly political?

This reviewer would submit that the answers to both questions must be affirmative. The appearance of a new dissident political journal in the mainstream of current *samizdat* merely means (regardless of how valuable and interesting its contents may be) that the dissident movement, despite many a pessimistic prediction, continues to exist and to employ forms and methods of activity by now traditional. This is why the *Journey*'s publication did not stir any particular interest in the West or furnish new material for analysis. The publication of *Metropol'*, however, suggests that the process of liberation and disengagement of Soviet society from the internal and external bondage of thought and creativity to which it has been subjected since the 1920's has entered a qualitatively new phase of development and extends far beyond the comparatively narrow circle of dissidents.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL and political climate for the publication of *Metropol'* was prepared by the prior struggle of Soviet society for freedom of thought and for the right to actually use those freedoms stated in Soviet laws. In this sense, *Metropol'* is genetically linked to the movement for the protection of rights, to the free exhibitions of nonconformist painters in the early 1970's, and to *samizdat*.

Through an unrelenting effort over many years, the movement for the protection of rights managed to heighten awareness in Soviet society that the state has the duty to implement its laws and respect the rights of citizens, and that citizens themselves have the right to act in any way not forbidden by law. The action of those who participated in the publication of *Metropol'* represented a concrete outgrowth of this movement, for the publication of the almanac constituted an effort to exercise a right. It was carried out with complete openness and, more important, with complete legality.

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This was by no means the result of chance or accident. The participants in *Metropol'* were particularly concerned that there be nothing in their actions that violated the law or that suggested a conspiracy. In 1977, when the idea of the almanac had already matured, some of the persons involved in the project came to me for legal consultation. (At that time, I was still living in Moscow.) They put before me two questions: (a) Does the publication of a typewritten uncensored collection of apolitical works violate any Soviet law, and can such an action result in any administrative or legal liability for those taking it? (b) Do the authors retain their rights to the works published in this fashion? I replied that, in strictest conformity with existing Soviet legislation, the answer to the first question was negative, and the answer to the second question was positive.

Despite the commonalities mentioned above, however, there is a feature of the publication of *Metropol'* that sets it apart from the movement for the protection of rights. The activity of the participants in the movement for the protection of rights (among whom we find natural and mathematical scientists, teachers, writers, and the like) is in no way connected with their professional activity. They are conducting a political struggle to ensure that every citizen in the country can truly avail himself of the social and political rights proclaimed by law. The publication by a group of professional writers of their works in an uncensored almanac, on the other hand, is a fulfillment of their professional tasks and assignments in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the movement for the protection of rights.

The compilers of the almanac emphasize quite strongly the professional nature of their activity with regard to the publication of the journal. *Metropol'* opens with a manifesto which states: "We deal with literature, and this is where we stand: there is nothing healthier and more entertaining for us than writing and showing what we have written. . . ." Moreover, the frontispiece of the almanac carries a special declaration that defends the authors' rights of the compilers and members.

Thus, the participants in *Metropol'* are engaged not in the *protection* of their rights, but in *implementing* their rights as professionals. This aspect of their activity not only differentiates it from that of the movement for the protection of rights but also marks an obvious step forward for the latter, a sign of its indisputable success.

In order to assess this progress, one has only to look back into the not-too-distant past. No more than 15 years ago, the social and psychological climate in the country was such that Yuliy Daniel and Andrey Sinyavskiy could not even imagine that a writer could ever openly exercise his right to publish his works. With all their courage, with all their inner spiritual independence, they still published their writings under aliases that kept their identities quite secret. And at that time the authorities threw them into camps for these actions, which in no way were in violation of Soviet criminal law.

To be sure, the action of the creators of *Metropol'* is not totally without precedents. During the 1960's and the early 1970's, for example, a small group of Soviet lawyers who took an active part in political proceedings, openly and publicly defended in court hearings the right of Soviet citizens to express opposition to the regime on the basis of the freedom of press, speech, and demonstration proclaimed in the Soviet Constitution of 1936.

In addition, nonconformist painters in 1974 managed to get official permission to exhibit their paintings and drawings. The initial exhibition took place in an abandoned field on the outskirts of Moscow on a rainy autumn day. But detachments of agents of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and militia, disguised as civilians, tore apart this first uncensored exhibition. I myself witnessed the paintings being thrown into bonfires especially lit for that purpose, and participants and viewers of the exhibition being chased away by bulldozers and sprayed with water jets. The battle on the outskirts of Moscow was thus won by the authorities. This, however, was a Pyrrhic victory. The explosion of indignation and contempt all over the world was so strong that it forced the authorities to capitulate. The very next week, the authorities permitted a free exhibition of nonconformist art in Izmaylovskiy Park. This exhibition was followed by other officially tolerated exhibitions appearing on a regular basis in halls that belonged to the Soviet Artists' Union.

Even though *Metropol'* bears many similarities to the free exhibitions of artists and painters, however, there are some things about the almanac that distinguish it from the exhibitions as a social phenomenon. First, it should be noted that all the exhibitions (except the first, in Izmaylovskiy Park) were not totally uncensored. In fact, the paintings had been previously examined and selected by a commission of the Group Committee of Artists. The compilers of *Metropol',* in contrast, did not allow any censorship prior to publication. They did not submit the almanac anywhere for a preliminary examination or check.

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But the main distinction concerns the status of those involved in the enterprises. Among the participants in the free exhibitions, there were virtually no members of the Soviet Artists' Union, and there were no painters who were officially recognized, whose works were regularly shown at official exhibitions, and whose source of livelihood was income from the state. In other words, all the participants in the free exhibitions were beyond the boundaries of the official establishment of Soviet art. When we analyze the makeup of the participants in *Metropol',* on the other hand, the picture is completely different. Of the 23 authors published in the journal, 14 are members of the unions of writers, of cinema workers, and of artists. And the two main artists for the almanac are not only members of the Union of Artists but are also part of the small group of leading and officially recognized theater artists.

When I looked at the list of authors included in *Metropol',* I was struck particularly by the abundance of names of writers who not only are officially recognized in the Soviet Union, but are appreciated and loved by the reading public. The books of these authors, published in editions of tens of thousands of copies, are sold out in bookstores in a few hours time and are then sold on the black market at three to five times their official price. Some of the authors even enjoy the privileges which full recognition by the authorities usually entails: regular visits abroad to "capitalist" countries (which proves that they are highly trusted by the authorities), state prizes, and the like. The publication of *Metropol',* in short, is a rebellion among those fully integrated into the official establishment of Soviet art against the unwritten laws, against total censorship.

IN MANY RESPECTS, the publication of *Metropol'* resembles what in the Soviet Union is known as *samizdat* and *tamizdat,* the publication of material by Soviet authors using their own names without the official authorization of the competent organ of state administration. What *Metropol'* has in common with *samizdat* are the dissemination technique (typescript), the small printing (eight copies), the lack of censorship, and, last but not least, the fact that the publishers are the authors themselves. However, there is one factor, one element, which sets *Metropol'* apart from current *samizdat* publications. This is the complete absence of secretiveness during the preparation of the almanac and at the time of its original dissemination. As one of the contributors to the almanac—Yuzef Aleshkovskiy—said in an interview with Radio Liberty on February 5, 1979, the almanac was prepared and published totally in the open. Unlike *Metropol',* traditional *samizdat* is circulated under conditions of total secrecy, and the publishers, with very few exceptions, do everything possible to remain unknown.

While *Metropol',* like *tamizdat,* has been sent to a publisher abroad without the permission or authorization of the All-Union Administration for the Protection of Authors' Rights, there are some substantial differences here as well. In transmitting their works for publication to publishers abroad, the best known among the *tamizdat* authors decide to break openly with the official establishment—that is, to accept expulsion or to resign from the Soviet Writers' Union, to abandon hope of publication of their works by the Soviet publishing houses, and so forth. To judge from information reaching us from Moscow, the participants in *Metropol'* seem to want to continue their professional activity in the mainstream of official Soviet culture.

ALL THE WORKS published in *Metropol'* are apolitical in the strictest sense of that word. Even if the participants themselves had not proclaimed the apolitical nature of the almanac—as did Yuzef Aleshkovskiy (in the above-mentioned interview) and Vasiliy Aksënov (in an interview given in Moscow to foreign correspondents[1])—that characteristic literally leaps out at the reader. Nevertheless, *Metropol'* and its appearance are phenomena which can be, and indeed must be, evaluated and assessed not only in esthetic terms but also in sociopolitical terms.

Officially, no state censorship exists in the Soviet Union. Under the relevant provision of the law, *Glavlit* (the Main Literary Administration), which in fact performs this censorship, is authorized only to see that the press does not publish information which could or does divulge state secrets. No juridical acts or provisions contain any mention of the censorship function or the powers of the organs of the party apparatus to carry out comprehensive censorship measures.

Nor is there any law in the Soviet Union that would forbid the reproduction or dissemination of literary works on typewriters or reproduction machinery. It is true that in 1978 a special ukaz was issued "concerning administrative responsibility [liability] for the violation of rules concerning the establishment of printing and printing-engraving enterprises, the acquisition, sale, utilization, registration, and storage of reproduction technology."[2] The

[1] See, for example, Kevin Klose's report in *The Washington Post,* Jan. 24, 1979.

[2] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), No. 37, 1978.

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purpose of that ukaz was to prevent use of institutional typewriters and copying devices and machinery for *samizdat* purposes. But even that ukaz does nothing but establish administrative sanctions for the violation of the rules governing storage of reproduction technology; it does not introduce any sanctions for its employment for nonadministrative or nonservice purposes.

So much for official legislation. In actuality, however, any attempt to convey to the reader or the viewer literary works which have not passed through party-state censorship becomes, regardless of the contents of the works and the means used for their reproduction, a grave violation of unwritten rules of behavior. The political significance of the publication of *Metropol'* consists precisely in that the writers and artists involved in producing it have torn through the cobwebs of unwritten rules that have enveloped Soviet society.

Neither the opening manifesto's declaration that *Metropol'* is but an abode for the homeless (that is, for works rejected by state publishing houses) nor the apolitical quality of the published works diminishes the political significance of the almanac's appearance. In a country where the authorities claim a monopolistic control over thought and ideas, any public manifestation of spiritual independence is taken by these authorities as a threat to the foundations of the regime. The publication of *Metropol'* has particular social significance because the violators in this case are writers who are integrated into the official establishment and who assert their right to remain inside the establishment even though they may violate the unwritten laws under which it currently operates.

In essence, the creators of *Metropol'* have attempted to legalize the coexistence in the country of two cultures: the official one and the unofficial one (in the manifesto the latter is described as "outside the rolls"). They have sought to open up for Soviet artists the possibility of working in and for the unofficial culture while still retaining their positions in the official culture.

ALTHOUGH the members of the Secretariat of the Moscow section of the Soviet Writers' Union who have called the creators of *Metropol'* to task have had to recognize that not one single line of the almanac contains anything anti-Soviet, they have charged that the publication of the almanac without any party-state ideological control was a grave ideological error. Furthermore, the head of the Secretariat, Feliks Kuznetsov, without directly naming *Metropol'* but quite obviously referring to it, has defined the publication of the almanac as a "diversion of ideological adversaries."[3]

The overstatement and exaggeration notwithstanding, these assessments accurately reflect the point of view of the authorities. The members of the Moscow Secretariat have in this case come out in defense of one of the principal foundations of the Soviet regime: the total monopolistic control of thought and the thought process.

This is why I cannot agree with Yuzef Aleshkovskiy (although I fully understand the seriousness of the tactical considerations which underlay his remarks), who stated in the interview mentioned earlier that the persecutions of the participants in *Metropol'* are the work not of the authorities but of the management of the writers' organization of Moscow, and that these persecutions are not in the interest of the state. I am well enough acquainted with the management and control mechanism of the Soviet system to be able to assert with complete certainty that the leadership of the writers' organization could not have undertaken disciplinary action without direct guidance, or at least without the direct sanction of the Moscow City Committee or (more likely) the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). My contention is reinforced by events connected with the publication of *Metropol'*. To celebrate the launching of the almanac, its creators tried to organize a reception at the Ritm restaurant, to which they invited representatives of the artistic and scientific intelligentsia. The Secretariat of the Moscow section of the Writers' Union asked the organizers with exceptional insistence to cancel the reception. Indeed, it was considered so important to keep this reception from taking place that two of the leading producers of the Soviet Union—Oleg Yefremov, director of the Moscow Artistic Theater, and Yuriy Lyubimov, director of the Theater on the Taganka—were summoned to the Ministry of Culture of the USSR and told to pass up their invitations to attend. And on the very day of the reception the Ritm restaurant was closed "for sanitary reasons."

There is no question that it would have been impossible for the Moscow writers' organization alone to bring about these coordinated actions. In fact, such coordination could have been effected only on instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (the Ministry of Culture of the USSR is not subordinated to the Moscow Committee) or the KGB organs (whose directions and instructions are followed by all Soviet bodies, regardless of

[3] *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 9, 1979, p. 2.

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their positions in the hierarchy of the state). This circumstance is incontestable proof that the Secretariat of the writers' organization of Moscow acted upon orders from one or the other of these organs of authority.

Nor can I agree with the description by Lev Kopelev, whom I have known for a long time and whom I respect very highly, of the persecutions of the creators of *Metropol'* as "shades of Stalinism."[4] In my view, persecution for actions similar to the publication of *Metropol'* was not merely characteristic of the period of Stalinism, but has been typical of the Soviet regime in all phases of its existence. Of course, the exercise of total and monopolistic control over thought and the thought process has gone through various phases: origins and development (the 1920's); the apogee (from the 1930's until 1956); and, finally, the present phase—the phase of corrosion and stagnation that began with the 20th Congress of the CPSU, at which then First Secretary of the party Nikita Khrushchev exposed what he called the "personality cult." However, the changes that have occurred in the phenomenon of thought control during the transition from one phase to another (changes in the degree of totality, the degree of rigidity, the form of persecution of the manifestations of spiritual independence, and so on) are evidence not of qualitative changes in the regime itself, but of the fact that the regime, while maintaining its initial characteristics (totalitarian rule), modifies its behavior and adjusts to altering external circumstances. The reaction of the Soviet authorities to the publication of *Metropol'* fully corroborates this point of view.

In accordance with its nature, the Soviet regime does not want to admit the existence of uncontrolled art; therefore, it cannot but undertake steps to suppress a group of writers endeavoring to exercise their right to freedom of creativity. To be sure, the regime, in view of the prevailing external circumstances (the need for intensive economic, scientific, and technical relations with the developed countries of the West, the necessity to take into account the interests of the international Communist movement, the existence of vitally important geopolitical conflicts with China, and so on) cannot react to the publication of *Metropol'* in the same fashion that it would have reacted 30 years ago (by arrests and sentences to labor camps) or even five years ago (with bulldozers and bonfires). Still, the Soviet regime cannot afford to give up persecution altogether, for *Metropol'* is dangerous to the regime not only on its own merits but also as a precedent, as the embodiment of another conquered bridgehead of free thought from which philosophers, historians, sociologists, theater producers, composers, etc., may tomorrow launch an offensive against the monopoly of state control over thought and the thought process.

It is precisely this collision between the desire to strangle the germs of freedom of thought and press, on the one hand, and the need to consider external circumstances, on the other, that explains why the measures of persecution against the participants in the production of *Metropol'*, for all their blatant repressiveness, have thus far turned out to be insufficient and inconsequential. From the press, from the Aleshkovskiy interview, and from information that has reached me privately from Moscow, it is clear that Soviet authorities are taking steps to cut off the sources of income of the authors of *Metropol'*. The screening of motion pictures with scripts by Vasiliy Aksënov and Andrey Bitov has been forbidden, and the latter has been expelled from the Institute of Literature of the Soviet Writers' Union, where he taught. The typeset plates of a book in which the works of some of the participants in the almanac were to have appeared have been destroyed. New writings by the contributors to *Metropol'* are not being published, and old ones are not being given to readers in libraries.

Nonetheless, the response of Soviet authorities has been limited in nature. At the meeting of the Secretariat of the writers' organization of Moscow, according to Aleshkovskiy, the authors of *Metropol'* were subjected to a flood of insults and accusations, but they were not threatened with expulsion from the Writers' Union, although a few months later a resolution adopted prior to the publication of *Metropol'* to admit two of the almanac's contributors (Viktor Yerofeyev and Yevgeniy Popov) into the Union was "revised." Only a few years ago, such renowned and well-established writers as Vladimir Voynovich, Aleksandr Galich, and Vladimir Kornilov were summarily expelled from the Union when they did not toe the official line. Moreover, the authorities did not even resort to the mass media to deal a blow to the authors of *Metropol'* by a devastating review—a tactic they had employed many times in the past to maintain their control. Yuzef Aleshkovskiy reports that an article entitled "Banality" and scheduled for publication in *Literaturnaya gazeta* was suppressed at the last moment.

It is difficult to say what further repressive action the authorities might take, for we do not have enough evidence at present to

[4] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 24, 1979.

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draw any reliable conclusions about how far the authorities are prepared to go in the persecution of the creators of *Metropol'*, and how steadfast the latter will be. Sources in Moscow inform me: "They [the authorities] get them with money, with the ruble—everything has been thrown out from everywhere. This, of course, is particularly hard on those who are unknown, not protected by anything." It is also reported that the authors are called, one by one, to the Writers' Union, where they are promised full pardon and mass publication of their writings if they make a public apology. But according to information that has reached me, as of May 1979 not one of the 23 authors published in *Metropol'* had apologized or had split from the group. Sources in Moscow write: "They all hang together in solidarity, and none of them loses his faith." Moreover, according to the same sources, many people in their entourage are ready to support them, and 13 writers have declared themselves willing to join the almanac and publish works in it.

IF WE extrapolate from the facts known to us about the evolution of Soviet society over the past quarter of a century, we can predict with a fair amount of certainty that the process of establishment and expansion of the unofficial culture will continue in the Soviet Union. Scores of new groups of artistic and scientific intelligentsia, fired by the desire for freedom of self-expression, probably will dare to violate the unwritten prohibitions and at the same time will strive to maintain their positions in the official culture, in the official establishment. There is also reason to believe that as this process expands to larger and wider strata, the authorities will be forced to reconcile themselves to some extent to the simultaneous and parallel activity of the same persons in both cultures.

Today, of course, it is exceedingly difficult to foresee how far this process may go, for there is great uncertainty about the only factor which can slow down or accelerate the process—namely, the degree to which the authorities will institute repressive measures in response to it. Depending on how the change of personnel in the governing party-state apparatus proceeds, depending on domestic economic circumstances and on the international situation, these measures could prove more or less stringent, more or less consequential. However, we can predict with the utmost confidence: the Soviet regime will not fully abandon attempts to suppress any manifestation of independent thought, independent art.

THE COMPILERS of *Metropol'* have devised as a poetic epigraph to the almanac a poem by Vladimir Vysotskiy about a poet who wants to lie flat on the bottom of the ocean like a submarine, lie there motionless and unheard by anybody

"So that nobody
Could find our bearings!"

It seems to me that it might have been better had they selected as an epigraph to the almanac another poem from the work of the same poet. This is about the wolf who dared jump across the line of red flags with which hunters usually stake out the pack during a hunt. With his mother's milk, the pup sucks in an unwritten law:

"You may not go beyond the flags."

But, writes the poet:

"I have abandoned obedience and
Have gone beyond the flags—
The thirst for life was stronger."

The thirst for free creativity, the thirst for self-expression of those writers who have taken part in the compilation of *Metropol'* has turned out to be stronger than the fear of unwritten prohibitions. They have jumped beyond the flags.

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Soviet Nationality Problems: Analytic Approaches

by Brian D. Silver

ZEV KATZ et al., Eds. *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*. New York, NY, Free Press, 1975.

RALPH S. CLEM, Ed. *The Soviet West: Interplay between Nationality and Social Organization*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

ROBERT A. LEWIS et al. *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897–1970*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

EDWARD A. ALLWORTH, Ed. *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

SYMPTOMATIC of the state of Western studies of Soviet nationalities is the absence of a widely accepted single monograph devoted to Soviet nationalities policy as a whole. Furthermore, Western textbooks on Soviet politics often discuss the nationalities only briefly, typically failing to devote as much as a single chapter to them. Representative of this neglect is Jerry F. Hough's recent revision of Merle Fainsod's classic *How Russia Is Ruled,* which despite its new title, *How The Soviet Union Is Governed,*[1] scarcely conveys a sense of the multinational character of the Soviet system.

To be sure, several good volumes have appeared on the politics of particular nationality groups or regions, especially for certain periods. (But no comprehensive treatments have been published of the politics of such important regions as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan, Georgia, and the Tatarskaya ASSR, among others.) Moreover, there has in the last few years been an enormous surge of scholarly production on Soviet nationalities, especially in journal articles and in multi-authored edited works. The importance of the ethnic components of the dissident movement, particularly among Ukrainians, Baltic groups, Crimean Tatars, and Jews, has also evoked a great deal of journalistic and scholarly attention. While most of this recent writing on the nationalities has contributed to our understanding of the dimensions of the nationality problem in the USSR, its primary role has been to sharpen our awareness that there is indeed a problem. Far from having "solved" the nationalities question, Soviet leaders must consider it as among the most salient issues on the political agenda.

The lack of a comprehensive monograph or of a consistent emphasis on nationality problems in textbooks on Soviet politics may reflect the special difficulties for the individual scholar of conducting original research on this complex subject, especially because so much important information appears in the non-Russian languages. But as is revealed by the excellent summaries of the backgrounds and recent developments of large Soviet nationalities in the *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (hereafter referred to as *Handbook*), we know a lot about the histories of the main nationalities, the impact of Soviet nationalities policy, current problems in ethnic relations, and the strengths and weaknesses of ethnic attachments. The essays illustrate, too, that experts on particular groups can uncover in local languages important information not available in Russian. Originally prepared as a reference manual for the US Information Agency (now the US International Communication Agency), the *Handbook* should not only fulfill that function well, but is the best single English-language reference work on the chief Soviet nationalities.

Like most such collective efforts, however, the *Handbook* fails to

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[1] Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979.

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provide a coherent framework for understanding the differences in the situations and prospects of the nationalities. For example, while the essays all discuss factors that shape the national attitudes of particular nationalities—such as history, language, religion, and competition with Russians—the separate essays cannot assess the relative importance of the various factors. Consider, for example, the role of immigration of Russians in determining the vitality of the indigenous nationality of a republic. From the individual essays in the *Handbook,* as well as several essays in Ralph Clem's *The Soviet West,* we might expect the assimilation of members of the local nationality to be affected not only by immigration of Russians but also by such factors as the group's religious heritage and literary tradition. But to discern how susceptible various groups may be to assimilation (i.e., to determine the relative effects of interethnic group contacts, religious heritage, and strength of the literary tradition), we would need to conduct carefully controlled, comparative studies or "experiments," such as the recent one by Roman Szporluk for the Ukraine and Belorussia.[2]

In designing such experiments, one should not ignore the experiences of even the smallest nationalities. It is difficult to agree with Richard Pipes' statement that most Soviet ethnic groups "are so small as to be of interest primarily to the anthropologist, linguist, and demographer" (*Handbook,* p. 2). In fact, if we were to acknowledge the abilities of some of the smallest ethnic groups to survive under extraordinarily difficult conditions brought on by modernization and by pressures to assimilate, we would not be very surprised by the abilities of the largest groups to devise survival strategies. Moreover, were we to identify *which* of the smaller groups have done best in preserving distinctive identities—namely, the Muslim nationalities—we would be better prepared to recognize the decisiveness of religion (and related customs) as a factor fostering ethnic distinctiveness. To determine the relative importance of factors such as population size, religion, literary tradition, or history to the maintenance of national identities, then, one must go beyond the study of larger groups and beyond case studies of particular nationalities (unless such case studies are placed carefully within a comparative analytic framework), and perhaps even beyond the boundaries of the USSR.

ALTHOUGH we lack a comprehensive survey of Soviet nationalities policies and problems, a number of scholars have tried to summarize the essence of Soviet policies. Most such efforts to summarize have adopted what may be termed an "adversary model" of nationalities policy, whereby the interests of the Russians or of central Communist Party leaders are opposed to the interests of non-Russian or regional populations. Party leaders (Russians) are said variously to seek to russify, to integrate, to blend, to denationalize, to exploit economically, or to suppress the genuine national feelings of the non-Russian nationalities in order to maximize dictatorial control by the party, to benefit the dominant Russian nationality, or to remold national cultures to fit the standardized shape of Soviet society; non-Russian nationalities are said to resist assimilation, exploitation, denationalization, russification, and the denial of political and cultural autonomy. Thus, the title of *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States* implies an effort by subject nationalities to resist pressures toward assimilation and loss of autonomy. Nationalities, the book contends, have devised "flexible defenses" against loss of group identity.

There is certainly nothing wrong with treating nationality relations as adversary in nature, for they are in fact adversary in many important respects, especially as they concern the desire of non-Russian groups for political and cultural autonomy. But the emphasis given to this dimension, and in particular to the immediate implications of current events, has led to a neglect of the nonadversary aspects of nationality relations. Recent writings have displayed a bias of emphasis, if not of interpretation.

In part, this situation reflects the disciplinary backgrounds of those who have worked on the subject. The study of Soviet nationalities has been dominated by political scientists and historians, who concentrate on political rights and on political relations among the nationalities. Even the great fascination in the West with national dissent among cultural and literary groups has focused much more on the regime's responses to dissent than on the development of culture, language, and literature per se. Only a few sociologists, geographers, and demographers, who ought to have a lot to say about changes in non-Russian societies and languages, have devoted much attention to Soviet nationalities—even those small nationalities in which "anthropologists, linguists, and demographers" are supposed to take special interest.

By assuming that the most significant aspect of Soviet ethnic relations is what the Russians are

[2] Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1979, pp. 76–98.

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doing to the non-Russians and what the non-Russians are doing in response, scholars have tended to underestimate the importance of several factors. These include: (a) the existence of certain shared values among peoples of the USSR, above all the commitment to economic development; (b) the role of the federal system as a conflict-reducing device; (c) the lack of cohesion and certainty of purpose among top-level makers of nationalities policy; and (d) the existence in national areas of autonomous processes of social change that are beyond centralized planning or control.

The virtually universal commitment to industrialization and to economic development more generally, while it does not by any means eliminate competition among groups for resources or for the benefits of development (Pipes is probably correct in stating that competition for resources and services is the most important single element that keeps ethnic feelings alive), at least assures that nationalities have a common interest in mass public education, the mechanization of agriculture, the automation of production, and so forth. If one does not give exclusive attention to the desire of nationalities for complete economic and political autarky, one can also recognize in principle (though less in fact) the potential mutual benefits of regional economic differentiation and specialization in the USSR.

It has become a cliché in writings about Soviet nationalities to observe that the regime's commitment to industrialization and to mass education in the native language, coupled with the delimitation of borders for national republics, has reinforced national consciousness. Some scholars have gone on to argue that the demarcation of borders for Soviet nationality-language groups (and the provision to them of a limited form of cultural autonomy) has sown the seeds of eventual destruction of the Soviet empire. That is, social mobilization of a population newly aware of its distinctive national heritage and strongly attached to the integral territory of the group will make central control of the periphery more difficult as time goes on. But by emphasizing that the Soviet regime has denied true autonomy to nationalities in the federal system—even if we sometimes note that the sham autonomy of formal federalism is important to the survival of nationalities — we often neglect to consider that the federal structure may also help to ameliorate some sources of intergroup conflict. While few would claim that federalism is a decisive element in cementing Soviet nationalities together, the federal structure does provide a legitimate forum for a constrained form of bargaining by regional elites for their shares of national resources and investments. One need not view such bargaining as a strictly zero-sum competition between center and periphery (as one is tempted to do if one views autonomy as the chief and indivisible goal of national leaders). Rather, the bargaining, because of certain shared commitments to development in general, is often over strategies for achieving common goals or increasing long-term economic growth.

It is likewise worth underscoring that the 1977 Soviet Constitution provides no hint of the imminent dismantling of the federal structure. This may well be an acknowledgment by party leaders that (in the words of a Soviet historian) the elimination of national borders would give rise to a "trauma to national feelings" and would do great damage to nationality relations.[3] Thus, even though the federal structure may reinforce national identities, it may also be a framework for reducing tensions or for establishing a context for debate over development strategies.

A further drawback to the adversary model of nationality relations is that it tends to beg certain questions. Specifically, it assumes that Soviet leaders have a unified set of goals that comprise a "nationality policy," and that most important changes in the social structures, cultures, and economies of the non-Russian areas are the result of policies imposed by the central authorities. To assume that there is a coherent nationality policy is easy because Soviet authorities so often claim to have one. One need only read the dozens of Soviet journal articles, pamphlets, and books on nationality relations published each year to discern the major aspects of the party line and even to find open evidence of the russification-ist, integrationist, antireligious emphasis of the leaders. But in fact we know little about how the party line on nationalities has been shaped in recent years. We simply read the official line as if there were a consensus among the leadership (excepting, of course, such disgraced "nationalists" as Pëtr Shelest). In addition, we have only minimal knowledge of the "politics" of nationalities policy. To be sure, recent research has uncovered important information about the selection of political leaders in the nationality areas, and scholars have investigated aspects of nationalities policy in some detail. Yet many key questions remain unexplored, to say nothing of being answered. Who, for instance, are the experts who advise in the for-

[3] T. Yu. Burmistrova, *Teoriya sotsialisticheskoy natsii* (A Theory of the Socialist Nation), Leningrad, 1970, p. 40.

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mulation of official policy? What role do representatives of the nationalities themselves play in the formulation of nationalities policy and of other policies that directly affect the national regions? How much flexibility is there in implementing central decisions?

Similarly, we may exaggerate the importance of nationalities policy in producing changes in the non-Russian regions, simply because party documents have articulated a comprehensive set of goals for change: to eliminate backward customs, to eradicate alien (feudal and bourgeois) ideologies, to promote the drawing-together of nationalities, to spread the use of Russian as a *lingua franca,* and so forth. At the same time, we tend to underestimate the amount of autonomous activity and change that occurs in the nationality regions. Recent recognition of the importance of the "second economy" of legal and illegal "non-socialized" exchange in the USSR should alert us to the need to identify noneconomic areas of autonomous action or exchange in Soviet society.

A GREAT virtue of the book by Robert A. Lewis et al. is that it proceeds from the perspective that many changes in the populations of the national areas are common to all countries undergoing modernization. The breakdown of extended families, liberation of women from traditional family roles, declines in mortality and fertility, increases in migration, and so forth, are depicted as virtually inevitable concomitants of economic development. While perhaps hastened by the efforts of economic planners and would-be social engineers, the changes that ultimately occur, according to Lewis and his coauthors, fit universal patterns of population change. Moreover, many of these changes are virtually immune to conscious manipulation. Witness the regime's inability to control the growth of major cities, the failure of its policies to induce migration to Siberia, and the undesirably sharp decline, from its viewpoint, in the fertility of many of the European nationalities.

There is an important difference in emphasis between the approach of Lewis et al. and that of scholars who focus on the survival strategies of nationalities. The latter too often assume that the central regime's efforts to induce change in the local areas are dictated by a coherent plan of action and are purposeful, direct attacks on national distinctiveness; and that failure of the local nationalities to comply with central designs results from a conscious (and, in effect, collective) decision to resist those plans. From this standpoint, the reactions by local nationalities are flexible, clever, often guileful. If nationalities cannot have political autonomy, they can circulate their views in *samizdat,* or they can speak through poems or songs that ridicule the Russian overlords in the peculiar aesopian language of national dissent. While this state of affairs does not secure them political independence, it at least nurtures an independence of spirit and the maintenance of a distinctive ethnic ideology. But scholars such as Lewis et al. do not politicize the processes of change or of resistance to central plans. Rather, individuals are said to make rational calculations of the costs and benefits of migrating, having children, learning Russian, and so on. Furthermore, they are deemed to make these calculations without ethnocentric bias. There is not, for example, one logic for Christians and another for Muslims.

The chief value of the latter approach is that it alerts us to the similarities betwen important population trends in the USSR and those in the rest of the world, and it reminds us not to exaggerate the regime's ability to manipulate large populations (especially in the absence of widespread use of terror or military force). Moreover, if used properly, such an approach can establish a baseline for assessing the degree to which the regime can in fact manipulate the population by using material and moral incentives.

The principal risk of attempting to apply universal experience to the Soviet (or any other) context is that we may try to explain too much in this fashion. In the introduction of their book, Lewis et al. are careful to note that they do not expect to explain everything in terms of general principles: "What we do claim, however, is that the most reasonable approach is first to test general demographic concepts in the USSR to determine if, or to what extent, they explain the processes under investigation, and then to examine conditions specific to the USSR to explain further these processes" (p. xxxi).

For much of their very informative summary of the processes of urbanization, population growth, and migration, the authors adhere to this procedure. Particularly in their discussion of what appears to be an anomalous persistence of high fertility among Central Asian Muslim nationalities and an unexpectedly low fertility among many of the Western nationalities (Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, and Estonians), the authors recognize the need to develop special explanations for the deviant patterns (though they do not develop the explanations in this volume). Presumably, the universal model of the "demographic transition" from high to low fertility and mortality will have to be dis-

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aggregated into component factors that affect these outcomes. For example, since birthrates are a function of the rate of marriage and the rate of marital fertility (that is, the number of children borne by married women per year), one must ultimately account for differences in rates of marriage (and in duration of marriages—or the incidence of early marriage) and in attitudes toward and methods of fertility control in order to explain differences in birthrates. Part of the explanation for the anomalous results is likely to rest on differences in cultural values of various nationalities.

But in a portion of the book that has already evoked a great deal of discussion and controversy, Lewis et al. appear to deviate from their earlier stricture and to insist boldly, in the face of contrary evidence, that universal theories of migration should apply to all Soviet ethnic groups. Briefly, the authors note that the combination of the increasing overpopulation of Central Asia, particularly in the rural areas, and the strong probability of serious impending declines in the standards of living for Central Asians will compel substantial numbers of Central Asians to migrate to cities in Central Asia and in the Russian Republic. A key assumption in this part of the analysis is that rural Central Asians are rationally calculating "utility maximizers" who, when the squeeze on resources comes, will decide to migrate rather than to suffer serious declines in their standards of living:

. . . when a growing population begins to exceed its economic density in any geographic area, the options for that population are economic development, birth control, further declines in the standard of living, or out-migration. . . . In Central Asia, . . . economic development sufficient to absorb the growing populations is not feasible, at least in the long run, and birth control in traditional rural areas is very difficult, and not an immediate solution because of the age distribution and the fact that the workers for the next two decades have already been born. It is safe to say that no one likes a declining standard of life. . . . As to being culturally rooted to the land for centuries, when the economic crunch occurs, this makes little difference. (p. 377)

One might question some of the data upon which Lewis et al. based their calculations of (a) the capacity of the local economy to absorb excess indigenous manpower, (b) the willingness of the regime to raise investments or to subsidize a stable or growing standard of living in Central Asia, and (c) the material incentives or other inducements that the regime might establish to draw the Central Asian surplus population into Russia.[4] Nevertheless, the basic logic of the argument in the above quotation cannot be questioned.

In addition, there is certainly nothing wrong with the argument if it is regarded as a hypothesis. Because it is a *predictive* hypothesis, it can be tested with the passage of time. Just how long the test will require depends, of course, on the time frame within which the massive outmigration of Central Asians is expected to occur. The authors refer to this happening "in the next few decades" (p. 354). But presumably one should expect to see the beginning of this outmigration in the 1980's, since the anticipated substantial reductions in standards of living are supposed to have begun by then. Thus, if one assumes agreement on what constitutes "significant" outmigration, Lewis et al. will be proved right or wrong by the year 1990, or perhaps the year 2000.

Most troublesome about the projections is neither the logic of the argument nor the factual basis of the calculations, but rather the inconsistency between these calculations and the authors' earlier cautious assessment of the reasons for differential fertility levels. In discussing fertility, the authors acknowledge unexpected results. Universal theory does not readily account for all the variations. Presumably some elements of national cultures help to explain the deviations. In predicting outmigration of Central Asians, however, Lewis et al. hold that when the pressure is on, a Central Asian behaves like *homo economicus* and migrates. What was initially treated as a working hypothesis becomes a law of behavior: "In summation, our argument is based on our working hypothesis that people throughout the world tend to react in the same manner to the forces that affect their demographic behavior, regardless of the political systems under which they live" (p. 380).

To make the arguments regarding these two types of demographic behavior consistent, one might propose that migration is subject to universal laws, while fertility is not. It is conceivable, of course, that elements of Central Asian culture may play a strong role in regulating (encouraging) fertility but not in

[4] These and related issues have already been ably discussed in this journal, so I shall not deal with them in detail here. See Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1979, pp. 1–13. For a thoroughgoing and penetrating analysis of the evidence on migration, see Murray Feshbach, "Prospects for Outmigration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, forthcoming in 1979.

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regulating migration. But the flow of Central Asians to Russia in recent decades has never exceeded a trickle. Therefore, any simple projection based on past trends would suggest little if any increase over time in this flow, and any form of multifactor statistical estimation of migration in the USSR would have to put in a strong negative "adjustment" for the Central Asians. One strongly suspects that, like certain customs related to family life, migration from Central Asia to a hostile Russian environment is still greatly affected by Muslim ethnic values.

It is hardly a mark against general theory that group behavior often confounds our expectations; rather, it should be the role of such theory to help to clarify and to articulate our expectations and to identify such deviations. Having found the deviations, however, we then must face the task of explaining them. A serious risk in relying too heavily on universal theories to explain the behavior of Soviet nationalities is that one may underestimate the relevance of special circumstances of the Soviet context. These special circumstances consist not only in the experiences and attitudes of the ethnic groups but also in the nature of the regime and the policies it may pursue. Unfortunately, in describing the trends in population growth, assimilation, urbanization, and migration, Lewis et al. seldom consider the possible role of *policies* in producing differences in regional economic development, incentives to assimilate, or the attractiveness of urban life. While one might argue in principle that it is easy to exaggerate the effects of laws and policies on demographic behavior, one should also make some effort to examine whether in fact policies have made any difference. Having defined the broad trends in demographic behavior, and having exhausted the explanatory power of general theories of modernization, one should look elsewhere to account for the behavior that remains unexplained.

Such an approach, it should be underscored in conclusion, is essential for all the controlled experiments with data that are so much needed in the study of Soviet nationalities. Such controlled experiments should follow what Sidney Verba defined many years ago as a "disciplined configurative approach" to comparative research.[5] In our effort to explain the actions of Soviet nationalities, we must avoid two opposing tendencies. We must neither exaggerate the uniqueness of the configuration of events and circumstances that we believe accounts for the behavior of particular groups nor exaggerate the lawlike obedience of particular groups to universal norms of behavior. Instead, we need to recognize that much of the behavior of particular groups may follow more general patterns, but also be alert to how and why the peculiarities of each case may confound our initial expectations based on these patterns.

[5] Sidney Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1967, p. 114.

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